December 10, 1997  
This Date's Issues: 1422  •1423 

Johnson's Russia List
#1423
10 December 1997
davidjohnson@erols.com

*******

Date: Tue, 9 Dec 1997 23:00:34 -0500 (EST)
From: "Rodney W. Jones" <71262.41@compuserve.com> 
Subject: Moscow START II Trip Report

Dear David:

Would you please be so kind as to include this Carnegie trip report in your
Internet List? Thanks much.

Rodney Jones

==========================================================

START 2 Ratification and Related Issues
Trip Report, November 19-22, 1997

Rodney W. Jones
Senior Advisor, START 2 Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Moscow Meetings: 

Rodney Jones, Carnegie Senior Advisor for START II, and Michael Nacht,
former Assistant Director for Strategic and Eurasian Affairs in ACDA and
currently Professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of
Maryland, traveled to Moscow for a sixth round of meetings on START 2
ratification under the auspices of the Carnegie Nuclear Nonproliferation
Project between November 19-22, 1997. The visit was timed to take a reading
on Russian reactions to the START 2 protocol and TMD demarcation agreements
signed on September 26 in New York City, codifying agreements presidents
Yeltsin and Clinton had reached in principle at the Helsinki Summit of
March 1997.

The primary meeting (and focus of this trip report) was a Carnegie Moscow
Center (CMC) Seminar on "START 2 Ratification: Endgame in Moscow?"
co-sponsored by the Center for Geopolitical and Military Forecasts (CGMF)
and All-Russia Spiritual Heritage Movement (ARSHM). The Seminar was opened
by Arnold Horelick, newly appointed Director of Carnegie's Russia and
Eurasia Program; Alexei Arbatov, Director of CGMF; and Gen. Yuri Lebedev,
Vice-Chairman of ARSHM. Alexander Pikayev, Nonproliferation Project Program
Associate at CMC, chaired the meeting. Alexander Vetsko, CMC
Nonproliferation Project Research Assistant, helped arrange the seminar and
several side meetings. Featured as speakers at the seminar were: 

Hon. Alexei Arbatov, Deputy of the Russian State Duma 
Hon. Richard Lugar, U.S. Senator
Mr. Anton Vasiliev, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament, Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (also head of Russian JCIC delegation)
Hon. Michael Nacht, University of Maryland
Mr. Anton Surikov, Assistant to State Duma Deputy Yu. Maslyukov
Mr. Gennady Khromov, former START I and JCIC Soviet/Russian delegation
expert
Dr. Rodney W. Jones, Senior Advisor, Carnegie START 2 project 

Key Impressions:

START 2 ratification appears to have been deferred to the spring of 1998:
The NATO-Russian Founding Act in May, the START 2 "extension" protocol
negotiated during the summer, and the ABM Treaty agreements concluded in
Geneva at the SCC in late August (TMD demarcation accords and the successor
states amendment), are believed to have completed the conditions that
Russia needed after the Helsinki summit to organize its long-delayed
ratification of START 2. Despite preliminary efforts in early September by
President Yeltsin, Foreign Minister Primakov and Defense Minister Sergeyev
to engage the State Duma on START 2, precedence was given to ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in early November. Duma leaders
seem interested next in action on the Open Skies Treaty. Meanwhile,
executive-legislative preoccupation with the budget and the revised tax
code, coupled with the crisis over Deputy Prime Minister Chubais and his
associates, appears to have set back deliberation on START 2 until
parliament reconvenes after the Christmas and New Year's recess, in
mid-January 1998. START 2 ratification action by the Duma and Federation
Council are not expected to occur before February and probably not before
April 1998.

Executive branch may be as responsible for delays in START 2 ratification
as the Duma: The conventional wisdom is that START 2 can be passed by the
Duma, once President Yeltsin conducts a full court press with his senior
cabinet officials in favor of the treaty. The overwhelming vote obtained
for the CWC in the Duma, followed by unanimous support in the Federation
Council, added "political will" to the Moscow vocabulary. It showed that
coordinated administration effort on treaty ratification can succeed, and
that the Duma opposition can compromise when the president is willing to
make deals on domestic issues that concern Members. 

