Russia Profile
www.russiaprofile.org
October 3, 2007
The Anti-Elite
New Government Leaders Come from Outside the System
Comment by Georgy Bovt
Georgy Bovt is a Moscow-based political analyst.
Although the recent government reshuffle was unexpected, the few changes in the cabinet, like many of President Vladimir Putin's appointments, are rather predictable in their own way. At least they all have one trait in common: all of these appointments were not only a surprise to the political community, but they were made in spite of this political community. These appointments are anti-elite per se; they reflect, above all, Putin's deep disappointment in the country's current political elite in general and in its ruling clique in particular. They also reflect his utmost unwillingness not only to consult with this elite on the matter of staff appointments, for example, but even to reckon with it and to display any signs of attention and respect for it.
It is not only a question of appointing Viktor Zubkov, whom everyone was ready to see off to an "honorable retirement" in the Federation Council, as prime minister. Earlier, Alexander Bastrykin was just as secretly appointed as head of the newly-formed Investigation Committee. Even though this committee is part of the Prosecutor General's office, it enjoys a great deal of autonomy; practically, it is subordinated directly to the President. The idea of its creation seems to have been founded on the dream of finding around 18,000 absolutely honest, uncorrupted detectives, who would help cleanse the country of corruption. This means, again, finding people who are outside of the rotten system, even though they may formally belong to some of this system's units. Before Bastrykin, another appointment was made in this vein: Vladimir Churov became the chairman of the Central Election Commission.
Appointing these men, and Zubkov in particular, reveals that there is one thing of utmost importance to Putin - that they not be involved in any of the present elite groups. The fact that Zubkov is not known to be part of any presently active cliques or deals is crucial because deep down, Putin really doesn't trust anyone who is part of the competition for contracts and projects. He wants to trust people like Zubkov who seems to be, if not absolutely from outside the system, then at least from the system's periphery.
Why does Putin have this profound distrust in his closest circle and in the presently active and ruling political elite in general? If Putin was worried only about his own political survival and his own safety after the end of his term in 2008, he could choose to rely on one of his closest friends on Sergei Ivanov, for example, or another person who is already deep inside the system and, on account of belonging to it, will continue to guarantee its stability. However, for some reason Vladimir Putin needs to break the stereotype; for some reason he needs to act in the most unpredictable manner.
I am convinced that he is acting this way only because of his profound disappointment in the way the present system is functioning and in what the current political elite represents. The general belief is that Putin doesn't trust anyone. But is this lack of trust so strong that he should deny his closest circle and the political community in general any role in preparing a leader for the next political cycle? It is said that in private settings Putin also frequently expresses fear that a certain project might not be successful because "everything will be stolen." He doesn't have any illusions in this area either. If that really is the case, Zubkov's appointment becomes even more understandable, along with Putin's train of thought, which reaches beyond the horizon of the presidential election of 2008. There may be another surprise awaiting us beyond that horizon. And then the "anti-elite" presidential candidate might be either the 66-year-old Zubkov, or another person who even better complies with these "anti-elite requirements."
In this case, however, all the previous attempts to explain Putin's political manners by his attempt to preserve the present status quo and the present distribution of power and control over the country's financial flows can at least be doubted. Because by nominating such "outsiders" for such influential positions, he does not in any way help preserve the status quo. On the contrary, he creates a potential conflict between his innocent outsider protégé and the broad coalition of "state oligarchs." This coalition formed over the last eight years as a result of systematic attacks of government-corporations, which are headed by specific government officials practically on all economic fronts.
And what is the future of Vladimir Putin? To what extent will his alienation from the reigning political elite prevent him from continuing to influence the country's fate? Right now he holds the most important post in the country; he controls hundreds of the most powerful instruments of influence, persuasion, and, if necessary, suppression of rebels and apostates. But what will happen when he no longer has control? He will not have the majority of these instruments, because due to extreme centralization of power in Russia, only one person has this power in all its entirety, and that person is the president. What if, after 2008, certain representatives of the reigning elite remember their hurt feelings and fears, and remember the fact that they were not asked for their opinions? This certainly is something to consider, especially since Vladimir Putin himself seems to have made it clear to everyone that after the end of his term he will hardly settle for being just one of the members of Russia's political community. This in itself already carries an element of opposition, and thus of some potential conflict. And in such a conflict, someone will certainly be on his side, and someone which seems impossible today will be against him.