Russia Profile
June 15, 2007
Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel:
Putin's Surprise
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
Contributors: Stephen Blank, Ethan S. Burger, Eugene Kolesnikov, Andrei Liakhov, Nicolai Petro, Vlad Sobell, Andrei Tsygankov, Andrei Zagorski
Will President Vladimir Putin's proposal to share the early warning radar in Gabala be a boon to Russia-U.S. strategic relations or further complicate them?
Putin offered the United States joint use of the Russian early warning radar at the radar base in Gabala, Azerbaijan. Putin said, "We have looked carefully at the U.S. suggestions. We have our own ideas, and I outlined these in detail. The first proposal is to use the Gabala radar station that we [Russia] lease in Azerbaijan." Putin said a radar system in Azerbaijan would cover not only part, but the whole of Europe. He added that a joint base in Gabala "will make it unnecessary for us to place our offensive complexes along the border with Europe."
Before the G8 meeting, Putin had been using increasingly aggressive rhetoric with regard to the planned U.S. missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, including statements on the need to test new Russian strategic missile systems to penetrate the proposed U.S. missile defenses and even a threat to target Europe with Russian nuclear weapons if the United States went ahead with its plans. This tough talk now appears to have been a calculated tactic to up the ante in Russia's bargaining with the United States, which was followed by a seemingly breathtaking proposal that, if implemented, would render the U.S. missile defense system in Eastern Europe redundant.
But has Putin's offer really made things easier? Not exactly. In fact, it made things more confusing.
Putin seems to be saying that joint use of the Russian radar at Gabala makes the missile defense deployments in Eastern Europe unnecessary, and, in a certain way, it does: The Gabala radar is much more powerful and can detect Iranian missile launches earlier than any radar based in the Czech Republic. But the United States was most certainly not planning to rely on the Czech radar for early detection, but rather use its space assets. The radar in the Czech Republic was to provide target acquisition and to send targeting data to interceptors launched from Poland. The Gabala radar is not even designed for targeting purposes and its modification for this would be questionable.
But does Putin's proposal envision the use of interceptors at all? He keeps saying there will not be any need for them for another 5-6 years. But at one point in his joint press conference with Bush, Putin alludes to the problem of intercepted missiles falling on European cities; with the use of the Gabala base, the missiles would be shot down over the sea. But Putin did not clarify where the interceptors would be based (Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia are all possibilities), or whether these interceptors would be Russian or American.
The U.S. reaction to Putin's offer was cautiously optimistic, but vague. The Bush Administration acknowledged Russia's "interesting suggestions." At the joint press conference, Bush added: "this is a serious issue, and we want to make sure that we all understand each other's positions very clearly. As a result of these conversations, I expect there to be better understanding of the technologies involved and the opportunities to work together." But U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice immediately poured some cold water on Putin's offer by saying that the Russian initiative does not change the rationale for the planned U.S. missile defense deployments in Eastern Europe, which prompted an angry retort from Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
What did Putin really mean with his offer on missile defense? Was he simply seeking to find a way to extricate Russia from the nasty rhetorical Cold War that was complicating relations with the West? Or was he looking for a way to make the planned U.S. deployments in Eastern Europe more difficult politically? Does he really have a joint missile defense system with the United States in mind? If so, what would Russia contribute to such a system apart from the radar at Gabala? What is likely to be the U.S. reaction to Russia's initiative; and how will it change the mood in Europe?
Andrei Liakhov, Norton Rose Law Firm, London
Has Putin's offer really made things easier? Yes, if one takes the US stated goals of containing Iran, North Korea and other rouge states at face value, which is exactly what Putin did. The early warning station at Gabala actually covers the territory from which the anticipated threat to EU, as stated by the United States, is likely to originate. If the warning system is located in the EU, U.S. radars will not see the crucial early (boost) stage of any missile launch from a rogue state.
