Russia Profile
www.russiaprofile.org
June 22, 2007
Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel:
Succession Watch Speculation
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
Contributors: Stephen Blank, Nikolas Gvosdev, Eugene Kolesnikov, Andrei Lebedev, Andrei Liakhov, Alexander Rahr
This week, Igor Shuvalov, Russia's G8 sherpa and an aide to President Vladimir Putin suggested in a speech in Washington that Putin is likely to surprise Russia and the world by promoting a yet-unknown candidate to succeed him as Russia's third president.
Shuvalov conceded that the front runners in the presidential race, which is about to be launched in earnest, are the two first deputy prime ministers, Sergei Ivanov and Dmitry Medvedev, both of whom, according to Shuvalov, could be elected President. But Shuvalov also made it clear that Putin entertains the notion of a surprise candidate, whom he would endorse personally at the last moment.
Shuvalov's comments, made in a Western capital for a Western audience, launched a new wave of speculation as to who the surprise candidate might be. Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Naryshkin, Russian Railways Chairman Vladimir Yakunin and St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Matviyenko were among those most often mentioned by Russian analysts.
Meanwhile, Ivanov put on a truly presidential show at the recent St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, where he delivered an agenda-setting speech that could serve as an economic program for his presidency as he set a goal of making Russia one of the world's top five countries in terms of GDP volume and GDP per capita by 2020.
Ivanov might be an early front runner in the presidential race, but Putin has suddenly begun indicating that he might be interested in coming back to the Kremlin in 2012. For the first time during his presidency, he admitted at the G8 summit in Germany that he might be entertaining the idea. Earlier, he also for the first time showed interest in changing the constitution to extend the current four-year presidential term to five or even seven years while keeping the two-term limit intact.
Thus, Putin seems to be interested in running the country for another ten to fourteen years after a brief rest period. In this case, he might want a caretaker president to succeed him who would hand the presidency back to Putin after only one term. Neither Ivanov nor Medvedev seem willing to play this kind of role. Both men are serious and appear to have their own visions of Russia's future. They do not fit the bill of someone fronting for Putin for four years and, therefore, Putin may indeed need someone else. Another argument for a third candidate might be that the Kremlin is trying to avoid a polarizing, two-candidate race and would seek to throw all of its support behind the only candidate that matters.
Is this scenario feasible given Russia's history and political culture? Why would Putin want to try to return to the Kremlin in 2012? Is it just personal ambition, or does he really feel he has a mission to lead Russia to a new prominent role in the world? How would the Russian public react to such a prospect? How would the West react to a caretaker president who lets Putin call the shots from behind the scenes? What would such a scenario tell us about the state of Russia's democracy?
Alexander Rahr, Director of Russian Programs, German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin
Vladimir Putin will leave office in May 2008. He may indeed want to return to the presidency in 2012 and the Russian constitution allows such a comeback. Such a political return would be very unusual in history, but Russia is a special country. Of course, Putin wants to continue with the reforms that he could not accomplish by 2008. In order to return to the Kremlin, Putin needs two things: A loyal supporter who would play the role of a caretaker president until 2012, and a position from which he could continue to influence politics in the next four years. Dmitri Medvedev could become such a provisional presidential figure.
Sergei Ivanov's ambitions are too strong to play such a role. The best person to act as Putin-II is, however, Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov. He will certainly allow Putin to return to the top office as soon as possible. He may even be willing to sacrifice power even earlier than 2012. Fradkov is said to be in poor health, which may be another argument for Kremlin strategists to envision him stepping in Putin's shoes in May 2008 - for a limited period of time.
Fradkov's candidacy would satisfy the conflicting power groups of Igor Sechin and Vladislav Surkov in the Kremlin administration. The problem with Fradkov is that even if he agrees to substutute for Putin, he must be elected. Would the Russian voters support such a spectacle? To put Fradkov on the Russian throne for four years, the Kremlin players would need to exclude any popular opposition candidates from running in the presidential race. Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky could become very dangerous opponents for Fradkov. And what will Ivanov say? Will he feel misused, exploited for another political spectacle? If Putin and his closest circles want to play out the Fradkov-Putin scenario, they must popularize it now. It seems, however, that despite Shuvalov's words, Ivanov remains the frontrunner.
Nikolas Gvosdev, Editor, The National Interest, Washington DC
In the scenario that has been sketched out, one cannot help but draw comparisons with Plutarco Elias Calles, Mexico's president from 1924 to 1928 who, also bound by constitutional term limits, tried to maintain his power and influence in a variety of ways. He sponsored the formation of a new business elite politically connected to him; he carved out a post-presidential position of authority as minister of war; he created a new ruling political party; and he selected several successors who held office for a few years and then resigned the presidency until he miscalculated, selecting Lazaro Cardenas as president, who then had Calles exiled from Mexico.
Is there a similar consensus among the Russian supreme elite that Putin is the "indispensable" politician whose presence is required to keep his system functioning? Would springing a surprise "successor" be accompanied by some sort of formal pact freezing all ministerial and presidential appointments? Would there be a last-minute effort to create some sort of Russian analog to China's central military commission, where Putin would enjoy de facto recognition as the "paramount leader" with others filling the formal positions of president and prime minister? It seems that, with so little time left, any such effort would be haphazard and slipshod.
