December 16, 1997 
This Date's Issues:    1435 • 1436 

Johnson's Russia List
#1436 
16 December 1997
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Dev Murarka: Lebed.
2. Jerry Hough: Re Mikheev on Yeltsin.
3. Journal of Commerce: John Helmer, RUSSIA ON ROUBLE PRECIPICE, 
US INVESTORS A SHOVE AWAY.
4. Moskovskiye Novosti: Report by State Duma Defense Committee 
Deputy Chairman Aleksey Arbatov, "The President's Word and Nuclear 
Warheads."
5. NTV: 'Hero of the Day' Interviews Gorbachev.
6. Legion (Canada): Matthew Fisher, RUSSIAN VETS: STRANGERS IN A 
STRANGE LAND: Inside the world of Russia's WW II veterans.
7. RIA Novosti: THE GUILT OF US CITIZEN RICHARD BLISS ACCUSED OF 
ESPIONAGE HAS BEEN OBJECTIVELY PROVED, THE FSB DIRECTOR SAID.
8. PC Magazine: Shopping in Space.
9. RIA Novosti: STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCE TO MARK ITS PROFESSIONAL 
HOLIDAY IN A RENEWED COMPOSITION.
10. RIA Novosti: ALEXIY II, PATRIARCH OF MOSCOW AND ALL RUSSIA, 
CALLED UPON PEOPLE TO OPPOSE "VIOLENCE AND MORAL 
CORRUPTION" OF SOCIETY.]

******

#1
From: "Dev Murarka" <devmur@centro.ru>
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 13:41:59 MSK
Subject: Lebed

Dear David,
In response to your call for comment on Lebed, let me first begin with
the reviews from WP (JRL 1388) and NYT (JRL 1430) you have posted.
What such reviews exhibit is an effort to belittle him in the
traditional Western manner of viewing Russians altogether as country
bumpkins. Exception is made by the West only for those Russians, who somehow
or other partly or fully conform to the Westerners image of themselves as
the greatly civilised, all knowing wise Messiahs of humanity, bestowed with
all the virtues imaginable. Lebed is not such a person.
The attitudes displayed in the reviews underline a continuously
troubling aspect of the current western discourse about Russia and Russians
in a wider context. It is that the majority of the western chattering class
have formed an incestuous intellectual relationship with its counterpart in
Moscow, if not Russia. It is the prejudices of this segment of the
contemporary Russian intelligentsia which are reflected in its posture on
Lebed.
Sadly, few of the western chatterers, who have absorbed the romantic
view of the Russian intelligentsia based on its 18th-19th century role or
its partial dissidence during the Soviet period, acknowledge or comprehend
the appalling degradation which has taken place in its character during the
last decade. From a class with a social conscience and civic values it has
turned into one of lickspittles of the present establishment. Naturally, it
views Lebed as a threat to its position and is apprehensive at the prospect
of his coming to power. Just how low this class has fallen could be seen
from the so-called congress of the intelligentsia organised and conducted
recently by Sergei Filatov, a Yeltsinite bureaucrat greatly responsible for
starting the Chechnya genocide. A pity that Gorbachov sought an audience at
this gathering.
For this Russian chattering class Lebed is simply "ne nash" or "not
ours", as they say. This attitude has deep historical roots in its
traditional alienation from the masses. It looks down upon what the common
people prefer because it does not really comprehend their criteria of
judgement as it knows little about their lives and problems and cares even
less. It no longer has even the simple honesty to ask itself whether Lebed
would be really worse than Yeltsin. The western counterpart of this class
simply regurgitates their position as its own wisdom. Hence the rather
posturing reviews of Lebed. After all, his memoirs are not meant to be a
literary masterpiece. 
In reality, Lebed has a bark worse than his bite. He is far from a
simple person. Without going into details of his career as he presents it,
it seems that two aspects of his character and personality stand out, his
sense of realism allied to an innate instinct of decency. His conduct in a
number of crises bears this out, in August 1991, in Transdniester, above all
in Chechnya, which even lost him some degree of public support. However, he
could not have achieved the end of war in Chechnya without a temporary
alliance with Yeltsin which is otherwise open to criticism on many other
counts.
Given his military background, he conducts himself in a blunt manner
and does lack sophistication in some ways. But it may be that the people
have a better sense of judgement in preferring him over those thoroughly
mired in the corruption of the Yeltsin regime.
Undoubtedly he is a nationalist and expresses it in a strong, even
intemperate, language. But he is not the most extreme of them of them. In
this, however, he is representative of his people who seek solace in such
verbalisation of their feelings of humiliation and distress at all round 
impoverishment. If the west wants to understand Lebed, rather than
dismissing him as a "lout" or condescendingly as a "pragmatist", it should
pay attention to his deep and genuine concern over the present state of
Russia, something felt and shared much more widely in the country than
realised by those promoting or mesmerised by slogans of reform and market
economy as the ultimate end of the road. There is a fire which burns in him
which should not be dismissed lightly or denigrated because it does not
conform to the received values of the market economy and globalisation age.
There is still a place for some idealism in the world, even if it has become
unfashionable to say so or recognise it. The more so in the present state of
the Russian society.
Lebed may not be an ideal person. But then, who is? In the wake of
Yeltsin Russia would need, above all, a strong dose of honesty and integrity
at the top and Lebed is one of the very few, though not the only one, who
might be able to administer it. A stack of silent votes is waiting to be
cast in his favour.
Moreover, is it not time to allow Russians themselves to select their
own leaders rather than weigh in on them with advice as to who is best for
them and unleash the Carnegie Foundation propaganda machine in favour of the
one favoured by the Washington establishment consensus?
A few days ago when Lebed was asked in a television chat show about his
contacts with the West and whether he was trying to raise money there for
the presidential election, his answer was most interesting and politically
sound. He denied, of course, that he was seeking funds but added that he was
trying to persuade it not to interfere. He had a good point.
In any case, ultimately there is little the West can really do if the
Russians, from its viewpoint, make a poor choice. Therefore, emphasis should
be more on understanding Lebed, or for any one else in the Russian political
arena, rather than to hasten to categorise and pass bright sounding, smart,
ex-cathedra judgement on them.