Gabala was designed and built specifically as a component of the system that the United States is trying to build. It will be much cheaper to upgrade it for the uplink with U.S. satellites and interceptor missiles than to build such complex anew. But does Putin's proposal envision the use of interceptors at all? Interceptor missiles will be necessary, but, ideally, should be positioned in Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Turkey or Pakistan since ICBMs are most vulnerable at the early stages when the low speed limits their maneuverability.
Unlike the United State, Russia has successfully tested its ICBM interceptors repeatedly since the late 1950s. The Russian design bureau designs the best missile weapons systems and will be perfectly capable of doing the job. I suspect, though, that if this plan ever gets off the ground, Russia will not care who designs and builds the missiles as long as it has a say in targeting them. Provided the Soviet early warning system survived, Russia, in theory of course, could connect the whole of its early warning system to a joint missile defense system, even for limited purposes. Technically this is achievable. I think Putin is sincere in his attempt to build a joint system for missile defense.
Putin took the U.S. proposal at its face value and suggested to achieve the same goal but possibly at a much lower cost. The center in Azerbaijan is one of the most modern early warning centers in the world and a relatively modest upgrade and uplink to existing U.S. satellites should allow it to perform the same functions as proposed U.S. installations in Poland and the Czech Republic much more efficiently.
By making this move, Putin showed that he is open to dialogue, that he takes the perceived U.S. concerns about Iran and Syria seriously, cares about "common security," and is eager to work with the Americans.
By offering the use of a leased Azeri station he very cleverly outmaneuvered Bush vis-a-vis Aliyev and created a situation where the ball is now in Bush's court, with the possibility of accusing the U.S. government of "creeping unilateral neoimperialist expansion" if the initiative comes to nothing.
Vlad Sobell, Daiwa Institute of Research, London
Putin's offer of cooperation on anti-missile defense was a very shrewd move indeed, as it will eventually force Washington to concede that the planned systems are designed to menace Russia. I consider Rice's comment that the offer does not alter the current U.S. line to be the most accurate indication of where we are headed. When all the "studies" and "consultations" are completed, it will become clear that Washington has no intention to abandon its anti-Russian posture. In fact, early analytical reaction suggests that the United States will push to have both the base in Azerbaijan as well as those in Central Europe.
What we are witnessing is reminiscent of the Cold War. But there is a big difference. That "war" was driven by the West's need to confront and roll back Soviet expansionism. Today we are dealing with the opposite - U.S-Western expansionism in the region. Having rolled back the Soviet Union, the United States demands Russia's "conquest." The present conflict is the war of post-Soviet succession.
There are several reasons why Washington feels it needs to pursue this campaign. First, it aims to integrate the post-Soviet space into the global economy - the West needs to exploit the region's immense resources, especially hydrocarbons - and it wants to minimize Moscow's obstructionism in this undertaking. Secondly, Western presence is needed in anticipation of the coming rivalry with emerging China.
Furthermore, there are some ideological reasons. Russia's insistence on its sovereign path to democracy implicitly undermines the U.S. pretensions to judge what constitutes genuine democracy and how its "universal standards" may or may not be violated. Since such independence is unacceptable from the U.S. viewpoint, Russia must be "conquered" and "genuine democracy" installed.
There is nothing reprehensible or irrational about these aims - and indeed, all empires have behaved this way. What is reprehensible is the U.S. habit of concealing its real intentions under the guise of the advancement of democracy and rollback of what they consider Putin's authoritarianism. Alternatively, the campaign is taken on as part of the war on terrorism. This amounts to a deception of Western electorates in a style reminiscent of the Iraq adventure.
Some might object to this analysis by pointing out that the neocon influence is on the wane, with the multilateralists and realists gaining the upper hand. I find such objections very unconvincing. The vast majority of Washington's think tanks, officialdom, politicians and pundits think more or less along the same, anti-Russian lines.