Andrei Liakhov, Senior Associate, Norton Rose Law Firm, London
Is this scenario feasible given Russia's history and political culture? Not at all. Nothing in the history of transition of power, nothing in the political culture, nothing in Russian culture in general or indeed in the national psyche supports this scenario. To ensure that this becomes possible even in theory, the following pieces of the puzzle need to be in place:
1. Putin's team must stay in power and continue to derive their strength from Putin and NOT his successor;
2. The successor must be so unwilling to run the country as not to seek to introduce ANY changes to any of the "power mechanisms;"
3. The successor must not have his own political ambitions, nor develop any during his presidency;
4. The ruling elite must agree to the return of Putin with all his shortcomings, which would, inter alia, mean less perceived stability of their personal positions;
5. Putin must stay visible and be perceived as de facto running the country by the electorate;
6. The domestic situation in 2012 must deteriorate markedly from 2008 so that the electorate would wish for Putin to return and improve the situation;
7. The PR machine must continue to be geared to Putin, rather than the 2008 successor.
All of this must happen against the backdrop of the unlimited power of the Russian president, and I simply cannot see this happening. I believe that the experience in 2001 can be disregarded, as clearly Putin had an obligation at least to allow the people who brought him to power Boris Yeltsin and the "Family" to recoup their investment. However, he quietly, but very strongly, resisted all attempts by Yeltsin to give guidance and advice. Putin's successor is unlikely to take over with such strings attached simply because there is no Putin "Family;" Putin does not need special retirement conditions like the immunity from prosecution he granted Yeltsin and he is not bent on power, as Yeltsin was.
Why would Putin need to try to return to the Kremlin in 2012? I see no reason why he should. His highest ambition was to become Chairman of Gazprom, and indeed when he was offered the job of prime minister, he suggested that he would like to be given the Gazprom position instead. He is (or at least was at the beginning) a "reluctant" president, who had no team, no strategy, almost no relevant experience and no money, as the state coffers were empty. He is no visionary, and nothing in his presidency suggests that he has a long-term strategy for the country. He tackles a problem when he encounters one. All his presidency could be referenced to a particular problem he was solving and the chain of issues necessary to be addressed for the problem to be solved. An example of this could be the Kursk incident which led to a crisis in the military which demonstrated a lack of funds, as a result, there was a need to improve the economy and he faced resistance from the oligarchs and proceeded with the show case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Putin is reactive, not proactive, although when he chooses or is forced to be proactive, he can sometimes be brilliant.
However, he is obviously tired not only physically, but also of the job itself. He has expressed these thoughts sometimes in low-profile public engagements, particularly in the last year or so. He is not a born public figure and all his previous experience and training pushes him to seek a role in the shadows, a role on the back seat of a comfortable car, and this is what I think he would be seeking when he retires. And most probably he will take a role in business rather than politics. Although not based on any factual evidence, my gut feeling is that his public role may be reduced to, say, chairmanship of the Public Chamber, or the Russian Chamber of Commerce, or something similar. I also expect him to become Chairman of Gazprom, maybe not in April 2008, but certainly by the end of 2009.
Is it just personal ambition or does he really feel he has a mission to lead Russia to a new prominence in the world? If my above analysis is correct, I think Putin is not on a mission; he is just a civil servant who has done his job well and wishes to reap the rewards. The age factor also plays an important role - it will be very difficult to persuade the 2012 electorate used to a much younger face to vote for someone in his early 60s. How would the Russian public react to such a prospect? Depending on the spin doctors' budget and instructions, I am quite cynical about it.
How would the West react to a caretaker president with Putin calling the shots behind the scenes? It will be business as usual, but I do not believe that this scenario is possible or being seriously considered. Putin is a master of disguise, and he throws out ideas not only to test them, but to obscure and distract the public from his real goals. I suspect this is such a case.
Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, The Netherlands
It is all about personal psychology and the bias of perception. One camp, particularly the Western one, sees Putin as a Machiavellian figure obsessed with power. In the eyes of this group, Putin's refusal to run for a third term is some kind of elusive and fiendish move to regain the power he craves by, for example, installing a technical temporary president. This camp is plotting, on behalf of Putin, various machinations that could be implemented to get him back into the Kremlin as soon as possible.
Another camp, to which I belong, sees Putin as a great statesman whose main objective is to propel Russia into the 21st century as an independent, modern and just society based on moral values. This group believes that Putin is not obsessed with power and just wants to continue playing a major role in the transformation of Russia.
The latter group is divided on the issue of what exactly this role will be. Vitaliy Tretyakov, Editor of Moskovskiye Novosti, suggested that Putin will take the role of a gray cardinal by taking the position of the head of the Security Council. I disagree. And that is where personal psychology comes in.