*******

#2
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 01:33:50 -0500 (EST)
From: "Jerry F. Hough" <jhough@acpub.duke.edu>
Subject: Re: Mikheev on Yeltsin.

I was surprised at Dmitry Mikheev's comment on Yeltsin. As I 
have written, I think Yeltsin is a revolutionary on the scale of 
Lenin--although not a chief executive of his caliber. But Lenin and 
Hitler were great men who had more of an impact on their countries and 
world history than Yeltsin. Does that mean that lesser folk do not have 
the right to analyze and evaluate them?
I would, however, like to support his encouragement of scholars 
to use your pages. I have asked questions about the financial 
situation, and I have been greatly educated not only by comments sent to 
you but by private communications. It seems to me extremely useful if 
people not only comment, but exchange information, findings, and 
questions. Dale Herspring's remarks, for example, strike me as quite 
informative.

*******

#3
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 11:28:55 +0300 (WSU)
From: helmer@glas.apc.org (John Helmer)

Journal of Commerce, December 16
RUSSIA ON ROUBLE PRECIPICE, US INVESTORS A SHOVE AWAY
By John Helmer

Just when Russian government officials claim they are through
the worst of recent market volatility that has thrown the economy into 
reverse, a new threat to the rouble has materialized, Russian officials and
economic experts warn.
According to bank sources, Russia's state savings bank and the leading
Moscow commercial banks are threatened with the loss of their entire capital,
if a foreign run on Russian short-term bonds (GKO's) develops late this 
month, forcing a sharp devaluation of the rouble. 
Foreign securities traders acknowledge that to prevent what one calls
"complete meltdown," everything depends on keeping foreign, mostly American
investment in the GKO market, and avoiding devaluation. This has meant 
raising GKO rates that have vaulted 45% already. What the bankers and debt 
traders have ignored is evidence of massive violation by Russia's banks of 
Central Bank rules, abetted by the government and the International Monetary 
Fund.
The problem stems from what experts say is the banks' large dollar
obligations, including short-term loans maturing in January; and an even
larger volume of forward currency hedge contracts with foreign holders of
GKO's.
On January 1, new Central Bank rules allow foreign holders of about $15 
billion in short-term bonds (GKO's) to repatriate their money without
passing over the bureaucratic hurdles and one-month delay required by
the Central Bank until now.
At the same time, January 1 is the scheduled date for the introduction
of the redenominated rouble and the Central Bank's new foreign exchange rate 
policy. One thousand old roubles will equal one new rouble. The Central
Bank proposes to set a flexible band for intervention to protect its
value at 15%, up or down, for the year; with a daily intervention band of 3%.
The combination of these changes, according to Andrei Cherepanov,
head of the foreign currency division of the Central Bank's foreign operations
department, allows, in theory, for the rouble to slide from a level of
between 6 and 6.2 to the dollar to 6.9 to 7.2.
Cherepanov claims this won't happen. "Currently, I see no difficult
situation in the market," he told The Moscow Tribune.
Russian and foreign media are reporting that foreign, mostly American,
investors are holding about $15 billion in GKO's, most of which is covered by
hedge contracts with Russian banks. They were written when the Russians
expected the rouble to go no higher than 6.2 to 6.4. in 1998.
According to a Business Week interview with Boris Jordan of Renaissance 
Capital, about $10 billion in foreign-held GKO stock is hedged by Russian 
banks. Cherepanov says that Central Bank regulations require hedges and other 
foreign currency obligations of the banks to total no more than 15% of bank 
capital. To cover the GKO hedges, therefore, Russia's banks would require 
capital of at least $67 billion. Official data confirmed by the Central Bank 
reveal the banks have nowhere near this amount. 
Moscow experts believe that only a handful of banks have been involved in
hedging operations. They reportedly include Sberbank, the state savings bank; 
Uneximbank, which is close to First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly
Chubais; and a few others in the top twenty listing of the banks. 
Contacted to say what the volume of their hedging contracts is worth, and
to give a current figure for their capital, bank officials refuse to give 
details of their hedge exposure. Sberbank claims its capital currently totals
the equivalent of $4.4 billion; Uneximbank claims $571 million. The capital
aggregate for the banks believed to be involved in hedging GKO's is no
more than $7 billion.
If the holders of $10 billion in GKO stock decide to exit and take their
dollars out of Russia in January, precipitating a rouble fall by the allowed 
15%, the losses on hedge contracts for the Russian banking system
would total $9 billion. This would wipe out the capital of Russia's
leading banks, and require massive intervention by the Central Bank as well.
Its reserves -- $18 billion and falling since the start of December --
may not be large enough to cope.
According to Cherepanov, massive violation of the 15% rule has
not occurred. "The Central Bank supervision confirms there are no cases of
violations of this rule," he says. 
The International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) has been in Moscow in December, 
examining this and other vulnerabilities of the Russian treasury and the 
Central Bank to new shocks. Noel Atcherley heads the I.M.F.'s financial 
statistical team at the Central Bank, and he may know what the foreign 
obligations of the Russian government and the Russian banks are. He says he 
is "not empowered" to say, and refers the question to the Ministry of 
Finance. The Finance Ministry official who knows says he is not allowed to 
talk to the press; the Ministry press section says it doesn't know the 
figures.
At the State Duma Budget Committee, deputy Victor Gitin says he doesn't
have 
government or Central Bank figures on the size of the foreign exposure. 
Western bankers believe the vulnerability of the Russian banks is worse
than the official figures suggest because capital has shrunk in the past
two months because of sizeable losses. 
Losses from Russian bank trading of Vnesheconombank bonds, commercial and
trade debt of the former Soviet Union, were about $1 billion before the
bonds were re-issued on December 5. At least $200 million was lost by 
Sberbank alone. 
Losses from last month's collapse of the Russian share market are less
easy 
to calculate, because Russian banks are unwilling to disclose them to their 
western creditors. In aggregate, they run into the hundreds of millions of 
dollars. Individual Russian bank losses probably don't exceed $75 million.
Some banks have suffered a quiet run by institutional depositors,
who have emptied 10% or more of their accounts. Inter-bank lending by Russia's
banks shrank this month by a third to a half. Turnover on the share market
has plummeted. Russian bank purchases of GKO's has also declined sharply.
Liquidity is tighter now than Russian bankers have experienced, as they face 
next month's liabilities. 
First Deputy Prime Minister Chubais, who lost his Finance Ministry
portfolio
for taking a payoff from Uneximbank, has said devaluation "totally contradicts
Russia's national interests." He also claims the GKO interest rate rise
this month has produced "a sign of growing investor confidence."
In the Russian parliament, finance experts say the government's budget
allows only enough money for debt service if GKO interest rates in 1998
don't exceed 20%. The deputies predict a deficit blow-out for which they 
expect the government to blame the Duma.

******

#4
Aides Urged To Curb Yeltsin Arms 'Inflation' 

Moskovskiye Novosti, No. 49
December 7-14, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Report by State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairman Aleksey
Arbatov: "The President's Word and Nuclear Warheads"