Bureaucratic turnover is a handicap: Although Foreign Minister Primakov
acted with alacrity to steal the show in welding a temporary solution to
the Iraq crisis, turnover in the MFA continues to leach arms control
expertise away from the front lines. The government had not yet officially
transmitted the September 26 amending protocol to the Duma and Federation
Council for action in conjunction with the START 2 treaty, and apparently
had not decided whether the ABM-related agreements should be submitted with
the START 2 protocol as a package. 

Interest in clarifying the technical content of START 3 is high in expert
circles: We detected little interest in a simplified START 3, an agreement
that might rapidly codify lower warhead ceilings at the expense of
deferring the more difficult issues of transparent, irreversible warhead
elimination. Rather, Russian interest seems to be in maximum freedom to
address Russia's land-based force structure preferences within foreseeable
budget constraints, while limiting U.S. reconstitution potential and
long-range cruise missiles. Some experts are looking at how strategic and
tactical forces might be combined, reshuffled and limited in new
categories. 

Consternation over the Duma going first, and U.S. Senate acting last: In
legislative and expert circles, awareness has dawned that the Helsinki
formula requires Russian parliamentary action first, before START 2 returns
to the U.S. Senate for modification, along with the TMD accords. This
evokes anxiety that the sequential process could somehow boomerang on
Russia. Some experts now speak vaguely of "joint" or "coordinated" action
by the U.S. and Russian legislative bodies. Senator Lugar implicitly
discouraged this notion by noting that President Clinton will not ask the
Senate to act until after the Duma has acted, and by personally affirming
this sequential requirement.

Anticipation of a Summit is in the air: Legislative circles appear to be
positioning themselves to take advantage of a summit, but it is not clear
whether they think their real advantage would be from having acted on START
2, or from trying to extract more U.S. concessions in advance or during a
summit.
Summary of Carnegie Seminar Proceedings
November 21, 1997


Remarks by Alexei Arbatov:

Arbatov touched on domestic and foreign political issues affecting Russia's
relations with the United States, as well as questions specifically
connected with the START 2 and 3 treaties. He noted that the Duma had
showed it could act responsibly by its handling of the CWC, the first arms
control treaty ratified since 1993, and he pointed out lessons from this
CWC experience for Russia's START 2 ratification. 

CWC passage was possible, Arbatov explained, because of detente between the
President and Parliament. The largest opposition faction (Communists)
withdrew a no-confidence proposal when Yeltsin arranged a round-table for
them and elicited their cooperation. CWC passed overwhelmingly in Moscow,
while it barely got two-thirds of the votes in Washington. If the same
executive-legislative cooperation is put into play for START 2, Arbatov
estimated that its chances were good. If there is a "cold war," however,
START 2 has no chance. Today the Communists took a hard line because
Chubais stayed in his position. This delayed action on START 2. Until
December, no one now will even think of START 2. But then in January,
legislators' attitudes will depend on executive cooperation with the Duma.

On the foreign situation: Arbatov said that while the Helsinki extension of
START 2 by five years and the appointment of Defense Minister Sergeyev made
the prospects for START 2 good, the Madrid Summit (on NATO enlargement)
undermined the positive effect of Helsinki, especially where it touched on
TNF and TMD. Like Makashov said, "NATO stands near Minsk." This is to be
measured against Russia's declining conventional forces. Nuclear forces
grow in relative importance for Russian defense. Nuclear deterrence is more
important for us. We need larger concessions from NATO on conventional
forces. Nuclear air weapons in Europe are an acute concern for Russia. This
connects with START 2.

On the set of issues in START 2 and 3: Arbatov argued that START 3 became,
de facto, part of the START 2 package. The federal government needs to put
the "program" for treaty reductions before the Duma; it still hasn't done
so for the new Helsinki elements. Once it does so, the Duma will go back to
work to address them in a new way. Two other factors should be mentioned.
One is whether the government will be responsible for financing the
treaties, CWC as well as START 2. So far, only 20 per cent of what is
needed has been allocated for CWC. The national defense budget, as
presented, is also 20 per cent less than originally expected, and less than
last year. 

Discussion:

Q: Do you think it wise to put before the Duma the whole package signed in
September in New York, tying the two different issues of START 2 and
strategic defense together?