At a minimum, it is possible to accept the view that Washington speaks with two voices, depending on the audience. In the last 15 years, it has been speaking of cooperation, while at the same time fighting a "war," through the expansion of NATO and other anti-Russian moves in the former Soviet Union. The "increasingly assertive" Moscow has now decided that enough is enough and will no longer going along with this duplicity. This is the real meaning of the Gabala radar proposal.
Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, The Hague, the Netherlands
Putin's surprise proposal is a package deal that has three main aspects: First, in accordance with this deal, Russia offers full cooperation on "rogue-state" anti-ballistic missile defense in Eurasia, provided that risk assessment and defense implementation is a shared responsibility between the United States, the EU and Russia; secondly, Russia gives unprecedented access to real-time data from the Gabala radar in Azerbaijan to effectively monitor missile launches from Iran, thus doing away with the need to build another radar in the Czech Republic; and thirdly, Russia commits to cooperate in the deployment of anti-missile systems outside of Europe within 3-5 years after Iran's long-range missile capability has been confirmed through radar surveillance, thus removing the need to deploy rocket launchers anywhere at this time, including in Poland.
It should be noted that Russia made this proposal in spite of the fact that it still believes that there is no discernable missile threat for Europe from Iran or North Korea. By doing so, Russia re-confirmed its commitment to a compromise solution and gave the United States the opportunity to save face at a time when their unilateral position has been seriously undermined.
This proposal comes on the back of another Russian diplomatic victory. On the eve of the G8 summit, the ever-so-cautious Chinese joined Russia in opposition to the U.S. plans for missile defense in Europe by announcing at a foreign ministry press conference that the missile defense shield would upset the delicate balance of security among the world's major powers. Prior to that, the Chinese had publicly challenged only the U.S. plans for deploying missile defense systems in Asia with the help of Japan and Australia. Ignoring Russia was difficult enough; after this announcement the United States would have to publicly ignore China as well.
The benefits of a joint anti-missile defense are obvious if it is indeed intended against a future threat from Iran or any other so-called rogue state. Such cooperation could be the first step in establishing a new comprehensive Eurasian security framework and further integrating Russia with the EU and NATO. However, the majority of the comments from U.S. officials and media are so far dismissive of Putin's proposal. By refusing to cooperate, the United States completely exposes the real aim of the anti-ballistic missile defense-preservation of the unipolar world order and subordinating Europe to the U.S. worldview. The ball at the moment is not in the hands of the Americans, but rather the Europeans. I believe the "old Europe" will now try to torpedo the deployment of U.S. systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, at least until the next U.S. administration, with the hope that a multilateral approach can ultimately prevail.
Nicolai Petro, Professor of Political Science, University of Rhode Island
President Putin's proposal to jointly run the early warning radar site at Gabala in Azerbaijan has several advantages for the United States. Indeed, it is a deal too good to pass up.
Its 6,000 kilometer (3,700 mile) range will allow the United States to monitor the Middle East, China, South Asia, India and much of Africa - all the places from which rogue missile attacks are likely to originate. It is a currently functioning station, with a ten year renewable lease, which means that the United States can entirely side step the local hostility and legal issues that will inevitably ensue with the creation of new bases in Europe.
Azerbaijan and Iran have already said that they do not see U.S. participation in such a joint endeavor as a threat, so that collaborating with Russia will enhance American security without provoking any further anger in the region (a rare feat indeed!). Finally, even the site's proximity to Iran, a cause of concern to some analysts, has its silver lining. Although less precise than the newest U.S. radars, the fact that Gabala is so much closer to potential launch sites allows it to detect missiles and plot their trajectory within seconds. According to First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, it can even detect the launch of cruise missiles.
These unique advantages permit the issue of tracking to be separated from the issue of interception (as it should be), and allow for a mutually advantageous compromise: By using a Russian radar to track missiles that can then be shot down by interceptors located elsewhere, Russia is ensured that the radar is not undermining its defenses by tracking missiles deep inside Russia, while the United States maintains complete independence in its response capability.
