December 9, 1997  
This Date's Issues: 1420  •1421 

Johnson's Russia List
#1421
9 December 1997
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. The Nation editorial: Russian Times
2. Rick Biondi: NATO survey.
3. Reuters: Martin Nesirky, YEAREND--Yeltsin back but hard year 
ahead for Russia.
4. Obshchaya Gazeta: Anatoliy Kostyukov and Lev Sigal, "Provocateurs'
Games. The Front-Line Truth About Soldiers in the Media Wars." 
5. Kennan Institute meeting report: Jim Millar on Convergence Theory 
and the End of Socialism.
6. RFE/RL: Russia: 'Big Four' Makes Progress on Critical Issues.
7. Voice of America begins series on Chechnya: ANDRE DE NESNERA 
TALKS TO THOMAS DE WAAL.
8. Albert Weeks: Hollywood and "Anastasia."
9. Rossiyskiye Vesti: Regional Leaders on Expectations of Center.
10. RFE/RL NEWSLINE: ZYUGANOV ALLY DEFENDS COMMUNISTS ON BUDGET
VOTE and GOVERNMENT PROPOSES SALES TAX.]

********

#1
The Nation
December 22, 1997
Editorial
RUSSIAN TIMES

The New York Times's ongoing attempt to
explain away the financial scandal engulfing its longtime Russian hero,
"free-market crusader" Anatoly Chubais ("It seems unlikely he was seeking to
line his own pockets," November 30), isn't the only recent example of its
Russia coverage undeterred by facts. Earlier that month, Times bureau chief
Michael Specter discovered that the growth of drug addiction is a product of
"Soviet mentality"-the "collectivismxat the core of 20th-century Russian
life." And a couple weeks later, both the Moscow bureau and columnist Thomas
Friedman reported that until being hit by turmoil in world markets, Russia
had been "getting its economic house in order" and "stabilizing its
economy"-this, about a country mired in the worst depression in modern
history. The latest revelation makes us wonder if "Soviet mentality" could be
behind our own drug problems, and whether the Times Russia-watchers read
anything but the propaganda of the Yeltsin government and its Western
fellow-travelers-or their own coverage.

*******

#2
From: Rick Biondi <bion8549@uidaho.edu>
Subject: NATO Survey
Date: Mon, 8 Dec 1997 22:08:51 -0800

I have drafted a survey on evaluating the sufficiency of NATO reforms
for the inclusion of Russia. I would like to invite you to take the survey
at the following URL if you are interested. It has 20 questions and takes
around 5 minutes to complete. It is located at:
http://www.uidaho.edu/~bion8549/survey.htm
Perhaps JRL members would like to take the survey? The results 
of the survey will be presented in March at the ISA conference. The survey
is completely anonymous. 

******

#3
YEAREND--Yeltsin back but hard year ahead for Russia
By Martin Nesirky 

MOSCOW, Dec 8 (Reuters) - Russia heads towards the New Year with as much high-
stakes uncertainty as it entered 1997. 
The difference this time is that concerns about President Boris Yeltsin's
health have receded, for now at least, and have been overtaken by growing
doubts about the state of Russia's economy and the future of its young market
reformers. 
Amid markets turmoil, a financial squeeze over wage arrears and next year's
budget, snail's pace military reform, a foreign policy setback and vicious
squabbles between politicians and big business, the rock among the shifting
sands is Yeltsin himself. 
``To my mind, Russia's fate is in the president's hands now,'' Boris
Nemtsov,
one of those reformers and a first deputy prime minister, told Russian
television recently. ``I think Russia is facing an agonising choice.'' 
Russia was not approaching financial ruin last year and is not necessarily
close to it now. But there are certainly some painful decisions ahead about
what kind of market economy the country should pursue and who will lead it
into the next millennium. The signals on both are decidedly mixed. 
Cautiously optimistic noises could be heard from the government and
markets at
the tail end of 1996 about Russia being poised for the big breakthrough.
Optimism grew this year. 
Indeed, inflation has been tamed, the rouble remains fairly stable and
industrial output has started to ease out of its post-Soviet decline. Even the
grain harvest looks good, and oil production has increased for the first time
since the late 1980s. 
But tax collection problems, capital outflows from the treasury bill and
government bond market, stock market wobbles, privatisation hold-ups and
delayed IMF financial help have tempered investor and government optimism in
the final quarter, although it is still not all gloom. 
``The pressure on the financial markets is complicated,'' said First Deputy
Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais, a leading light among reformers. ``Pressure
will be strong and the load heavy.'' 
Add to this a creaking orbital space station that was once a source of
pride
and an opposition-dominated lower house of parliament that remains hostile to
market reform. 
A recent political scandal that dimmed Chubais's star and cost him his
other
job as finance minister did little to instil confidence either. 
More heads could roll after the government reports to Yeltsin on the
economy.
The president says that session will be this week and it will be no holds
barred. 
``False dawn, it seems, follows false dawn,'' the Economist magazine
said in
an editorial. ``Reformers come and go. Brutality, venality and poverty seem
constant...Yet all is not lost.'' 