A: This will take us into a debate on defensive systems, no doubt. If the
Duma ratifies START 2, deputies will insist on preconditions on ABM in the
resolution of ratification, both for the entry into force and for the
implementation of the START 2 treaty.

Q: Have you figured out how to deal with the NATO tactical weapons in
Europe?

A: The U.S./NATO decision not to deploy nukes on the territory of new
members was shaped by practical realities -- to try to store them on the
territory of new members would have been costly; but it became a political
factor, they could not rule it out.

Q: Is it not regrettable that the five-year START 2 extension corresponds
to the epochs of military reform policy?

A: We've not reviewed that yet, but personally I do not believe it
corresponds that way to epochs of military reform. START 2 actually reduces
our costs, and now comes close to the natural service life of the missiles.
The first phase of CWC in 1998 will cost more than the costs of START 2 for
its entire duration under the extended deadline, even if we include
elimination costs. The replacement components are different; their cost
would be huge. If we tie in START 3, this also reduces the replacement
component costs, and this would allow more expenditures on military reform.


Remarks by Anton Vasiliev:

START 2 is a process that places controls on nuclear weapons without
undermining deterrence. The September agreements in New York codified a
five-year extension for START 2, and demarcation of theater missile
defense. These results better fit our financial possibilities. START 2
meets our interest, it is expedient to ratify it.

Regarding START 3, efforts to determine future parameters now is partially
in reaction to the Duma. START 2 will enter into force before deactivation
of warheads at the end of 2003. 
How we deactivate delivery systems will be worked out after START 2 EIF.
There will also have to be a SLCM discussion in the context of START 3;
cruise missiles are important. On the level of experts, contacts are
already underway on a regular basis.

What problems can we foresee? Arbatov is right that we need the means,
money, for disarmament; that is only common sense. The resolution on TMD at
New York is one thing, but we still have to follow developments in the
United States, including ASAT testing.

In the MFA, we plan to submit together those instruments that have to be
ratified. This includes the START 2 treaty and START 2 protocol. On TMD we
are flexible. It may be expedient to ratify these as a package. In any
case, it is the President who will submit the documents to the Duma.

Discussion:

Q: Do the TMD agreements assure us that the United States will not
continue to develop strategic defense? Do you believe in the CBMs?

A: We signed these documents based on today's circumstances. We believe
they ensure that the United States will not circumvent the ABM Treaty,
which is a necessary condition for Russian ratification of START 2. This is
not only an MFA view, it is the view of the entire government. At the same
time, we recognize the document is not for all time. It provides for
meeting at intervals, or on notice, to deal with issues as they come up.

Q: In the New York package, one document deals with downloading of
Minuteman-III, and allows downloading any time through December 2007. There
is no comparable agreement covering the SS-19. Does this mean they wont be
downloaded until then?

A: We saw no need for additional agreements. The document referred to is
just a clarification. We ensured it would not be harmful. Both sides agree
on START I provisions. This clarification was a matter of internal interest
for the United States. By extending the START 2 reduction period by five
years, we are more easily able to eliminate our heavy ICBMs. It was
important to us not to undermine START I.

Q: You said the time period established for START 3, that time period is
much shorter. How can we tie in START 3, and reach lower levels, by 2007,
the same period as that for START 2?

A: We have the advantage that we already know what the lower levels will
be. The year 2003 is mentioned in connection with entry into force. The
content of the START 3 treaty will be established much earlier.

Remarks by Senator Richard Lugar:

Last October I accompanied Secretary Bill Perry to Moscow, only to find
that most Duma members were not receptive to START 2. I took up the task of
learning whether those concerns could be addressed. Now conditions appear
to be more favorable. I congratulate you on passage of the CWC, and commend
also the help of the NGOs and of Carnegie Endowment too. Those lessons
should now be applied to START 2 ratification.

The actions of both legislatures on TMD and the ABM Treaty show the growing
role of legislative bodies. But having pushed in their respective ways, the
legislative bodies now need to show their responsibility, by approving
these documents. The overall package deserves support in both bodies, if it
allows START 2 to enter into force, and preserves the essence of the ABM
Treaty.

