#2 - JRL 2006-224 - JRL Home
Moscow Times
October 5, 2006
Georgia Has the Edge for Now
By Simon Saradzhyan
Staff Writer

The Georgian leadership may have won a tactical victory by provoking a heavy-handed response from Russia in the two countries' ongoing dispute, but Tbilisi has made little progress toward its goal of regaining control of two breakaway regions, analysts said Wednesday.

The arrest last week of four Russian officers suspected of espionage infuriated the Kremlin to such an extent that it severed all transport links and postal service to Georgia, even after the officers had been returned to Moscow.

As a result, Georgia is scoring points in the eyes of its Western allies and the international community, cultivating its image as the victim of economic and political pressure from its giant neighbor to the north.

Such victimization of Georgia will do much to convince the West that Russia cannot play the role of unbiased moderator and peacekeeper in the "frozen conflicts" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which seek independence from Georgia. It also strengthens the case for admitting Georgia into NATO in order to ward off aggression from Russia.

"Saakashvili is playing a cynical but very effective game, even though it involves exposing his own people to economic hardship," said Ivan Safranchuk, head of the Moscow office of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information.

"He has managed to cast what was previously viewed as the result of wars of secession between Georgia on the one side and Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other as a conflict between Russia and Georgia," Safranchuk said.

The West had been reluctant to get involved in the frozen conflicts before, but now the sanctions and belligerent rhetoric coming from Moscow have compelled NATO and the United States to weigh in.

While the West may lend verbal support to Georgia in this conflict, however, it is unlikely to get involved in peacekeeping missions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia or mediation of the conflicts.

Given Georgia's location on Russia's southern border, and the heavy commitment of NATO and U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, "Georgia will likely have to roll over once more," said Monica Duffy Toft, an expert on ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government.

"Although there may be some rhetorical exchanges expressing displeasure with Russia's actions, this rhetoric is unlikely to be backed up with much action in defense of Georgia's interests," she said.

Safranchuk agreed. The perception -- promoted by Russia -- that the United States and NATO are pulling the strings in Tbilisi is inaccurate, he said. "This is Saakashvili's game."

In the absence of meaningful Western intervention to resolve the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Saakashvili has little hope of resolving these issues before the referendum on independence is held in Kosovo. Leaders in both separatist regions argue that a successful Kosovo referendum would establish a precedent. South Ossetia already has a referendum of its own for November.

The main hope for Saakashvili is that UN mediators succeed in convincing Serbia to acquiesce to the Kosovo referendum. Since Tbilisi will never accept similar measures in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, this would decrease the value of Kosovo as a precedent, Safranchuk said.

Eventually, Saakashvili may even convince NATO to admit Georgia despite its unresolved territorial disputes, but he cannot realistically hope for re-integration of the separatist provinces, he said.

"Saakashvili seems to be scoring a tactical victory, but he is not getting any closer to a strategic success," said said Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of the Russia in Global Affairs magazine.

Moreover, Russia's economic sanctions and political pressure could destabilize Georgia enough to bring about a regime change, he said.

Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's announcement on Wednesday that Russia would expedite the withdrawal of its troops from Georgia could be a step in this direction.

By removing its troops, Moscow deprives Tbilisi of a major PR weapon and increases its own freedom of action in the country, Safranchuk said.

While pressuring the Georgian leadership, the Kremlin is also moving against the Georgian diaspora in Russia, especially its business interests. This campaign could backfire, however, if the international community views the crackdown as an "ethnically selective offensive against individuals in a European capital," Lukyanov said.

"Saakashvili is scoring one point after another, but he may get caught off-guard and get knocked down," Safranchuk said.

A successful change of regime or "taming" of Saakashvili, who came to power in a velvet coup and adopted a pro-Western stance, would send shockwaves across the South Caucasus, if not the entire former Soviet Union. It would help to contain NATO expansion and EU influence in what Russia regards as its sphere of influence.

Yet there is also the risk that, having set out to oust Saakashvili and install a pro-Russian regime in Tbilisi, the Kremlin may find itself on a road to nowhere.

"What if Saakashvili still doesn't bow down and crawl on his knees to Russia?" Lukyanov said of the Kremlin's high-stakes game. "What will Russia do then?"