YELTSIN BEATS ILLNESS AND SEEMS AT EASE WITH POWER 

Given the way the year began and such a range of problems, it is
something of
a marvel that Yeltsin, now 66, is once again the stabilising factor that
allows analysts to remain upbeat. 
Yeltsin re-emerged briefly last December after heart surgery but then
disappeared again, suffering from pneumonia. It was only in February that he
was back full time at his office, more than six months after he was re-
elected. 
Yet from his March 6 state of the nation address, televised across the vast
Russian Federation, the president took a firm grip after months of perceived
policy drift and market worries about the course of reform. 
First he tackled the cabinet, bringing in Chubais and Nemtsov as first
deputies to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and as finance and energy
ministers respectively. 
It was a deft shot in the arm for reform. 
From that flowed Russian accession to the Paris Club of government
creditors,
a sttlement with the London Club of commercial bank creditors and a seat at
the high table of the Group of Seven industrial nations to make a ``Group of
Eight.'' 
Moscow said it would lop three zeroes off the rouble from January 1 and
set a
pivotal rate of about six to the dollar. 
Russian shares almost tripled to a near-euphoric record level in October
before Asian market aftershocks sent them falling back to where they had been
in February. But that was still 60 percent up on the start of the year. 
Interest rates fell sharply before going up again, but the central bank
still
expects lower rates in 1998 to make commercial bank lending to domestic
industry more attractive. 
Privatisation moved ahead. It was not without a huge bust-up between the
loose
coalition of business magnates who helped get Yeltsin re-elected in 1996 but
fell out in mid-1997 over who would secure how much of telecoms concern
Svyazinvest and Russia's biggest mining company Norilsk Nickel. 
Yeltsin hauled in the six main business leaders in September to try to
put an
end to the squabbling. But any truce soon proved to be nominal at best. 
Further planned privatisations are on hold following the Asian market woes,
even though the government desperately needs the cash to help keep its promise
to pay wages owed to millions of public sector workers by the end of the year.
Despite the mounting economic problems and the political intrigues, Yeltsin
has seemed more at ease as the year has progressed. He even made conciliatory
overtures to parliament. 
It could be that thrives on playing the role of supreme arbiter, one stage
removed from day-to-day business. It could be that he simply has the
confidence of a man with a new lease of life. 

