From: Eugene Ivanov (eugene_ivanov@comcast.net)
Subject: Successes and disappointments of the 2005 Moscow City Duma election (re Aron JRL 11)
Date: Sun, 15 Jan 2006
As we all know, the best way of dealing with unsettling facts is to creatively interpret them. Leon Aron, in his analysis of the 2005 Moscow City Duma election (JRL 11), gives this idea a new boost.
Aron calls 47 percent of the party-list vote cast for the United Russia party "disappointing," but interprets 11 percent won by Yabloko/SPS as "a significant achievement." No problem with the "united democrats;" their ability to overcome the draconian 10 percent threshold is a remarkable success. Besides, Aron's passion for Russia's marginal political parties and politicians is well-known and, hey, in politics, achievement is a matter of faith, not math.
On the other hand, the "disappointing" performance of United Russia deserves further exploration. Explaining how the party of power got as much as it did, Aron names three usual suspects: "administrative resources," "electoral shenanigans of the authorities," and excessive campaign funding.
Let's start with the first. Whatever "administrative resources" mean to different people, the implication is that, due to a variety of machinations, a political party would get significantly more votes than it should have gotten without the use of the notorious "resources." A pre-election poll conducted by the Levada Center ¬ hardly a United Russia sympathizer ¬ indicated that 43 percent of Muscovites were going to vote for United Russia. How is it different from the 47 percent won by the party on December 4, given that the sampling error of the poll was 4.5 percent?
Perhaps Moscow is different from the rest of the country? Not at all. On December 4, in addition to Moscow, eight other regions held elections. According to the Central Election Commission database, 3,279,996 people have voted in these elections, and 1,341,023 of them cast votes for United Russia. This represents 41 percent, which is exactly ! the party rating published by the Levada Center in December.
Unless Aron provides proof that the Levada polls are seriously flawed ¬ or that the Levada Center uses "administrative resources" to inflate United Russia's ratings ¬ there remains little doubt that the party of power is getting exactly what Russian voters are willing to give it.
Aron's record of "electoral shenanigans" does not come across as credible mainly because it's based almost exclusively on a single source: an article characteristically titled "Report from the trenches" (giving a new dimension to the expression "entrenched mentality"). This is not to say that the poll was totally violation-free. But given the scale of United Russia's domination ¬ 30 percent over the second-placed Communists in the party-list vote and only one single-mandate district of 15, where United Russia candidates led by less than 8 percent -- there were no reasons for "the authorities" to resort to massive fraud.
Considering United Russia's financial strength and Russia's murky regulations of campaign funding, it's almost certain that the party had spent in excess of the declared $2.7 million and perhaps even in excess of the official limit of $3.6 million. But in Russia, the money-vote relation is not as straightforward as Aron wants us to believe. In spite! of widespread perception that private businesses are too scared to support the opposition, "united democrats" have come to the election with an impressive war chest of $2.4 million. During the campaign, they have overspent the Communists by almost 8-to-1, yet lost by 6 percent of the vote. In 2004, Irina Khakamada was the best funded presidential candidate, at least nominally. She had spent about $3.4 million -- only slightly less than all other five candidates combined, $4.2 million -- yet finished fourth with less than 4 percent of the vote.
Calling United Russia's election results "disappointing" or "discouraging" is hardly new. A year ago, critics were pointing out that in the majority of 2004 regional elections, United Russia was winning less than the 38 percent it scored in the 2003 Duma election (Russia's regional elections in 2004, JRL 9041). The party's misfortunes continued well into the first half of 2005. Of the eight elections held during this period, United Russia had lost two and had overcome the 38 percent "barrier" only once. The situ! ation changed dramatically in the fall. The party has won all 12 elections held since October 16 and collected more than 40 percent of the party-list vote in eight elections.
Now, in order to feel disappointed with United Russia's performance, Aron seems to be setting a new bar: "to secure a majority." What majority exactly does Aron have in mind? If 28 seats in the 35-member Moscow City Duma (80 percent) is not a majority, then what is?
However, the most questionable part of Aron's analysis is not retrospective but, rather, prospective. Aron predicts that in the 2007 Duma election, "united democrats" can "realistically" capture 20 percent of the national vote and become "the second largest party in the country." This optimistic forecast seems to assume that the success of "united democrats" in Moscow represents part of an emerging trend. This is simply not true. Excluding Moscow, the combined vote cast for Yabloko/SPS in the 11 most recent regional elections is only 4 percent, which is! pretty much in line with their combined average Levada rating, 4 to 5 percent.
What factors can potentially persuade 20 percent of the voters to choose "united democrats" in 2007? Few in Russia would disagree that worsening economic conditions or major political cataclysms will only strengthen leftist nationalistic movements. It's therefore puzzling why Aron seems to believe that a drop in oil prices, massive public protests or the sprawling war in the Northern Caucasus will trigger a 5-fold increase in appreciation of liberal values among the Russian electorate.
"United democrats" have their work cut out for them: to overcome the 7 percent threshold in the 2007 Duma election and form a functional, albeit unavoidably small, Duma faction. Chasing the chimera of becoming "the second largest party in the country" will only result in setting false priorities, lost focus ¬ and lost voters along the way. Outcries over omnipotent "administrative resources" and "electoral shenanigans of the authorities" will inevitably follow. It's time for Russia's liberals and their Western supporters to get entrenched in reality.