The agreements related to START 2 were crafted to respond to the concerns
of some Duma members that START 2 would have required an expensive missile
buildup to maintain parity by the year 2003. This buildup was to proceed
simultaneously with the build-down of MIRVed ICBMs. Now this build-down has
been extended to the year 2007, coupled with START 3 ceilings which are
lower. However, the formal negotiations on START 3 will not commence until
START 2 entry into force.

The five-year extension assures Russia against the collapse of reductions
and against the loss of the ABM Treaty. The Minuteman-III side-letter
provides reciprocity with SS-19s, whose downloading is postponed until
2007. Deactivation will occur by December 2003. The stretch-out to 2007,
coupled with deactivation in 2003, give Russia an alternative to the costly
buildup, and secure for the United States the operational change in the
Russian force on roughly the original time frame. Minister Primakov made
clear that deactivation will not take place unless START 3 is completed
well in advance of the December 2003 deadline.

The TMD agreements provide for the following points: Except for
space-based systems, any system called TMD is permitted, provided it is not
tested against a target traveling at 5 kilometers per second, over a range
of 3,500 kilometers. The question is whether this flexible interpretation
can satisfy Duma critics on one side, and U.S. Senators on the other. I
believe this can work as long as neither side aggressively exploits these
flexible provisions. I believe it is a reasonable response to oft-repeated
Duma concerns.

If the Duma seizes the opportunity, then I believe the Senate can act
expeditiously. The U.S. Senate will have to adopt the ABM amendments, while
retaining the essence of the ABM Treaty.

If the Duma rejects, I expect the prospects for further reductions will be
bleak.

In the absence of Duma action so far, a certain impatience has crept into
U.S. circles. This creates an interest in dealerting and deposturing, on
one side, but also the exasperation of two secretaries of defense over the
$2 Billion required to maintain those systems we wished to eliminate. This
evokes a mood of unilaterism, which can take the form of objection to any
strategic reduction. 

The approval of international treaties is a constitutional power that
carries with it an important responsibility. Conditions that would require
renegotiation need to be addressed with extreme caution. Typically it is
better not to change treaty provisions; there may be room, however, to put
binding conditions on presidential action. Time is not necessarily an ally
in getting deeper reductions.

In summary: I know Duma members have had concerns about START 2. The
Helsinki agreements meet them. The Nunn-Lugar program will help Russia
reduce nuclear arms, and it needs to do more. The ABM/TMD agreements of
September 1997 ensure the viability of the ABM Treaty. The United States is
restricted to staying at START 1 levels, unless START 2 enters into force.
Without START 2 entry into force, START 3 negotiations don't commence.
Informal START 3 discussions are already taking place. I concur with
President Clinton's position not to begin negotiating START 3 until the
START 2 package with the TMD accords has been approved by the Duma. It is
up to the Duma and the Federation Council to determine whether the linked
measures suffice. I believe they serve Russia's interests.

Discussion:

Q: Does the Senator find no inconsistencies in the facts that the
presidents at Helsinki could put START 3 parameters into a written
document, yet the official U.S. position now opposes formal negotiations on
START 3, and yet again, it allows expert discussions? Why should it not be
possible to produce another document that explains how the deactivation
could be fulfilled by the year 2003, and spells out under START 2 whether,
or how and when, warheads would be destroyed? 

A: Briefly, the answer is that START 3 would have to be completed by the
end of 2003, because that is when deactivation must occur. In further
informal talks, conceivably more might be worked out about this matter.

Q: Regarding the documents signed in New York, what are the prospects for
their submission and approval in the United States?

A: President Clinton will not submit the package of agreements to the
Senate until their fate is clear in the Duma and Federation Council. I'm
also planning to bring information back to the Senate on these matters.

Q: The question concerns disparity in the breakout potential between
Russia and the United States, and the growing symbolic significance of this
issue with deeper reductions. In the event of a collapse of the arms
control process, Russia would be at a disadvantage. What about a good will
gesture from the United States to Russia, to undertake on a unilateral
basis changes to the Minuteman-III platform, so that it would not have
empty spaces, only space for one warhead. This could be explained as a
gesture to facilitate START 2 ratification. It would involve some
expenditures, but not great cost. It might allay larger Russian fears, and
provide evidence of trust.