UNEASY YEAR FOR RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Either way, he has adopted a fatherly tone, broadcasting on radio once a
week
about anything from vodka to mushrooms, and a no-necktie formula when meeting
visiting foreign leaders. 
He has also revived his alarming habit of making unexpected policy
announcements while abroad, prompting aides to ``clarify'' what he had in mind
and water down the proposals. 
Russia took a hit on foreign policy mid-year when it became clear its
objections to NATO's planned eastward enlargement would be listened to but
ultimately ignored. 
Yeltsin signed a ``Founding Act'' on relations with NATO in Paris in
May, and
Moscow now has a permament military representative at the alliance
headquarters in Brussels. 
But the Kremlin, and the Russian military, remain unconvinced. This has
had a
knock-on effect on ties with Western countries, particularly the United
States, and Moscow's perception of its role in world affairs. 
``The NATO enlargement issue, the controversy over it, has taken its
toll and
in my judgment has further weakened the foundations of the U.S.-Russian
relationship,'' said Arnold Horelick, vice president of the Carnegie Endowment
for Internatinal Peace during a visit to Moscow. 
He said Yeltsin revelled in summits, such as the one he held with U.S.
President Bill Clinton in March. 
``But lately even Boris Yeltsin has joined the chorus of critics of the
United
States,'' Horelick said, noting he talks of ``multipolarity'' and puts stress
on ties with Asia and Europe. 
Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov has also been on a Latin America tour and
raised his profile by helping to ease tensions between Iraq and the United
Nations over arms inspectors. 
Closer to home, Chechnya remains a major problem for Moscow even though the
war is over. Yeltsin wants to visit the rebel region in January, much as he
does other parts of Russia. But Chechnya wants the trip to show it is
independent of Moscow. 
Humiliated in Chechnya, the Russian military faces another tough year in
1998
as it slashes troop numbers from 1.7 million to reach a target of around one
million men by the year 2000. 
That year, Yeltsin's presidential term ends. It remains to be seen
whether he
decides to find a way to run for a third term or take his place in the history
books. 
Possible contenders to replace him include Nemtsov, Chernomyrdin, Moscow
mayor
Yuri Luzhkov and retired general Alexander Lebed. The Communists, under
Gennady Zyuganov, face a demographic decline but should not be entirely
written off. 
So 1998 will be a crucial year. Yeltsin and his team, whoever is in it,
will
be struggling to lay the political and economic foundations for the next
year's parliamentary election and the all-important presidential race that
follows. 

*******

#4
Spin Doctor Blamed for Planting 'Fake' Tape 

Obshchaya Gazeta, No. 48
December 4-10, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Report by Anatoliy Kostyukov and Lev Sigal: "Provocateurs'
Games. The Front-Line Truth About Soldiers in the Media Wars" --
first five paragraphs are introduction

Brief Summary of the Event 

On the night of 19-20 November Obshchaya Gazeta political commentator
Andrey Fadin died in a car crash on Kutuzovskiy Prospekt.
On 24 November, the day before the funeral, one Maksim Meyer asked the
AiF-Novosti agency to organize a press conference for Sergey Mitrofanov, a
"freelance journalist" who was a friend of the late Fadin.
Mitrofanov told the press conference that on 20 November he found in
his mailbox a diskette containing the article written by Andrey Fadin
before his death -- a commentary on an "intercepted" telephone conversation
between bankers Berezovskiy and Gusinskiy, who were agreeing to "dump"
compromising material on Chubays and company. Before he died, the author of
the article had decided to warn society about the "creeping coup d'etat"
being staged by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, Vice Premier Kulikov, and
State Duma Speaker Seleznev, in addition to the wiretapped businessmen.
Mitrofanov's sensational discovery was a fake. Anyone who wanted to
could see this even during the press conference: The fake was rather
crudely fabricated.
All the indications are that this is a classic example of what is
known in political science circles as an "intellectual provocation." Not
even scoundrels do such things "just for the fun of it": It takes at least
some effort. In all probability, the fabricators are not in the service of
the persons named as "creeping coupists." It is more logical to look for
them among the opposing "party," that is, the Chubays team.
Knowing Maksim Meyer's place of work and Sergey Mitrofanov's circle of
friends, it was easy to surmise that the fake could well have been produced
at the Effective Policy Foundation (FEP), whose leader, Gleb Pavlovskiy,
has long been an effective practioner of the genre of political
"disinformation."
Such scribblings are written in order to be printed. But this time
around it seemed that the "intellectual provocateurs" were not expecting
large print runs. First, it did not look very intellectual. Second, it
was only too blasphemous. Who would sully themselves by touching such a
"product"?
Unfortunately, their faith in the scrupulousness and common sense of
their journalistic colleagues failed the test of reality. On 26 November
the anonymous article adorned the front page of Komsomolskaya Pravda and on
the same day Moskovskiy Komsomolets provided a detailed and passionate
commentary on it.
The cynics who produced this filth turned out to be right: Any piece
of shit will attract its fly.