There are some long term benefits to consider as well. The first is that it would give the Pentagon a foothold in the region's most oil-rich state, one whose favor U.S. officials have long curried. Another is that it would encourage much-needed confidence building measures in the area of missile defense. More than anything else, it is a lack of trust that has thwarted real cooperation on this issue, which both sides agree is of vital importance. A joint defense mission will, obviously, force such cooperation.
The problem: The Russians thought of it first. That suffices for Russia-haters to nix the idea, but serious analysts should ask themselves whether they really want to dismiss a proposal so advantageous to the United States just because Putin proposed it? Putin's offer to link U.S. and Russian missile defense systems could be a win-win scenario, allowing the United States to obtain a functional system almost perfectly suited to its needs now, while at the same time making Russia a stakeholder in European security. If properly nurtured by future Russian, American, and European administrations, this proposal could become a model for future arms control initiatives that move beyond linking defense systems to the linkage of defense strategies.
Putin's innovative proposal forces us to look at security issues anew, in a decidedly post-Cold War light, by asking: "How much is Russia's goodwill worth to us?" If, as President Bush has repeatedly said, Russia is truly welcome to participate in ABM defense, then the superiority of the Gabala option makes the choice obvious. If, however, the United States goes ahead unilaterally, despite the fact that its alternative will not be immediately effective and will create considerable problems, both in the Middle East and in NATO, then those who argue that those words were merely rhetoric, will see their analysis confirmed.
Andrei Tsygankov, Associate Professor of Political Science, San Francisco State University, San Francisco
It seems to me that focusing on interceptors is not useful here, since there is nothing to intercept coming from Iran. The Iranian card is merely an excuse to introduce the idea of missile defense, which is presented as a defensive act, but in reality is expansionist and potentially offensive. It is introduced to solidify the American global hegemony by strengthening control over the "old Europe" and eventually gaining a greater control over Russia's nuclear infrastructure. The idea is not explicitly anti-Russian, and George W. Bush means what he says when he notes that he personally likes Putin. It is just that Russia, with its nuclear arsenal and ability to destroy the United States, gets in the way. As it is common to say in the United States, it is not the intentions, but the capabilities that matter. There is nothing personal in this deal; it is strictly the business of maintaining global hegemony, which is viewed by the White House as the only guarantee of U.S. security.
Nothing will demonstrate this better than the forthcoming U.S. refusal to work with Putin on his Gabala proposal. Putin's proposal has a chance to get some European support and generate a new wide ranging debate within the U.S. political establishment, where the concept of world hegemony and unilateralism has been seriously disputed for quite some time. European support is less important because the current White House administration simply doesn't care what the world thinks, including the country's closest allies. The internal debate within the United States is more important at this point; indeed, it is the only serious constraint on Bush's actions.
Putin's proposal is risky, however, because it may tempt the United States to have its cake and eat it too: Take advantage of the proposal and move in to Azerbaijan while continuing with deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hedley has already hinted that the US could agree to the proposal if the Gabala station would add to, rather than replace, the Eastern European deployment plans. There are no technical issues that cannot be resolved by Moscow and Washington if there is a principal political decision to work together.
Unfortunately that decision is not there, and the U.S. political will to work jointly with Russia is missing. This leaves Moscow with no option but to go ahead with its plans to prepare an adequate defense against U.S. expansion of its nuclear infrastructure, which has been euphemistically referred to "defensive" in nature. This is quite possibly the last chance Putin will give to the idea of a Russia-U.S. strategic partnership. If the U.S. missile defense plans are not defeated internally, a Cold War defined by minimal cooperation in security affairs may become inevitable.
Ethan S. Burger, Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University, Adjunct Professor Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.
