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Excerpts from the JRL E-Mail Community :: Founded and Edited by David Johnson
#21 - JRL 2006-31 - JRL Home
Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2006
From: Mac Broderick <mac.broderick@gmail.com>
Subject: re JRL '29/Parachkevova

In response to Ms. Parachkevova's Op-ed in JRL #29 (2006), I have a few observations that I would be interested in hearing other people's opinions on. Paramount among these is the issue of possible sources of instability for the president. Ms. Parachkevova aptly points out that President Putin is acting in an increasingly paranoid manner; however, I would argue that this behavior results not from any threat posed by Berezovsky or the oligarchs, but rather from Putin's worries regarding the general public's support for him. This may seem odd given that his approval rating has never dipped below 60%, but can be explained by examining the underlying structure of Russian politics under Putin.

At the heart of this is the nature of stability in Russian politics today. Under the Yeltsin regime, stability revolved around two bargains: one between the Elites, in this case Yeltsin and the oligarchs; and another between the elites and the people. So long as Yeltsin made no moves to expropriate the oligarchs wealth, they would support him. In the case of the people, they were willing to tolerate Yeltsin so long as he did not impinge on their new found freedoms or the state did not devolve completely into chaos.

Putin viewed Yeltsin as hamstrung by having to strike a bargain with the oligarchs. Believing a strong rapport with the general populace to trump any relationship with the oligarchs, Putin decided to declare open war on the oligarchs. In the process, he created a new class of oligarchs who owed their wealth and power predominantly to him, and thus neutralized them. One could argue that Yeltsin and Chubais did the same thing to create the oligarchs, who eventually did adopt an independent streak. However, what separates Putin from Yeltsin is the people's faith in his ability to work in their interest. He derives his power from this seemingly unshakable faith.

Putin has taken a page out of history. Today's siloviki are a modern spin on Ivan the Terrible's oprichniki, emasculating the oligarchs (simply a new version of the boyars) and creating a new elite class loyal to the president, or at least in fear of him. While it is possible that infighting among the new elites could destabilize the administration, Putin does not truly fear this possibility. Moreover, Berezovsky, Gusinsky, and Khodorkovsky are generally anathema to the new elites, who have come to power at their expense. Politics does make for strange bedfellows, but given the frequency of threats emanating from London and the continued popularity of Putin, he does not seem very concerned with many of oligarchs in exile, be they in London, Cannes, or Chita. As long as he has the people's trust, why should he?

Thus, Putin's greatest fear is of a mass uprising of the general populace against him. He has thus far succeeded in painting himself as the "Good Czar" and shifting blame to the "Bad Boyars," as one of the other articles in this issue elucidates. However, the battle over the monetization of benefits program seemed to shake the president. He lost some of his reformist zeal after his efforts failed. Instead he shifted most of his energy to heading off short term threats to his power as opposed to addressing long term concerns about Russia. For this reason he has targeted foreign human rights organizations which he sees as possibly fomenting opposition to him, such as the Moscow Helsinki Group, and also sources of internal opposition such as the Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers. Both of these groups could help to organize and galvanize any quickly rising opposition.

This all sounds very sinister on the part of the Kremlin. However, Russia has made great economic strides under Putin and the administration did at one point at least seem to be intent on spurring economic growth, even if it meant implementing painful reforms. Could it be that Putin believes he has to consolidate his power before pushing forward with unpopular reforms? He has stated his desire to lessen the burden of the social safety net from the state, as well as eliminate exemptions for military service, both of which will prove very unpopular. Or is he simply trying to insure that he and his cronies can line their pockets during their window in power? Only time will tell, but I am intrigued to hear other people's views on what the real threats to Putin's leadership are, and the potential of the oligarchs to destabilize Russian politics.