The Transmission of Lies Over Distance

Generally speaking, the guys working in this genre know their job. 
They are no fools. Sometimes they are even very talented, well-educated,
and quick-witted people. You will not immediately realize that you are
dealing with a con artist. Their trickery is professional. It is part of
their job to manipulate other people -- not individuals, but crowds. In
order to do this well you have at least to learn to despise what you are
manipulating -- with all its complexes and moral hang-ups -- and in time
this makes you stop worrying about your choice of means.
Until recently professionals in this field could only be found in
state security. Democracy with its election campaigns, party struggles,
and pluralism has made political spin doctors, imagemakers, and other
specialists in "brainwashing" mass trades. Unfortunately, the need for
such specialists is an inherent flaw of the democratic state, but the
extent of their influence on social mores depends greatly on society's
political culture. Clearly, in a country where political mores are crude
and where the most elevated personages use police compromising material to
settle scores, political spin doctors who can work with the coolness of a
hit man are in the greatest demand.
Masters of media provocations are among the most prized specialists of
this kind. Their product is skillful disinformation that, once
disseminated by the mass media, provokes a process desirable to the client
who ordered the action. Say, you need to set A and B at loggerheads: We
plant rumors in the press that B is undermining A. Sooner or later it will
work. This can be called the art of creating conflicts or the art of
spreading gossip. The choice of terms does not change the essence of the
matter.
Like any profession, this one also has its leading lights. Gleb
Pavlovskiy is one of them.

>From Dissidents to Sleazemongers 

When Pavlovskiy was young and dark-haired, lived in the city of
Odessa, and naturally did not have a stylish office on Lyusinovskaya Street
in Moscow, he already knew one exceptionally important thing. It transpires
that a small but close-knit group of people, by cleverly spreading rumors,
can organize a coup d'etat. He liked saying this to his buddy, Vyacheslav
Igrunov, subsequently a dissident and later a State Duma deputy. The
latter did not believe him but remembered the comment.
In 1974, on the basis of Pavlovskiy's testimony, Igrunov was jailed
for anti-Soviet activities. In 1982 Pavlovskiy himself was arrested. 
True, he repented and was given a lighter sentence than his cohorts.
In the early 1990's Pavlovskiy founded the Postfaktum agency and with
Andrey Fadin edited the Vek XX i Mir journal (eventually he and Fadin went
their separate ways).
During these years Gleb Olegovich [Pavlovskiy] had plenty of stuff
published. Readers of Moscow newspapers surely remember him as an ardent
critic of the "Yeltsin regime." Pavlovskiy was especially outraged by the
storming of the Supreme Soviet.
In the summer of 1995 the erstwhile dissident became a founder of the
FEP and took part in the election campaign of Skokov's Congress of Russian
Communities. The campaign failed, but the FEP was noticed and received a
new commission in 1996. To the amazement of Pavlovskiy's colleagues and
acquaintances this time around the foundation's client was Boris Yeltsin's
campaign headquarters.
The change of political orientation had incontestable material
benefits. Pavlovskiy bought yet another apartment in Arbat, started
wearing smart clothes, refurbished his office appropriately, bought
cellular phones for his subordinates, and started regularly taking his five
children to Florida and the Finnish lakes. Most importantly, he gained
access to the Kremlin corridors, where he had the opportunity for informal
contact with Chubays himself.
Fickleness of political positions is not regarded as a serious flaw
among political spin doctors. It is an occupational hazard, so to speak. 
We play whatever tune the client wants. His colleagues, however, were
bothered by Pavlovskiy's total lack of restraint in using obvious
"disinformation."
Gleb Olegovich first excelled in the role of "media provocateur" back
in the spring of 1994. At the time he became famous for the notorious
Scenario No. 1 suggesting that a number of high-ranking persons were
preparing a coup d'etat. The proceedings against the slanderers were
subsequently dropped following an amnesty, thanks to which the public then
had an opportunity to get acquainted with such masterpieces of
disinformation as the bogus "CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian
Federation] Economic Platform," the fake issue of the Trudovaya Rossiya
newspaper, and so forth.
Sometimes it seems that Pavlovskiy suffers from the "Herostratus
complex." After all, he himself announced his involvement in "Scenario No.
1" and eagerly granted interviews in which he described the unsavory tricks
of the "media war" that his foundation was waging during the presidential
campaign. This, however, is a very carefully calculated exhibitionism. 
Such is the specific nature of the market for political scandalmongering: 
What seems disgusting to the overwhelming majority of ordinary people is an
indisputable merit in the eyes of potential clients -- political and
financial big shots.
Sometimes members of this guild even conduct public campaigns designed
to build a "scary" image of themselves. This fall, for instance, a certain
Gamayun party appeared on the scene. It is supposedly an underground,
terribly oppositionist, and appallingly extremist organization. Gamayun
distributes and faxes out leaflets containing calls for the forcible
overthrow of the constitutional system, threatens reprisals against
"corrupt journalists," stages an uproar at the Bolshoy Theater.... Public
interest reaches its zenith -- and at this point the leader of the
"intransigent oppositionists" removes his mask. Revealing Georgiy
Glagovskiy, a young, successful imagemaker from St. Petersburg, son of the
"nickel king," and a member of the Gaydar party....

