#27 - JRL 2006-236 - JRL Home
Russia Profile
October 20, 2006
Russia Profile Experts’ Panel: Anna Politkovskaya’s Murder and the Kremlin Reaction
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
Contributors: Andrei Lebedev, Andrei Seregin, Sergei Shishkarev and Andrei Zagorski

On Saturday Oct. 7, 2006, Anna Politkovskaya, an independent Russian journalist who had been fiercely critical of President Vladimir Putin’s policies, was gunned down in the elevator of her apartment building in what appeared to be a classic contract killing.

This was the second assassination of a prominent public figure in less than two months. In mid-September Andrei Kozlov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Central Bank, who was in charge of banking oversight and had been a tough fighter in the war on money laundering, was similarly gunned down by two hired assassins for reasons still unknown.

Politkovskaya’s murder was also the second killing of a prominent investigative journalist in recent years. Paul Klebnikov, the editor of the Russian version of Forbes, was killed in July 2004 at the entrance of his office building. Both Politkovskaya and Klebnikov were U.S. citizens.

Almost immediately, rampant speculation began over the identity of those behind the Politkovskaya murder. Most of the Western media, as well as the Russian opposition, focused on the fact that Anna Politkovskaya had been a fierce critic of Russian policies in Chechnya and most recently ran investigative reports exposing corruption in the pro-Moscow Chechen authorities led by Ramzan Kadyrov.

Two versions of the killing seemed most popular ­ the Gongadze theory and the Paul Klebnikov theory. The first one, named after an assassinated Ukrainian journalist who had been critical of former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma and was killed by the security services on what appeared to be direct orders from the highest levels of the Ukrainian government, assumes that Anna Politkovskaya was killed by the Russian security services on orders or with tacit encouragement from the Kremlin because of her intense criticism of the Kremlin’s policies in Chechnya.

The Paul Klebnikov theory implies that Politkovskaya was assassinated by a Chechen warlord criticized in her reporting. In the Klebnikov case, the prosecution believes the assassination was ordered by Chechen warlord Khozh Akhmed Nukhayev in retaliation for his unpleasant portrayal in Klebnikov’s book Interview with a Barbarian. For Politkovskaya, it is assumed the warlord she crossed might well be the de-facto ruler of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov. Some have even claimed cynically that killing Politkovskaya on Putin’s birthday (October 7) was Kadyrov’s birthday present to his master in the Kremlin.

A wave of condemnation of Putin’s Russia swept Western capitals following the murder. U.S. President George W. Bush, the European Commission, the EU governments and the Council of Europe all joined in the chorus of indignation. The Russian government and Putin himself went AWOL on the matter for several days, in typical fashion, allowing their fiercest international critics to make full use of the story.

Then last Tuesday, on a visit to Germany, Putin weighed in with his first public comments, but hardly helped himself or the Kremlin with his remarks.

While correctly stating that the killing of such a prominent government critic as Politkovskaya has done more damage to the Russian government than her criticism per se, Putin then went into a clumsy discussion of whether Politkovskaya was more influential in the West than in Russia. He also referred to some secret intelligence reports indicating that some enemies of the regime might want to destabilize the country and discredit the Kremlin abroad by ordering an assassination of a prominent government critic in Russia.

While this might well be true, this is not the line the Kremlin should be publicly promoting in this case. By indicating that it is more interested in shifting blame to its enemies, the Kremlin produces the exact opposite PR effect from what is needed and makes it appear that Politkovskaya’s murder is being used for sordid political purposes. What the Kremlin should have presented instead is a very straightforward statement pledging an intensive and objective investigation into the killing.

What kind of political fallout will Politkovskaya’s murder have in Russia internally as well as on Russia’s relations with the West? Will it shatter political stability in Russia? How is the Russian government handling the political consequences of having one of its most public critics gunned down in central Moscow? And why are members of the Western media and political pundits so quick to blame the Russian government and President Putin himself for this horrible crime?

Andrei Zagorski, Associate Professor of MGIMO, Moscow:

For all sorts of reasons, the murder of Anna Politkovskaya does not have the potential to become anything like the Gongadze case was in Ukraine several years ago. The overwhelming indifference of the vast majority of the population, the lack of avenues for political articulation, the rise of nationalism and xenophobia, and the failure of the liberal and democratic movements to mobilize significant popular support say as much.

The murder of Anna Politkovskaya and the following reactions reveal, however, two important trends. The first is a deep mistrust of Putin’s Russia in the West that has grown over the past three years. Regardless of who is behind the murder, the act itself reinforces the worst theories about the anti-democratic nature of Putin’s policies: it is not only difficult but also dangerous to be a public critic of this regime. Although vested economic interests (as for many European nations) or other sorts of political deals (as for the United States) may well mitigate their public criticism of Russian domestic developments, this shall not be confused with their approval. The reactions to the murder in the West clearly indicate very little acceptance for Putin’s Russia.

The second trend reveals that Moscow’s official propaganda has learned very little about how to address sensitive issues. While finding itself in benevolent conditions at home where manipulation of electronic media substitutes for real competitiveness, it fails outside the country, where it cannot monopolize the media landscape. Admitting that the critical investigations of a prominent reporter harmed the country’s image is counterproductive in the extreme, when sincere sympathies are the overwhelming emotion. Implying a conspiracy theory as an explanation of the crime only makes it worse.

Indeed, the conspiracy theory is a trend that has characterized the actions of Putin’s government ever since Summer 2000. Regardless of where the controversy emanates from, explaining each of your political failures as a hostile action of your enemies, domestic and/or external, can only result in the further estrangement of domestic elites and foreign partners rather than their progressive constructive integration.