The Russian president surprised the world again by announcing in
Sweden: "We are unilaterally reducing the number of nuclear warheads by
another third."
But strictly speaking, in spite of all the outward effectiveness of
this "peace initiative," in essence it does not really commit us to do
anything. After all, it was not said what nuclear warheads were in
question or from what level the one-third reduction will be made: from the
actual one existing in the strategic forces today (approximately 5,000
weapons) or from the ceiling in the START-I treaty (6,000), START-II
(3,000-3,500), or START-III (2,000-2,500), planned for the future? 
Finally, it is not clear in what time period this reduction will be made.
Really, these parameters can be played around with in such a way that
no real reduction will have to be specially conducted at all. Because old
equipment will have to be taken out of combat service, the Russian nuclear
arsenal will be decreased in the next 10-15 years anyway. Immediately
following the president's announcement in Stockholm, the heads of competent
departments started explaining that what was meant was a reduction from the
ceilings agreed to in the START-III framework (that is, to the level of
1,300-2,700 weapons), moreover only in 10 years and, most importantly, only
together with the United States. So now it is only left for everyone to
pretend that this is what the president meant, even though the "sound" (as
he put it himself) suggested something different.
Another factor can only cause apprehension. In the sphere of
strategic security it is as if some kind of "inverted" system for
elaborating decisions has formed in Russia. First at one, then at another
summit the head of state suddenly announces some strategic idea from God
knows where. And then high-ranking state officials, turning cold from
discomfiture and contradicting one another, have to begin giving it
interpretations in order to eliminate the overall misunderstanding and
avert damage to the country's defense and the negotiations process. That
is what happened with the May (1997) declaration about "removing warheads
from Russian missiles aimed at countries participating in the Paris
summit." The same thing took place with the older idea of creating a
"global ballistic missile defense system" jointly with the United States,
and with the declaration of "not aiming Russia's missiles at U.S. cities,"
and so on.
It is obvious that all of these political initiatives should be
thoroughly prepared in advance with the participation of specialists from
the appropriate departments and only then be "sounded" in public. At the
same time, achieving the propaganda effect and a positive reaction from the
world community is very possible. In any case, every word of the
declaration should be weighed with a pharmacist's precision. After all, an
extremely complex and dangerous military, strategic, and technical reality
lies behind it: tens of thousands of "Hiroshimas," not to speak of
trillions of rubles from the treasury.
When the question is one of dismissing a high-ranking, even
discredited functionary, the Kremlin works through and weighs up the
decision for many months. Yet here, just on the whim of a good mood,
improvisations are made about nuclear missiles that excite the whole world
and cause the Russian state apparatus and defense complex to shudder.
Why is this so? Perhaps this is a sphere that the president, by
virtue of his life experience, understands the least and does not
comprehend all of its momentous complexity, seeing it as a kind of field
for speedy and carefree decisions that yield a great outward effect (and
this, it must be acknowledged, he really loves to do). Delusions probably
exist that both the foreign and the Russian political communities, just
like the press, do not comprehend these affairs and will not understand
that they are simply being taken in. Finally, the president's closest
aides apparently do not dare to provide him with a truthful evaluation of
the consequences of such steps.
In the end, the improvisations yield an entirely opposite effect. An
opinion is taking root in the world that Russia's behavior is quite
unpredictable, moreover in the sphere that is unfortunately the only one
today in which it still maintains the status of a great power and even a
nuclear superpower, which entails great responsibility before the whole
world. This is one of the reasons behind the scornful yet cautious
attitude toward Russia that is growing in the West.
Inside the country, such surprises only bring joy to the enemies of a
rational defense policy, the military reforms that have finally begun,
treaties on the mutual reduction of arms, and, most of all, the
ratification of START-II.
No, it is not sensations that Russia needs at summits now to increase
its prestige and weight in international affairs. Since our economic and
geopolitical situation is still so vulnerable, the matter can at least be
helped somewhat by a consistent and thoroughly thought-out military and
strategic course -- especially in the nuclear missile dimension. And it is
time for the Kremlin's dreamers and practical workers to understand that
the president's word is also the state's property, its gold reserve, its
hardest currency. Not allowing its inflation is just as important as
fighting the fall of the ruble rate.

********

#5
'Hero of the Day' Interviews Gorbachev 

NTV
11 December 1997

Moscow NTV in Russian at 1641 GMT on 11 December carries the "Hero of
the Day" program in which correspondent Pavel Lapkov holds a 15-minute
interview with former USSR president Mikhail Gorbachev. Lapkov tells
viewers that Gorbachev made a sensational statement at the congress of
Russian intelligentsia, proposing an alliance with the writer Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn to "save the Russian people," to use Gorbachev's own words. 
Gorbachev says that he attended the congress as a guest of honor and that
he himself had asked for an opportunity to speak, to encourage the
intelligentsia, such as doctors, teachers, scientists, and assure them that
Russia needs their work in the present and future.
Asked whether Solzhenitsyn was aware of his proposal of an alliance,
whether he had in fact spoken with the writer, Gorbachev replies: "You
know, I supported rather than made him an offer. And I supported what
Aleksandr Isayevich [Solzhenitsyn] said when he was speaking at the academy
in particular, because today he spoke about what is most important --
saving the Russian people, and he was quite right in saying that that is
the most topical national idea. I added that we must save and preserve our
state." Gorbachev reflects on a recent round table of his foundation
attended by scholars and scientists who stated that 52 percent of the
population were living below subsistence level. He mentioned the falling
birth rate and rising mortality, which threatens a 20 million decrease in
the population over the next 10-15 years. "Russia is dying on us, is
getting smaller," Gorbachev says. He adds that in 1995 one third of
pregnant women were suffering from anaemia and more than 29 percent of
children born were sick. "The basis of the nation, the basis of the people
is being undermined," he says. Gorbachev expresss optimism that Russia
would come out on top, although he is concerned about what he believes is
happening in the moral sphere, such as the collapse of education and
science.
He warns against a delay in turning Russia into a civilized country,
which might mean that it would become deflected from this course for
another 70 years. "Therefore -- when the presidential election campaign
was under way -- I said this was what was urging me on because neither the
present regime, nor the communists, our Russian Communist Party, who are
desirous of replacing them, can offer the policy that would extricate us
from this state." Gorbachev says that the intelligentsia had drawn up
programs for improving things in Russia but the government had ignored
them. "I have said that I am prepared to appeal, together with Aleksandr
Isayevich, to everyone, to the whole of the Russian public, to all the
peoples of Russia, to the Russian people above all, in order to combine our
efforts, in order to get the policy that we need, for I can see from what
is happening that we have lost our way. You see, did you hear what Deputy
Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov said a few days ago -- we have done what we
set out to do. But what are the results? He can see and we can see. And
he added that they don't have any other ideas, any more ideas. That means
that they should go then, if they don't have any ideas."
Regarding the pizza commercial, Gorbachev says that in principle he is
opposed to taking part in financial campaigns and appearing in commercials,
but that his foundation was so short of cash that he had to resort to it to
boost funds. He denies that he is receiving $150,000 for the commercial,
but did not reveal the exact sum. He said that his foundation's original
building had been taken from them by the President and that they had
difficulty in paying for the present one and setting up a library and a
perestroyka archive which, he promises, would contain "worthwhile
documents."
Gorbachev concludes by saying that he will meet Solzhenitsyn.