A: The fear of breakout is met with deactivation and elimination. I noted
earlier the creeping in of impatience in the United States with
expenditures to maintain systems between 2003 and 2007 that we had planned
to eliminate. There is redundancy and expense involved in delay. I
understand your concern about Minuteman-III, but I don't believe it is a
valid fear about breakout. Moreover, in START 3 we could proceed in even
bolder fashion -- as you raise the unofficial figure of 1,000. In effect,
this reflects the fear of being muscle-bound. Of course, we're worried
about good faith, and about breakout. But we have addressed a number of the
thresholds of safety at Helsinki, especially with the five-year extension.

Q: It appears as though another impasse is coming on -- the Duma must go
first, the Senate will act only afterwards. Would it not be prudent to
create a joint commission, and conduct a joint decision process in the
Russian and U.S. legislatures?

A: Some approaches are not helpful. My colleagues, some of them, want to
reinterpret the ABM Treaty. If Russia wants to wait around, or leaves the
impression is may not be serious about the process, some of my colleagues
would press ahead.

Q: As long as the United States stays at 2,000 to 2,500, can you forecast
for citizens of the smaller nuclear powers a START 3 phase at which you
might move on to the multilateral level of negotiation?

A: I can't really comment on that prospect in a definite way. Much depends
on how far we come in the current situation.

Remarks by Michael Nacht:

Nacht concentrated his remarks on the situation after Helsinki, and the
milestones since Secretary Perry's visit to Moscow in October 1996.
Questions had been raised by Russian negotiators about breakout and
uploading, he noted, but had never been put in a form that had to be
resolved before START 2 ratification. In response to a question raised in
discussion, he noted (for the sake of precision) that nothing in the START
2 protocol prescribes warhead destruction by 2003. What it calls for is
deactivation by the end of 2003. The Helsinki elements that go beyond START
2, he added, would include a warhead elimination regime in START 3.

Nacht briefly reviewed how the Helsinki elements in March, the NATO-Russian
Founding Act at Paris in May, and the signature in September of the START 2
protocol and TMD demarcation accords addressed the Russian concerns that
had existed at the Helsinki summit. The CWC had been done first, and done
well; hopefully it will serve as a model for START 2 ratification.

Next Nacht commented on the discussions among experts, which are not
negotiations, but allow issues to be aired. On SLCM constraints, he noted
that the United States had been willing at Helsinki to include nuclear
SLCMs as long as they are addressed in the context of tactical nuclear
weapons. On the recent U.S. ASAT test, he emphasized that the United States
has no intention to develop ASAT weapons, and U.S. adherence to the Outer
Space Treaty should make that clear. Weapons to attack early warning
satellites are prohibited by that treaty as far as the United States is
concerned. There have been discussions informally of even lower numbers for
START 3 than those formally announced at Helsinki, but, Nacht said, a
formal statement on even lower numbers is not likely to materialize, absent
START 2 ratification. The idea floated of reintroducing MIRVed ICBMs under
START 3 would not be received favorably in the United States. Continued
demands for ABM Treaty reassurance would not add anything to the Clinton
administration's existing affirmations, now reinforced by the TMD accords.
This, he summed up, gives a sense of where we are.

Reflecting on Senator Lugar's remarks, Nacht said that the Senator was too
much of a gentleman to talk about the atmospherics in the U.S. Senate
contrived by a few to make life difficult for Clinton, as, for example, the
recent administration defeats on trade legislation and on an emergency
financial bailout for Thailand. Russians could well be sensitive to these
difficulties faced in the U.S. Senate by Clinton. There are senators who
are less than eager to satisfy the START 2 amending provision for extended
timelines, or who are dissatisfied by any constraints on TMD at all and do
not welcome the demarcation accords. President Yeltsin said to Clinton at
Helsinki, "you have delivered, now I need to get START 2 ratified." But
each trip we hear a new list of items. Nacht said he doubted that President
Clinton could go back for more, even if he wanted to, and Nacht added that
he doubted that Clinton wants to go back for more. Conservative senators do
not like the TMD provision barring space-based interceptors. It is not
clear that there is a two-thirds majority for the TMD accords. But
President Clinton believes he can overcome that hurdle if he has Russian
Duma ratification in his pocket.