Sergei Shishkarev, Deputy Chairman, State Duma Committee on Energy, Transportation and Communications:

We need to distinguish between two things.

One is the poor advice that President Putin received when formulating the Kremlin’s response to the murder. There could and should have been only one possible reaction ­ an expression of sorrow over the death of a fellow citizen who was a public figure and the offering of condolences to her family, followed by a public pledge to find the perpetrators of the crime and bring them to justice. That would have been enough, and should have been done immediately after the killing. Maintaining a long silence fueled public suspicion and allowed the Kremlin’s opponents to capitalize on the tragedy for their sordid political purposes. Another mistake was to give an official presidential reaction to the murder before a foreign audience in a foreign country. This was a Russian internal matter and Putin should have spoken about it to his nation first. And then, of course, it was inadmissible to make disparaging comments about the deceased. This is not the first time that the president has been let down and publicly embarrassed by his media advisors and clearly the time has come to do something about it.

The Western reaction to Politkovskaya’s murder is quite another matter. The fact that the Kremlin is prone to shoot itself in the foot is not enough ground to portray it as an embodiment of all evil or worse, to accuse the Russian authorities as somehow being behind the killing. The people in the Kremlin are no angels and can be clumsy in their public gestures, but they are not cold-blooded murderers and they certainly are not idiots. The political and media frenzy that has engulfed the Western capitals is disgusting, and glaringly anti-Russian. It gives the impression that the West is not mourning Anna Politkovskaya but is instead trying to put Putin on trial.

True, the Kremlin has been no fan of Anna Politkovskaya and her writing. But it is in Putin’s Russia that she was able to have a very successful career as a journalist and human rights activist, it is in Putin’s Russia that she enjoyed the freedom to travel to the conflict zones in Chechnya, interview her sources and then publish what she wanted to say in a major independent paper. True, she made a lot of enemies by taking hard-nosed public positions on very sensitive matters. But it was in Putin’s Russia that she was able to accuse the highest powers, including the president himself, of nothing short of criminal activity. I wonder if she would be allowed to do the same in the United States under the Bush administration. Could she have done her style of reporting in Iraq? I doubt it.

The West should take a step back and simply mourn Anna Politkovskaya, not accuse President Putin and his government of crimes they never committed.

Andrei Lebedev, Senior Associate, the State Club Foundation, Moscow:

Most Russian politicians and political analysts show (if only unwillingly) extreme uneasiness when talking about the murder of Anna Politkovskaya. It’s difficult to admit that political killings still take place in your own country. So, the shame spreads over every Russian who might have a say in preventing another murder of a journalist (or a politician, state official) or at least make a protest afterwards, but failed to do his best.

True, the office of the Russian General Prosecutor was up to the occasion ­ it reacted promptly and adequately, fulfilling its professional duty. Political reaction was less immediate, and widely criticized for its, let’s say, clumsiness. It doesn’t matter whether the tactless lines belonged to Putin himself or were prompted by his aides ­ they were inappropriate.

The fallout following the murder would have been loud in any case, but the inadequacy of the Kremlin’s reaction increased its severity. Now it is useless to try to correct the situation with PR. The only way to save face is to quickly find those who ordered and carried out the murder, no matter how important they are. Otherwise, popular trust in the law-enforcement agencies, judicial system and political leadership might be utterly shattered. No doubt the process of undermining this trust (or its remnants) will be stimulated by those both within and outside the country interested in undermining Russia’s stability.

This is not to say that the murder of Politkovskaya could serve as a detonator for some public disturbances, but certainly its role will not be restricted to further corroding the authorities’ credibility. Adding to the existing disillusionment of the middle class, this killing and its aftermath might add to the growing feeling of defenselessness in much wider circles. Finally, the indirect social consequences of this murder might be much deeper and stronger than the direct influence of Anna Politkovskaya’s articles.

Andrei Seregin, Senior Political Analyst, National Laboratory for Foreign Policy:

With all respect already paid to the memory of Anna Politkovskaya, it is impossible to dismiss the feeling that the journalist’s murder fits well into the Western strategy of pressuring Putin’s Russia. Indeed, prior to her death, Politkovskaya’s reporting could do limited harm to Putin and his entourage. Her Chechnya coverage had recently begun to bother even some of Putin’s most ardent critics. Portrayed as a “martyr”, she presents a perfect case for unleashing another lengthy media campaign against the Kremlin. The “democracy-promotion” community has already tried to turn Politkovskaya’s death into a political happening, aimed at blaming Putin and his “oppressive regime.” U.S. Undersecretary of State Paula Dobriansky even attended a ceremony for Politkovskaya held by the National Endowment for Democracy on Oct. 16. Simple logic would, of course, acquit Putin of any responsibility for the crime. However, it will be nearly impossible for the Kremlin to fix the damage caused by this new “Gongadze case” in the near future.

It would be a great mistake, however, to attribute the entire Western media frenzy over Politkovskaya’s murder to some pre-planned campaign against Putin’s authoritarianism. The American public, media and political establishment have a long tradition of respecting talent, decency, professional demeanor and responsibility in journalism. From the muckrakers fighting corporate abuses in 1900s, to the investigative efforts of Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein in the Watergate case or the example of Walter Cronkite in the 1970s ­ American journalists were often viewed as those the nation could trust the most. Unfortunately, this was not the case with Politkovskaya at all. She was not an unbiased reporter, but rather someone on a crusade against the Russian government. True, she was a fearless crusader, and she served what she believed was a high moral cause. She has earned respect for taking a tough public stand against a powerful state and its institutions. But this is called political activism and it certainly clouded her view as a journalist.