*******

#6
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 10:30:47 -0500
From: Matthew Fisher <R_MatthewFisher@compuserve.com>
Subject: a trio of pieces for possible inclusion in Johnson's List.

Moscow,
David,
Enclosed in this E-Mail are three articles by me which appear 
together in the November/December issue of 
Canada's second largest magazine, Legion. [DJ: Only first one here.]
Legion magazine serves Canadian veterans. You might wish 
to include them in Johnson's List.
Incidently, the magazine assures me there is no problem publishing this.
Merry Christmas,
Matthew Fisher
The Toronto Sun

RUSSIAN VETS: STRANGERS IN A STRANGE LAND: Inside the world of Russia's WW
II veterans.
By MATTHEW FISHER

Just down the street from my Moscow flat, hidden from view
by piles of trash and an abandoned industrial construction site,
there is a perfectly-preserved pillbox. It's a small one, an
upside-down concrete frying pan with narrow machine-gun slits,
dating from that desperate autumn of 1941 when the Nazis were at
the city gates and all citizens, old and young, were mobilized
for a last-ditch defence. The pillbox never could have seen
action; the Germans were finally stopped about 3 kilometres
further out. But someone has fixed a plaque to it, there is a
tiny, well-tended flower garden to one side, and a path leading
through underbrush to the main street is regularly swept. Not far
away, near the commercial bustle of Kaluzhskaya metro station,
elderly Russians -- many of them about the right age to have
manned that pillbox in its day -- come to rummage through
dumpsters for anything they can eat or sell. For them it's a new,
and in its way more frightening, battle for survival.
The generation of Russians who fought in World War Two, or
the Great Fatherland Patriotic War as they still call it, are now
an average 75 years old. Of the 22-million veterans who survived
the war barely 2.4-million are still alive in Russia; 800,000 of
them are severely disabled. Almost a quarter of a million die
with each passing year. Yet they remain a highly visible social
force, with strong organizations and widely-circulated
publications. In a country that has few cohesive institutions and
a badly crippled sense of historical continuity, veterans find
themselves ardently courted by politicians hungry for the aura of
genuine, untainted patriotism that attaches to them. 
Chaos has scrambled Russia's calendar in recent years, with
old Soviet-era holidays falling into disgrace and the new
religious and official holidays still lacking acceptance. But
there remains one day that everyone, across Russia's fractious
political spectrum and age divide, continues to venerate: May 9,
the date the Soviet Union celebrated its historic victory over
Nazi Germany.
But for all that, the private lot of most surviving Russian
veterans is grim, and getting worse.
Their lives have seen an historical roller-coaster ride that
has careened through several distinct epochs, each with its own
harsh sacrifices and special terrors, and finally deposited them
in what seems an alien land, far from the country and beliefs
they were born into. At the end of the ride many find themselves
reduced to a sad and grinding daily poverty, with little to show
for a lifetime of struggling and working for the sake of Soviet
society. More than that, there is a feeling akin to shell shock,
as they wander across a landscape that is at once familiar but at
the same time irrevocably and totally changed.
"It's impossible to explain the rage, the frustration that
one feels, to see all that we fought for and built up just
evaporate overnight. It's an unspeakable tragedy," says Ivan
Denin, editor of the Russian Veteran Committee's official weekly
newspaper "Veteran", which has a circulation of about 50,000. 
"We were brought up in a collective spirit, to share and
give and build together. Young people today live only for
themselves, and could not care less about what we did. And they
have contempt for the values that we hold dear."
Many Russian veterans, like Denin, speak fondly of those
halcyon days of World War Two, when the Red Army was advancing on
all fronts and Soviet leaders sat down with the Western allies to
shape a new world order. The victory over Naziism -- which most
still view as a uniquely Soviet achievement, won at the
staggering cost of 26-million lives -- seemed to give meaning,
legitimacy and a sense of historical destiny to the Communist
system. After decades of turmoil, sacrifice and murder brought on
by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's collectivization of agriculture,
forced industrialization and bloody political purges, the
promises appeared to be finally coming true.
This helps to explain why so many Russians who lived and
fought through the war remain staunchly pro-Communist, to this
day. In 1996, five years after the utter collapse of the USSR, an
old-line Communist, Gennady Zyuganov, ran for for Russian
president against the reformer Boris Yeltsin, and won over 40 per
cent of the vote. The single most identifiable source of
Zyuganov's support was among Russians over 60, the World War Two
generation.
"We built a huge superpower that was respected throughout
the world," says Denin. "It was strong discipline, common belief