On the question raised about negotiating strategic arms cuts among the five
nuclear weapon states, Nacht noted that most of his colleagues believe
START 3 will be the last of the bilateral agreements. But there is still a
lot to do to get there. We can't get there, he suggested, without a regime
for warhead destruction, and that regime will be very difficult to work
out. It will be a formidable agenda just to work it out bilaterally, let
alone with all five nuclear states. After that, it may be possible to get
down to lower levels of warheads and delivery vehicles, low enough to
require adjustments by all five nuclear weapon states.

START 2 is basically a good agreement for both sides. He recalled the
well-known aphorism that "the best is the enemy of the good." With
continued delays and indecision, he warned, we could lose it all.

Remarks by Anton Surikov:

Surikov directed his initial remarks to interpreting the attitudes of the
Communist fraction in the State Duma, given its pivotal role in START 2
ratification activity. He disputed the notion that the controversy over
Chubais (or other domestic problems) had anything to do with Communists
views of the merits or demerits of START 2. He did concur with earlier
remarks that if there is a spirit of cooperation from the Kremlin toward
the Duma, it would enhance the chances of START 2; under those conditions,
he would rate START 2 chances as 50:50. He warned against expecting
anything like the positive vote achieved for CWC. He said there are just
some 30 to 40 people in the Duma who hold the balance on START 2.

Surikov turned next to Russia's security problems in a global context. It
is no longer possible to talk realistically about parity. However, Russia
is potentially rich, and adjacent to many centers of power. Only nuclear
weapons currently give it standing. In that context, the real question is
the future of the strategic forces, which have not benefited from
modernization for years. In the long run, if the current trend of strategic
force degradation holds, we can see ourselves having zero, while the U.S.
could have thousands.

There are serious problems with the executive power in Russia. The Duma has
asked about R&D, procurements, deployments in the out years, the details of
the program contemplated by MOD and agreed to by the Ministry of Finance.
This would help shift Duma discussions from the language of politics to
technical issues. At the moment, it is hard to find someone serious to
discuss these matters with, there is such instability in government. Even
Sergeyev cannot make commitments that will stand for a matter of years. The
executive power needs to settle down first, before we can address START 2.
The position of the American side is important, and needs to be known;
things are, after all, being discussed. We need to know when START 3 will
be signed and ratified.

For the Americans, START 2 is not a reductions treaty: for them, it merely
means moving Trident warheads into storage. So there is a need to deal with
warheads. If we deal with these issues, we could shift 20-30 votes. START 2
is not a favorable treaty for Russia. However, the executive power should
decide what it wants, and then come straight with that message to the Duma.

Remarks of Gennady Khromov:

Earlier speakers today have spoken mostly about the "political" issues of
START 2 ratification. Khromov said he would concentrate on technical
matters. Treaties should insure the safety of the countries involved. Today
START 2 seems to be hostage to START 3. We were told by the MFA
representative that we have until 2003 to prepare START 3. But the Duma
should have an understanding of the potential difficulties and benefits of
START 3 while ratifying START 2. It is not clear the Duma will have a clear
picture of this in 1998 (when ratification is expected). Khromov alleged
that it is not the Duma but rather the executive power which has delaying
the ratification of START 2. The executive should have explained matters
fully to the Duma. Khromov then went through a checklist:

On START 3 ceilings, Khromov said that some people think getting to levels
of 2,000 to 2,500 can be done simply. It cannot. (1) Lower ceilings change
force structure. START 3 may require dropping the triad. (2) Warhead
transparency issue may require long negotiations. How dismantlement and
elimination of warheads are to be done, no one yet knows. (3) The problem
of reverse potential (reconstitution) involves many issues. Free-fall,
aviation bombs must be dealt with in START 3; they represent an uncertainty
range of 1,500, or 2,000, or even 4,000 nuclear charges, and this becomes
very dangerous. Transparency and reconstitution problems cannot be solved
without confronting the ambiguity of British Trident II warheads, missiles
provided by the U.S. side, and warheads tested in America. We have no idea
how many warheads are involved. There is also the residual problem in START
2 of the upload option, since the original warhead platforms are not
eliminated; downloaded warheads could be reloaded. (4) A question of
eternalization (indefinite duration) has been raised. Personally, I could
agree with that for START 3, but why not apply it to START 1 instead of
START 2? (5) Nacht raised the SLCM issue. U.S. sea-based SLCM assets are
formidable. If SLCM is limited in START 2, it should be halved in START 3.
But there is the problem that nuclear and non-nuclear, and air-based and
sea-based SLCMs are indistinguishable. (6) There is the question of
concentration on national territory; NATO nukes should be confined to U.S.
territory, just as all Russian nukes are confined inside Russia. (7) The
deactivation for missiles that must be reduced under START 2 is a technical
question that must be solved in a way that does not infringe on the
interests of the parties. (8) Some foresee negotiating multilateral
reductions. That may be premature, but it is not premature to talk about a
creative approach to this issue. Involving the third powers in non-binding
discussion of verification mechanisms could be eye-openers for them; they
are freshmen in this area. (9) A procedure is needed to organize work on
START 3. Absent official negotiations, there is nothing to bar
philosophical discussions. 

