#27 - JRL 2006-136 - JRL Home
Date: 13 Jun 2006 05:19:54 EDT
From: Anna Parachkevova (Anna.S.Parachkevova.04@Alum.Dartmouth.ORG)
Subject: KREMLIN TECTONICS: THE REMOVAL OF RUSSIA’S CHIEF PROSECUTOR

The recent resignation under pressure of Russia’s chief prosecutor caused a tremor in the Kremlin. Vladimir Ustinov’s removal attests to the rising tensions amongst government factions. Although intended to restore the power balance between jockeying Kremlin factions, the dismissal might signal further instability in the run-up to the 2008 presidential election.

Ustinov and the Siloviki

Ustinov’s removal, widely perceived as being orchestrated by President Putin, was possibly meant to diminish the rising power of the siloviki faction, of which Ustinov is a member. A group of former and present members of the security services, the siloviki have gained significant economic and political power over the last two years. Ironically, Putin, himself a former KGB agent, facilitated the rise of the siloviki, by uniting them under the anti-oligarch banner. When he came to power in 2000, Putin re-appointed Ustinov, who was hired by President Boris Yeltsin the previous year. Winning over the new president meant supporting his initiatives. So, the prosecutor-general became actively involved in the anti-oligarch campaign. He presided over the lawsuits of Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky. The first two managed to flee the country when investigations were opened against them. The latter is now serving an eight-year sentence in a Siberian labor camp.

Meanwhile, the siloviki took over the financial empires of the exiled or imprisoned oligarchs. Igor Sechin, considered to be the head of the siloviki faction, now chairs the state-owned Rosneft, which gobbled up the Khodorkovsky’s assets in Yukos. The alliance between Sechin and Ustinov was strengthened with the marriage of their children. In 2003, Ustinov’s son married Sechin’s daughter.

Even with the oligarchs’ threat reduced, the siloviki continue to use similar tactics in pursuit of their economic and political interests. A recent example is the arrest of Aleksey Barinov, governor of mineral-rich Nenets Autonomous Area in Russia’s Far North. Behind the accusations of embezzlement, Barinov’s case might have been prompted by the vested interest of the siloviki. State-owned Rosneft, chaired by the siloviki leader Sechin, had a personal axe to grind, after Barinov campaigned against a subsidiary of Rosneft for non-payment of $33 million tax debt and breaking ecological standards. Along with resentment over the demand for payment, Rosneft likely fears that Governor Barinov would use his power to impede the company’s work in the region. Nikolay Petrov, scholar-in-residence at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, does not exclude the possibility of Ustinov’s involvement in Barinov’s case. According to Petrov, the role of a prosecutor general is a powerful one especially around election time.

Indeed, Ustinov’s recent warnings of pending high-profile corruption cases might have suggested that he was on the verge of targeting members of Putin’s administration. With the presidential election around the corner, Ustinov’s presence could prevent Putin from maintaining a level playing field between the various factions. So far, Putin has designated two main candidates in the presidential race, each backed by a faction, one being the siloviki. The first group, comparatively liberal, backs Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, who chairs the state-owned gas giant Gazprom. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov is expected to represent the more right wing siloviki. Removing Ustinov might have been a cautious move to prevent a smear campaign against the rivals of the siloviki-backed contender. It seems that President Putin is determined to create the illusion of a free and open election while keeping his hand firmly on the tiller.

From a Tremor to A Quake

But Putin’s intervention attests to an existing instability of the system, which is not self-sufficient and requires his assistance. Until now, the president has managed to preserve the power balance in the Kremlin. But as his second term comes to an end, it remains to be seen if his heir will manage to navigate the system as skillfully. Failure to do so might result in a loss of control that leads the country into a political and economic crisis.

Putin’s frequent cabinet reshuffles are also likely to further destabilize the country. Dismissals and resignations won’t necessarily resolve any problems, but will surely create new outspoken critics of the regime and intensify the friction among various Kremlin factions. Such clashes can result in more than just a tremor that shakes the ground beneath a single Kremlin official. The entire Russian state will be the epicenter of this political quake, whose vibrations would be felt long after Putin is gone.