A Three-"Layer" Cake 

The author of the fake "found" by Mitrofanov obviously set himself a
certain task. What was it?
The very first theory is this: The Chubays team had completely lost
the "war of compromising material," and the fake was a desperate attempt by
Chubays's supporters to retrieve the situation.
A more complex scenario, however, is also possible: What was planned
was not just a "session of black magic" but a "session of black magic with
subsequent complete exposure." The authors of the provocation wanted their
hoax to be immediately seen through and deemed underhand. After all, this
would devalue in readers' eyes the publication of compromising audio
recordings as a genre. When he reads yet another transcript "about
Chubays," the layman will say: "We know what these tapes of yours are
really worth: They are all produced on Malaya Arnautskaya Street" [street
in Odessa where, according to satirical novelists Ilf and Petrov, all fake
goods are manufactured].
Incidentally, not so long ago gallery owner Marat Gelman, Pavlovskiy's
friend and companion, organized at his gallery an entire exhibition
entitled "Compromising Material" for precisely this purpose. Visitors
could see for themselves that it is technically not so difficult to produce
any fake. Mr. Gelman has quite good experience in this sphere. Including
experience in elaborating the theoretical basic principles of
disinformation. In he second issue of the magazine Pushkin, published by
Gelman in partnership with Pavlovskiy, the gallery owner wrote an
interesting essay entitled "Compromising Material as a Literary Genre."
Pointing out that the "followers of this genre have made history, and will
continue to do so," the researcher honestly admits: "According to the rules
of the genre, compromising material should look authentic, but it certainly
does not have to be such." We will not argue with this: Gelman ought to
know.
But we are entitled to presume that the producers of the fake diskette
could have been pursuing a very simple objective: to remind forgetful
clients of their own existence. According to Obshchaya Gazeta's
information, even though he continues to brag about his access to
Government House and Staraya Square, the FEP head no longer has any
standing in these corridors. With the departure from the Presidential
Staff of Maksim Boyko, who looked upon Pavlovskiy as an oracle, Gleb
Olegovich has no highly placed patrons left. So why not try to regain the
favor of old clients?
Incidentally, there is a gloomy irony of fate. At one time the
Obshchaya Gazeta management asked Andrey Fadin to write about the dirty
tricks of Pavlovskiy and his firm. Andrey refused: It was embarrassing;
his acquaintances would think that he was settling old scores with Gleb.
Pavlovskiy, as a rule, feels no such embarrassment.