Khromov closed by saying that START 2 negotiation had been hurried and led
to a defective treaty. This lesson should be taken to heart in START 3.
START 3 should be prepared carefully in the relevant departments, MOD and
MFA. Treaties especially require preparation.


Discussion:

Comment: Today Russia is not the country the Soviet Union was. If we are
real partners with the United States, Russia should be free first to assess
its possibilities. In this regard, it might be worthwhile to put a
moratorium on arms control treaties, and concentrate on sorting things out.

Comment: Whether we ratify START 2 or not, or adopt a moratorium, we are
hostages of the past power of arms production. Our submarines' service
lives have been exteded many times; we need to destroy these submarines in
any case. Chemical weapons are unsuitable for military use, and they had
few delivery systems. Now we need help to get rid of them. What do they
represent for the safety of our nation?

Q: Is it not true, as Yakovlev (SRF Commander) said, that if we keep our
potential at START 1 levels, we would need as much money again as our whole
defense budget, 100 trillion roubles?

A: If we allocate funds to meet the figures posited by Yakovlev, we will,
in reality, go down within 10 years to 200 deliverable strategic nuclear
warheads, and within 12 years, we would be down to zero. The important
question is whether our strategic forces will exist at all. We will never
reach START 2 levels with single-warhead missiles. If we want to maintain
START 1, we will need 300 Topal M and 154 heavy ICBMs.

Comment: Everything depends on the capability of the government and of the
force. Our reconnaissance means (e.g., early warning assets) are not
compatible with the combat means.

Comment: The international political situation has changed drastically; we
are now in a disarmament race. The Chinese only have 200 long-range nuclear
systems. Do we need thousands? Just use common sense. Nothing should
prevent us from going down to 400 warheads. A single warhead detonating on
a nuclear powerplant would be enough.

Q: Consider your zero hypothesis to be real. In that case we could be
attacked by Poland, or by China. Everybody has only one adversary in mind,
however, and that is the United States. Does anyone think they would do a
nuclear blow on us, or we on them?

A: (sarcastically) You could be strictly philosophical and assume no one
will attack us. But in that case, why would we need an Army at all? Even
border guards?

C: When START 1 was prepared, huge work was done, on concepts,
requirements, etc. A lot has changed since that time. There is no concept
any longer. There is no one left any longer even to answer these questions.
Yet these are questions of national security.

Q: The work of Blair, Feiveson, von Hippel is interesting. To what extent
is the United States prepared for the procedures they outline, of
de-alerting?

Q: The British have been interested in reductions, but have adopted them
unilaterally. The British approach is not based on the numbers of weapons
other power have. Are parity considerations now driven by
military/technical, or by political considerations? Defensive arms -- how
do they affect parity considerations?

A: At this stage, overall, parity is driven by political considerations
primarily. The question about offense-defense mix is an important one.
Defensive forces obviously make deep reductions difficult. This is part of
the next agenda, as well as a matter for the P-5.

A: On the question about unilateral steps discussed in both Russia and the
United States, steps that may involve detargeting, de-alerting, etc., they
are worth thinking about, but treaties are serious matters.

_____________________________________________________


For questions, feel free to contact:

Rodney Jones - 202-939-2297 or 703-620-1324
Michael Nacht - 301-405-6332 

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