Generally, governments do not want "surprises" sprung on them at international summits or conferences. Usually such meetings are to announce plans worked out long in advance by professional staff, provide opportunities to build personal relationships, set future agendas, or, if reaching substantive progress on key issues is not possible, at least offer certain countries the chance to position themselves in a favorable light for domestic and certain foreign audiences (PR victories).
President Putin's proposal on the deployment of a limited ballistic missile defense system would seem to fall in the latter two categories. It is doubtful that he and his key advisors underwent any last minute conversion in their thinking, but recognized that Russian foreign policy in this regard was counterproductive.
There finally seemed to be the recognition in Moscow that it was certainly not benefiting from its rhetorical tirades, particularly on the heels of the cyberattacks on Estonia. Russia decided to seize any new opportunities it could get at the G8 meeting before serious thought was given either to expand the number of countries coming to the meeting (Brazil, China, India. South Africa, and perhaps others) or it found itself excluded to some degree from future meetings.
The United States and its NATO allies must now make the effort to study the Russian proposal for joint missile defense to see how it might be implemented without creating any negative consequences. It is a shame that the Kremlin's conversion on this issue was not sudden since now it is viewed with greater suspicion irrespective of its merits for regional security. Greater Russian efforts to combat Iran's development of nuclear weapons could go a long way towards reducing many fears among NATO countries and Israel.
Simply because the Russians proposed something does not mean the concept is a Trojan horse. President Putin's call for new structures, or at least new policies, for the world's financial and trade institutions is justified.
Economic conditions are not what they were in the immediate post-war era, and Russia's importance in the global economy is not as critical as Moscow sees it, but the growing importance of the Chinese and Indian economies cannot be ignored, and the U.S. budgetary and trade situation combined with the diminishment of its stature in the foreign policy realm demands a fresh look at institutions that are no longer optimal in today's far more complex environment, where billions of dollars can be moved with the click of a key on a computer...
Andrei Zagorski, Professor, MGIMO-University, Moscow
This is a step in the right direction if it implies the Kremlin's openness for long-term cooperation with the U.S. in missile defenses. It is, however, a wrong and primitive move if based on the assumption that joint use of the Gabala radar station could substitute for autonomous U.S. defense capability in Europe.
The radar in Gabala is part of the Russian early warning system. Its purpose is to verify missile launches detected by space-based surveillance systems. Data from both flows into the chain of command that triggers nuclear retaliation once a missile attack is confirmed. The radar planned for the Czech Republic would have a similar purpose, but would feed data collected into another chain of command in the United States that would trigger the launch of kinetic interceptors rather than a nuclear response.
In a series of joint exercises, the United States and Russia have looked into how they can make their systems interoperable and have made significant progress. The problem is technically solvable. Neither country, however, is politically ready to amalgamate their systems to the extent that 1) Moscow allows all data gathered by Gabala, or any other station, to be supplied uncensored and in real time to the relevant U.S. headquarters while 2) Washington accepts dependence on Russia's good will in such a sensitive area. Although the United States has been open to cooperation with Russia over the past 15 years, at no moment was it ready to give up its autonomous capability, and the option of receiving data from Gabala does not provide an incentive to abandon this policy. The Russian military would never abandon its autonomous capability either.
Putin's proposal can bring us a step forward, however, if it helps revive U.S.-Russian cooperation in early warning systems. In 1998, Moscow and Washington agreed to create a joint center to share early warning data from both sides. The center was meant to enable Russian and American operators, sitting together in a room, to simultaneously follow what both Russian and American early warning systems were seeing. Apart from providing mutual reassurance in case of an unauthorized launch, or of a misinterpretation of launch data that could trigger a nuclear war, shared early warning could become the first step towards a cooperative missile defense system. Such a system would not substitute for the autonomous systems developed in either Russia or the United States, but would bring them a step further in mutually-reassuring cooperation.
