#33 - JRL 2006-136 - JRL Home
From: Timothy Blauvelt <blauvelt@rambler.ru>
Subject: Re: Sergei Roy, JRL 132 [re: Georgia,
Caucasus]
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2006
In his rejoinder to my comments in JRL 131, Mr. Roy in JRL 132 provides further illustration of exactly the kind of attitude that I was referring to: We know the Caucasus. They cut people's throats there. We know. We've rock climbed there. A foreigner (or more precisely, an American) cannot possibly have lived and worked in the region for a number of years, speak one or more local languages, or have significant first-hand experience in the conflict areas. He must, by default, be (at best) a dangerous dilettante with a pastime of paying flying visits to the region to buff up preconceived opinions. (I don't mean to ascribe this attitude to Russian intellectuals in general, but I suspect Mr. Roy is correct in his assumption that there are many more people who share this point of view).
Rather than replying to Mr. Roy’s rejoinder point for point, I would like to highlight several issues that deserve particular attention.
1). I would happily defer to Mr. Roy's judgments on the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia if he would “adduce" his arguments on the basis of anything more than anecdotes, stereotypes, and clichés, none of which are particularly helpful in the search for viable solutions: e.g., the Chechens retroactively invented the Colombian necktie (sometimes also called a “Sicilian necktie”), so a negotiated settlement of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts is out of the question; the Abkhazians and Abaza are one people so they have an unquestionable right to unification, never mind that a number of other peoples in the region are similarly close to the Abkhazians in terms of language, ethnic heritage, and surnames (not least the Mingrelians in Georgia who although belonging to a separate language group have many shared family lines and often indistinguishable surnames), or the fact that the Abkhazians themselves have never mentioned an “unquestionable right" to unification with the Abaza in any official document on conflict settlement or political status demands. More importantly, there are many places in the world where minority populations live in border regions, and ethnic ties alone are never considered sufficient basis for an “unquestionable right” to change international boundaries in either international law or in practice.
2). Ultimately, as I understand it, the essence of the discussion is whether the status quo in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts with Georgia is stable and maintainable. Clearly Abkhazia and South Ossetia are de-facto separate from Georgia, but perhaps less so than Mr. Roy avers. Large parts of both territories are not under the control of the de-facto authorities: South Ossetia is a patchwork quilt of Ossetian and Georgian held areas, and in Abkhazia the de-facto authorities’ control over the Gali district, populated primarily by returning Georgian refugees, is tenuous at best. Significant cross-border interaction, trade and contraband activities with Georgia proper take place in both territories.
The Georgian leadership is indeed restrained in its actions, to a degree, by Georgia's dependence on Russia, although in the wake of recent events there is a perception that Georgia is now orienting itself towards other markets and reducing her dependence on her northern neighbor. Whether this is actually happening or not is hard to say, but there is a perception among Georgians that it is. That perception, combined with the (probably misguided) assumption that Russia will stay neutral in the event of hostilities in the conflict zones if the Americans are involved, might be eroding that restraint on the Georgian leadership.
The saber rattling of the Georgian leadership unfortunately has tremendous resonance among the Georgian population, and it would be political suicide for any Georgian politician to accept the status-quo in the separatist regions. It is my belief (yes, just my naïve opinion, based on what I see here every day) that the Georgian leadership is serious about efforts to compromise and negotiate a political settlement, and they are serious about their commitment to use political rather than military means. But whether my belief is correct or not, the status quo is simply unacceptable for the Georgian population, and without some form of negotiated settlement (or at least concessions, such as internationalizing the peacekeeping contingent) this conflict will never go away, and will explode again sooner or later.
What is more, posturing from the Russian side about the irreversibility of the status quo and presenting the issue as a zero-sum game is possibly very dangerous, in that it is exactly the sort of thing that might push the Georgian leadership into doing something stupid, like attempting to use force again.
3). On a more positive note, although Georgia has had nothing to offer the separatist territories in economic terms in the past, it is conceivable that this reality could change in the future. Despite continuing dependencies, the economic development in Georgia over the past few years has been significant and noticeable: transforming from a “failed state" with negative growth to an estimated annual growth of up to 9%. Therefore, some of the suggested confidence-building measures involving something like free trade zones between Georgia and its separatist territories might not be beyond the realm of possibility in the longer term.
Timothy K. Blauvelt
Bakuriani, Georgia
P.S. I'm the last person to shy from criticism of American foreign policy, and I have rather serious concerns of my own about the enthusiasm with which Georgians are taking up American patronage and the sort expectations that Georgians are deriving from it, as well as about the American leadership's haste to use Georgia as a successful example of an “export of democracy.” But nevertheless, one could argue rather strongly that the current mess in the Transcaucasus resulted not so much because of a “centuries-long history of animosity," but rather because of 200+ years of Russian and Soviet policies: conquest, meddling, mismanagement, and “divide-and-rule" strategies. While Russia has very legitimate interests in the region, its pursuit of these interests would be helped by understanding mistakes that have been made in the past and thinking about how to improve on them, rather than just continuing to muddle along and view Georgia’s turn towards America and the West as a zero-sum game.