and collective struggle that made our country great. We won the
war with that spirit.
"Now Russia has joined the so-called capitalist world, what
is it? A beggar nation that has to crawl on its knees to the West
for scraps of food."
Like some of their Canadian counterparts, Russian veterans
report feelings of crushing disappointment and bewilderment when
wartime hopes for a better, more open world gradually dissolved
into the hatred and mutual hostility of the Cold War. But unlike
their Canadian counterparts, there was to be no postwar consumer
prosperity for them. They faced the agonizing task of rebuilding
a shattered nation, in conditions of near-total isolation from
the world economy, with all the country's best resources diverted
to a new race for military supremacy.
Though the Soviet Union waxed powerful, the lot of average
people was tough. In the early postwar years they faced long,
hard hours of work on near-starvation rations. Millions moved
from the devastated countryside to new industrial cities, but
were given accomodation in teeming dormitories or cramped
communal flats, where several families were jammed together into
a single living space. Over ten per cent of Russians still
inhabit these "kommunalkas", the majority of them elderly people.
Until Stalin died in 1953, all Soviets lived in fear of a
midnight visit from the secret police and a nightmare journey
into the vast, secret Gulag prison camp system, from which few
ever returned. When Nikita Khrushchev came to power, he denounced
Stalin, began liberalizing political life and emptied the Gulags.
The terror receded, but never completely went away. To this day
many Russian veterans, graduates of that hard school, will talk
eagerly to a foreign journalist about their wartime experiences
but then cagily refuse to give their last name.
The decades that followed were peaceful and even relatively
prosperous. The wartime generation grew to middle age as the
Soviet Union ascended to superpower status. Sputnik went up in
1956, amazing the world, and five years later Yuri Gagarin became
the first person in space. The USSR gained nuclear parity with
the United States, a fact recognized when President Richard Nixon
launched detente with Moscow and began negotiating the first arms
control treaty in the early 1970's. There were also times of
profound international tension, when the Soviet Union tightened
its grip on Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 by sending
in the Red Army, and at least one moment of hair-raising atomic
terror during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Very few Russians
dared to speak out or protest at these events and, it seems, most
tended to accept their government's point of view or had learned
it was better to have no opinion.
Although the 1960's and 1970's are considered by scholars as
a time of creeping crisis in the Soviet Union, the beginning of
the end, most Russian veterans speak of the Brezhnev era as a
golden age. The hard postwar reconstruction was over and the USSR
was completing its transformation from a predominantly rural,
backward society to a modern, industrial urban one. By Western
standards, it never made the grade. Nevertheless, this was the
period when many Russian families received their first self-
contained city flat, acquired a telephone, TV set and home
appliances, saw a family member attain a higher education or
receive dental care, all for the first time.
Besides basking in official praise and public adoration on
Victory Day, Soviet war veterans enjoyed a host of special
privileges. In a society of chronic shortages, all veterans had
the right to go to the head of the line-up in any shop. By Soviet
standards, they enjoyed comfortable pension bonuses and priority
access to housing. They were entitled to use public transport
free of charge, and take a free annual plane or train journey to
anywhere in the USSR. Many veterans were given access to special
food shops, medical clinics, and summer rest homes. War invalids
enjoyed a network of special hospitals that provided free
physical therapy, artificial limbs, wheelchairs and other
services.
That comfortable world began to unravel in the mid-1980's,
after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and set about reforming the
sputtering Soviet system. Gorbachev was the first postwar Kremlin
leader too young to be a veteran, and his enthusiastic talk of
democratizing politics and vigorously restructuring the USSR's
sclerotic economy was alarming to many in a World War Two
generation that was itself sliding into old age.
The final collapse of the USSR in 1991 was an
incomprehensible event for most veterans. The power they had
grown up with, fought for, that had seemed so mighty, suddenly
evaporated. After an abortive coup and an almost completely
bloodless power struggle, Gorbachev shuffled off the stage and
the Soviet Union ceased to exist. It went out with a whimper, not
a bang. And it left millions feeling bereft.
The new Russian government, under Boris Yeltsin, launched
radical market reforms, including price liberalization, a massive
privatization campaign and drastic slashing of state subsidies
for health, education and other social services. 
Soviet-era privileges that had made life bearable for
veterans were not withdrawn in theory, but in practice they