The wrong next step, therefore, would be to insist that the United States stops any work in Europe unless we fail to agree on Gabala. In that case, the discussion over Gabala will end rather abruptly. The correct next step would be to revive the plan for the joint center, which was paralyzed by a bureaucratic dispute over liabilities of American staff, and then make plans for what to do after the center has become operational.
Stephen Blank, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA:
(Dr. Blank's views as contributed to Russia Profile do not represent the position of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government)
Putin may well have sought to extricate Russia from the dead end that his own intemperate threats had created for it, even as he simultaneously thought to drive a wedge between Washington and Brussels by posing as the apostle of reason, dialogue, and compromise. However, there are many more sides to this proposal then are even listed in the questions above. First of all, the operational and technical difficulties involved here, only some of which Vladimir Frolov pointed out above, are very great. For example, if a radar is located in Gabala under joint command, it cannot function without joint approval nor give signals to interceptors. And if it is to be effective, given the distance to Iran, the radar must spot the missile virtually at the moment of launch and immediately transmit its coordinates to the interceptor. Given the mistrust and policy divergence between the two states involved, prompt replies and actions cannot be relied upon.
Secondly, Putin's proposal in fact betrays the utterly groundless nature of Russia's earlier charges against the missile defense system and indicates that they are made out of a quest for political and psychological advantages, not strategic anxiety. First, the proposal to allow a U.S. radar near Iran demonstrates that all the many statements that Iran is no threat has no visible or future missile capability were false. The proposal for a radar concedes that Iran is developing a threatening capability, something that Sergei Ivanov had often alluded to. Finally Russia has come around to seeing Iran as a threat against which it too must defend itself; Ivanov's remedy for this scenario being withdrawal from the INF treaty and building more missiles. Second, the proposal for a radar in Gabala that can cover all of Europe also further emphasizes the already-professed anxieties that, with the radar in the Czech republic, Washington could see all of Russia to the Urals. The same holds true for Gabala, and if it is not a threat there, then it is not a threat anywhere else in Europe.
Third, Putin's remarks about placing the interceptors in Turkey, Iraq or at sea are utterly disingenuous. The Czech and Polish locations were not chosen by happenstance and the fact that Putin proposes basing interceptors in Iraq or Turkey shows that either he or his advisors have failed to understand or communicate accurately what the purposes of these radars and interceptors are and how they will work. One cannot seriously entertain the thought of putting such radars in Iraq in its current situation and placing them at sea adds to their vulnerability and does not necessarily remove the technical problem of debris from an interception over Russia or Europe. Third, the Gabala proposal opens up the possibilities for large-scale espionage against the United States. It already is known that in the many briefings Russia has received, its people attentively followed the technical data that was presented but offered no response about cooperation, suggesting that they were on an intelligence mission rather than seeking genuine cooperation.
It appears that the real issue for the military-political elite is the U.S. presence in Central and Eastern Europe, and if this is the case, a radar at Gabala will not lessen their anxiety or reduce their threat perception. It also appears that Putin openly admitted that it was his military experts -notoriously anti-American, obstinate in their commitment to viewing the United States as Russia's main enemy, determined to get more resources to support their corrupt mismanagement of Russian defense policy, and a group not necessarily committed to telling the truth about foreign issues - who formulated the dimensions of this so called threat. Indeed, he invited them to do so, an invitation that they seized with alacrity to advance their own parochial interests. Once Putin went public about this fact and threatened Europe with missiles, a threat that can only injure Russia, it became clear to him that he needed to retreat. But the more one looks at the Gabala gambit, the less it looks like an offer that Bush can't refuse. Such an assessment of Putin's plan may play well among Russian analysts like Vyacheslav Nikonov, but in fact, the Gabala proposal looks more and more not like a great or irresistible offer, but rather what Lenin called a rotten compromise. If there is a genuine basis for Russian-American strategic collaboration against Iran, it should be pursued, but it should not be pursued on the basis of attempts at intimidation, abuse, and threats, especially when the invocation of these threats can only redound against Russian interests.