Putin has always kept his word just recall his promise to recover the Kursk nuclear submarine. He made it clear that after stepping down he will play a role by joining the people and, somewhat jocularly, being in opposition. Putin has been direct and outspoken on many occasions and he does not fit the profile of a gray cardinal.
My guess would be that he is going to take charge of United Russia, reform it and use it to create a stable long-term democracy, making this party the guarantor in staying the course. This way, Putin could make the party truly popular and play an opposition role when necessary.
It is becoming more and more apparent that Sergei Ivanov is the likely successor, although Putin is probably going to publicly support both him and Dmitry Medvedev in the presidential race. Ivanov can be anyone but a technical president. I think Putin is ready to hand over power to his successor while focusing on reforming the party scene and strengthening democracy in Russia. He would go back into the Kremlin only if it becomes necessary for rescuing the course he designed for Russia. This may not be necessary if he and his successor are successful in what they are supposed to do.
Shuvalov's remarks about a possible surprise candidate in my view are made to keep the suspense going, which is important for the balance of power on the eve of elections. A surprise candidate does not make sense. As I mentioned in one of the previous panels, picking a preferred candidate just before the presidential nominations - Jack Welch style - would hurt Putin's closest allies and would be a very atypical move for Putin.
Stephen Blank, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA:
(Dr. Blank's views as contributed to Russia Profile do not represent the position of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government)
Any and every scenario is possible for the upcoming presidential election because Russia is effectively an autocracy where laws mean little or nothing. Certainly Putin's acolytes want him to run again to protect their investments in his rule and their ill-gotten gains from it. And Putin's ambition can easily disguise itself, even to him, in the message that Russia needs him and that he is rescuing his country. So it is not surprising that his entourage and his own ego may be suggesting that he can return in 2012 for another 10-14 years or even suspend elections altogether if need be. However a tsarist system needs a tsar and it is unlikely that it can be stage-managed behind the scenes, or that Putin's successor will graciously bow out and make room for him after one term.
Instead, that ruler is likely to conceive of himself or herself as the tsar and take steps to ensure his or her security in office and extended tenure. All these machinations in fact, testify to the essential insecurity, and even illegitimacy, of the system, which is clearly manifest to its leaders and their desperate efforts to secure themselves and their retainers in power. Succession remains the Achilles heel of the system, as it was in the Soviet Union another sign of continuing resemblances between the two systems. Therefore, it is entirely possible that Putin could nominate some dark horse as his most likely successor, or suspend the election entirely on the grounds of some national emergency, which could easily be provided for, if it is not already in the constitution.
Palace coups from above and extended autocracies are by no means foreign to Russian history and tradition. It is easy for the elite to make the case that their interests and those of Russia (which for them are pretty much the same thing) demand that either Putin stay in power or call the shots from behind. But a dual-power system is anathema to the political elite and wholly against Russian tradition, which leans heavily towards concentration of power at the top.
On the other hand, one doubts that the Russian people would erupt with indignation, since the media is controlled by the regime. Additionally, Putin is wildly popular, although his regime is not, the public appears to be apathetic, and the Silioviki, whose support is essential in any palace coup, will either be bought off with material or political payments or brought into line thanks to their penetration by interlocking security systems. On the other hand, such a move would obviously further inflame the already tense relations with the West, although Kremlin cynics might be persuaded to believe that the West will "swallow it." In any case, it is likely that many similar dramas concerning the succession will be enacted between now and March but that none of them will move towards greater democratization. And it is only that outcome that can repair the tensions in Russian national security policy and provide meaningful and true prosperity for all of Russia over a long period of stability.
Andrei Lebedev, Senior Associate, the State Club Foundation, Moscow
Putting the issue of a caretaker president aside, let us consider the feasibility and acceptability of the hypothesis.
From the point of view of political culture, it seems to fit perfectly. According to a recent speech by Surkov at the Russian Academy of Sciences, three principles are fundamental to Russian political culture: Centralization, idealization and personification. The idea of offering an interim ruler to be replaced later by a well-known leader conforms to all three. First, during a certain period, a newcomer who has yet to prove his leadership will govern the country. At this time, centralized power will be prone to the most fierce attacks both from within and out of the country. The suggested idea minimizes this period. Second and third, the image of President Putin reflects, according to numerous opinion polls, Russians' craving for the ideal, or the closest thing to it. The return of the ideal in person would satisfy this craving.
From the point of view of Western liberals, such a scenario, if implemented, would cause a windstorm of indignation. It would be called "cheating" and "abusing the principles of democracy," among other things, notwithstanding the fact that no legal corner would have been cut and laws would have been strictly observed. But that would prove once more that the Russian political system is democratic. Performing such a scenario would require highly developed democratic procedures on a federal scale they are in place, ready to be used. Evading them to say nothing of avoiding them would undermine the legitimacy of the whole enterprise. And this is the last thing Vladimir Putin, who is sometimes called a legalist, needs.
But all of this is speculation on a hypothetical question. Playing out such a scenario requires a lot in particular, finding a candidate able and willing to become an interim president. Nevertheless, it is perfectly feasible, legal and democratic. The other question is whether President Putin will want to play it out.[]