withered. Special hospitals closed, formerly free services now
had to be paid for, and the cash-strapped Russian state withheld
pension payments for months at a time, claiming there was no
money.
In 1992 Russia endured a 2,000 per cent inflation rate,
which virtually wiped out most peoples' bank savings. Many
elderly Russians, who had accumulated enough money to cover
funeral costs, or perhaps pass something along to grandchildren,
saw their savings dwindle within months to barely the price of a
chocolate bar. Despite promises from President Yeltsin and other
leaders, there has never been any compensation.
"The government pays lip service to veterans and their
troubles, but in reality it has simply abolished all of the
support structures and left people to sink or swim in the new
world," says Nellie Naidenko, a legal advisor with the Veteran's
Support Committee, an independent organization that lobbies for
veteran's rights in the Russian parliament.
"This may be OK for young people, but for the elderly it is
a catastrophe. And this is not just a case of tough luck. It is
the total betrayal of pledges this nation made to people who
fought, and worked and sacrificed everything. They were promised
a dignified and comfortable old age in return," she says.
"Now suddenly the official ideology has changed, and we now
supposedly live in an individualistic society where everyone is
supposed to take care of himself. How are our veterans supposed
to feel about this?"
In conversations with Russian war veterans today, it is a
theme they return to again and again: at a time of life when they
expected to be enjoying a well-earned retirement and the few
comforts the system had allotted, they find themselves plunged
into a new whirlwind of political turmoil and economic privation.
And worst of all, they feel they have been abandoned by society
and left to face it alone.
The average pension for a Russian war veteran today is just
220,000 roubles (about $37 US) per month. If he or she is an
invalid, there is a supplemental payment of 140,000 roubles
(about $23 US). In Russia's expensive new market economy, this is
barely enough for a subsistence of bread and tea. On the other
hand, most veterans were able to gain clear ownership of their
Soviet-era apartments, and housing and utilities charges in
Russia remain very low by Western standards. Also in Russia,
where families tend to be tight and respect for elders strong,
few are left without some sort of assistance. 
It is common for veterans to say they regret not so much
their own condition as the degradation of Russian society. Soviet
streets were safe and orderly, they recall; nowadays crime and
anarchy seem to rule the roost. Educational standards, along with
public health and life expectancy, have been in free-fall since
the demise of the USSR. Russia's new government, though somewhat
more open and democratic than its Communist predecessor, is a
swamp of corruption, incompetence and waste. Some veterans
interviewed for this article said it was particularly horrifying
to see the Russian army they had once proudly served wielded by
President Yeltsin in a bloody and futile 2-year attempt to put
down a separatist rebellion in the southern republic of Chechnya.
Others argued that the fratricidal war was justified, but it was
humiliating to watch their once-great army defeated and chased
off the battlefield by lightly-armed Chechen irregulars.
Finally, most say they feel infuriated by Russia's loss of
great power status and the perception of respect from the rest of
the world. Nothing symbolizes this more than the Western military
alliance NATO's decision this year to expand to the borders of
the former Soviet Union. The mere mention of this can send many
aging Russian vets into a towering rage.
"We dissolved our military alliance unilaterally and
voluntarily, and we all expected at least a little goodwill from
the other side," says Vassily Soshnev, a 78-year old veteran of
the Ukrainian and Belarussian fronts, who now heads the Russian
Veteran Committee's social services department.
"Instead the West takes advantage of Russia's temporary
weakness to move its armies up to our very borders. This is
historical perfidy on a grand scale, and it will poison relations
in the future, you'll see," he says.
Much of the anger is reserved for the Russian government,
which is perceived as weak and ineffectual.
"Our generation fought and won real security for Russia,
almost unparalleled in all our history. But what was accomplished
through so much blood and sacrifice, and held onto by the Soviet
Union, these young idiots have squandered in a few thoughtless
years," Soshnev says. "It is so heart-wrenching to see this
happening."
Rightly or wrongly, Soshnev's view sums up the feelings of
betrayal that most Russian veterans feel.
Whatever the future holds in store for the new Russia, it is
not likely to bring much solace for its embittered and neglected
war veterans. The enormous achievement of their war victory seems
unfulfilled, even mocked, by the poverty, crime and chaos they
now find around them. Yet for all that the memory is still alive
for the next generation to find, perhaps by stumbling upon an old
pillbox, with a well-tended flower garden, near a busy street
corner. 

********

#7
THE GUILT OF US CITIZEN RICHARD BLISS ACCUSED OF ESPIONAGE
HAS BEEN OBJECTIVELY PROVED, THE FSB DIRECTOR SAID 

MOSCOW, DECEMBER 16. /FROM RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT ANDREI
GALKIN/ -- "The guilt of Richard Bliss, an employee of the
American telecommunications Qualcomm company, has been proved,"
Nikolai Kovalyov, director of the Federal Security Service (FSB)
of Russia, said today in an interview to a RIA Novosti
correspondent. 
However, the investigation, he added, is examining the
subjective motives for his actions, that is, "who and what
pushed the American into conducting geodesic work in
Rostov-on-Don". Bliss says that he received such an assignment
from the administration of his company.
Kovalyov's assurance in the guilt of Bliss is based on the
fact that the American citizen conducted topographical surveys
with a precision of upto three metres whereas according to the
Russian laws, the cartographic and geodesic surveys done with
the precision higher than thirty metres are considered a
violation of the state secret. 
The Russian Geodesic and Cartographic committee expressed
an expert opinion that the equipment used by Bliss is designed
for a more precise survey, the fact which was not denied by
Bliss himself. The data received by Bliss, Kovalyov stressed, 
"represent an interest for foreign military intelligence
services".
The FSB director said that after the detention of Bliss, he
himself met with the US Ambassador in Russia and with the
leadership of the Qualcomm company. Against their guarantees,
Bliss was released from custody under the recognizance not to
leave Rostov. Kovalyov said that the Russian special service was
offered a ransom for Bliss (he did not mention the sum), but the
FSB refused it. Now, Kovalyov says, the US citizen "is attending
the interrogation procedure and gives evidence".
Incidentally, the FSB director said, Bliss became the third
American citizen who was detained this year in Russia with a
topographical equipment of high precision. "If the first two
were officers of the military intelligence of the United States
the employer of Richard Bliss is still not known".

*******

#8
PC Magazine
January 6, 1998 
[for personal use only]
Shopping in Space
By Angela Hickman, Carol Levin, Sebastian Rupley, and Don Willmott

Flight Commander Anatoly Solovyev and Flight Engineer Pavel Vinogrado
plan to be floating 200 miles above Earth inside the space station Mir
until February, but that hasn't stopped them from doing a little holiday
shopping. The cosmonauts recently made history by placing the first online
order from space.
They used Virtual Emporium's online personal shopper
(www.virtualemporium.com) to select two Pentium II systems, then e-mailed
their choices to Virtual Emporium, where the request was translated into
English. The order was placed on Gateway's Web site and received in
Gateway's facility in Kansas City, Missouri. Then the order was processed
and forwarded to Gateway's manufacturing plant in Dublin, Ireland, where
the PCs will be built and shipped to Russia.
That's about as far as Gateway will deliver the order.
Cosmonaut entering cyberspace. 

******

#9
STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCE TO MARK ITS PROFESSIONAL 
HOLIDAY IN A RENEWED COMPOSITION

MOSCOW, December 16. (RIA Novosti correspondent Yuri
Alexeyev) -- The strategic missile force of the Russian armed
forces is marking its professional holiday - the 38th
anniversary of its creation - in a renewed composition.
As is known, pursuant to the presidential decree of July
16, 1997 "On priority measures to reform the Russian armed
forces and their structure", the strategic missile force, the
military space force and the space missile defence force have
been integrated into a single service.
The RIA Novosti correspondent was told at the press centre
of the strategic missile force that work in the units,
institutions and educational establishments of the military
space force and the space missile defence force to integrate
them with the strategic missile force has been completed by now.
Such a complex facility as the Baikonur space port has been
accepted. As a result of integration, managerial personnel has
been trimmed by 30% and overlapping structures have been
abolished. According to preliminary estimates, this will make it
possible to save about 240 billion rubles. As a result of the
integration of the strategic missile force, the military space
force and the space missile defence force, 2 trillion roubles
will be released by the year 2000.
As a result of reorganisation, from September 1 through
November 1, 1997, in the strategic missile force, the military
space force and the space missile defence force 57 military
units and institutions were disbanded. By May 1, 1998 the
strength of the strategic missile force will be trimmed by
another 18.4 %.
In the opinion of the Russian military leaders, the
integration of the strategic missile force, the military space
force and the space missile defence force is a natural, logical
step which has helped to raise the reliability of troop control,
their combat readiness and efficiency of combat application and
increase the potential of nuclear deterrence in general. 

*********

#10
ALEXIY II, PATRIARCH OF MOSCOW AND ALL RUSSIA, 
CALLED UPON PEOPLE TO OPPOSE "VIOLENCE AND MORAL 
CORRUPTION" OF SOCIETY

MOSCOW, DECEMBER 16. /FROM RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT
ALEXANDRA UTKINA/ -- Alexiy II, Patriarch of Moscow and all
Russia, expressed his firm intention to oppose "violence and
moral corruption" in the present conditions. He addressed today
an Eparchial assembly in Moscow, attended by representatives of
the clergy and councils from parishes and monasteries.
"The storm of protest, both among the Orthodox and other
religions, was caused by the showing of the film 'The Last 
Temptation of Christ' which contains a monstrous slander against
Jesus Christ, Son of the God", the Patriarch said in his opening
address, which was devoted, in particular, to the criticism of
mass media.
According to him, statements similar to the communist
anti-religious propaganda are made at some TV channels now. The
Russian clergy is accused of all mortal sins. In this connection
the Patriarch expressed his opinion that the attacks on the
Church are explained by the fact that it "comes out against all
that is constantly shown on TV--violence and moral corruption".
"A negative attitude towards the Russian Orthodox Church which
is demonstrated by television and the press is, possibly,
betokens a new attack on the Church", Alexiy II believes.
At present, in his view, attempts are being made again to
weaken the Church through slanderous articles in the press as
well as through the calls to disclaim centuries-old traditions
of the Orthodox Church. "In conditions of freedom the
possibilities of the Church for its mission in the world are
growing but the activity of its enemies are also growing. Today
all are free to act as they wish - they include those who push
the believers to the road of split and those who arrive from
abroad with their different and alien teachings and those who
propagate the way of life incompatible with the moral norms",
the Patriarch said. He called upon people to "be vigilant, to be
able to see the difference between the Spirit of God and the
spirit of delusion".
In this connection he stated the necessity of creating a
church weekly which would be able to give "timely information,
express the attitude of the Church to present-day magazines,
films, newspapers and other mass media means". 

*******