******

#5
Convergence Theory and the End of Socialism
Meeting Report
Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies
Washington DC
by Nancy Popson

An analysis of the theories of economic convergence put forth in the past
century shows that in the post-Soviet era economists have to think in terms 
of economic development or economic history rather than comparative economic
systems, remarked Jim Millar, Director of the Institute for European,
Russian, 
and Eurasian Studies at the George Washington University and former Fellow of 
the Woodrow Wilson Center at a Kennan Institute lecture on 6 October 1997. 
Convergence, or the independent development of similarly structured and
functioning systems, has been a recurring theme in the study of the economies 
of the United States and the Soviet Union. The idea that the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. may develop independently toward a similar outcome arose first in
the 
1920s during the period of NEP, then again in the 1960s, and
finally again under Gorbachev.
Millar outlined the major players in the discourse on convergence.
According to Millar, there are two main models that theorized unilateral 
convergence. The first is the model of Karl Marx, who hypothesized that both 
systems would converge radically toward socialism. This
would occur, according to Marx, because the system of distribution of wealth
in the mature capitalist society is irrational and would eventually be 
overthrown by the workers. Millar noted as well that Marx's model is based 
on the assumption that scarcity can be overcome. On the other
hand, the opposing unilateral convergence model--championed by Von
Hayek--sees scarcity as a permanent condition and foresees convergence toward 
capitalism and free markets. This convergence would be based on the fact that 
the number of market supply and demand equations and the immense variety of 
wants present in a developed economy would make a completely
planned system far too costly to run.
There are also a number of economists who discussed mutual convergence. 
Millar noted in particular Tinbergen, who formed his theory while considering 
the implications of the cold war. In Tinbergen's view, both the U.S. and the 
Soviet system were extreme regimes. Since rational actors would move toward
an 
optimal, central regime, both systems would gradually approach an economic 
system that balances equity and efficiency. This means that the Soviet
Union would adopt markets and become more efficient, while the U.S. would
develop a welfare system. Millar also noted that Tinbergen associated
economic 
convergence with a kind of political convergence as well, leading to a more 
peaceful world and the end of the cold war.
Finally, Millar presented his own theory, which applies the economic
development argument of J. R. Hicks to convergence. Hicks claimed that the 
market gradually evolved throughout the world, replacing the previously 
dominant custom and command economies. Markets expanded first in the area of 
international trade and then in domestic economic transactions. Within this
evolution theory, command economies only exist in pure form in the case of
emergency or crisis. The Soviet Union, therefore, was a crisis economy 
extended indefinitely as part of a historical period marked by regression 
away from the market.
According to Millar, when one examines these convergence models in the
light of the collapse of the Soviet Union, conclusions can be drawn as to 
their viability. Millar explained that the present economic situation
disproves
Karl Marx's theory, since there is no sign today that growing conflict in 
capitalist society will lead to its collapse. Tinbergen was also wrong, in
Millar's view, because the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were not equidistant in their
extremity from some midpoint--either the U.S. turned out not to be an extreme 
case or the Soviet case was more extreme. Hayek, on the other hand, looks far
better today, since it did cost far too much to run the Soviet economy, and
it 
seems that the Russians are trying desperately to move toward a free
market system.
Millar explained that the Hicksian model best portrays the situation in
that it starts from a discourse on economic development. When one looks at 
the ratio of market transactions to non-market transactions in various
economies 
since 1850, it is obvious that there has been constant growth of the market
as 
a share of all economic transactions. The case of the U.S.S.R. is an
anomaly, since there was a deliberate regression away from the market.
However, that course has now been abandoned. Moreover, Millar emphasized that 
Hicks' theory is advantageous in that it portrays economic development as
fueled 
by transaction costs rather than rational decisions of economic actors.
That is, 
the market has continued to grow because its functioning incurs the
least amount of cost per transaction, not because actors have made decisions
based on rationality. Finally, the Hicks model is the only one that allows 
for the generation of novelty, of new institutions, and types of economic 
transaction. 
In concluding, Millar suggested that approaching the present economic
situation in terms of economic history and its development based on
transaction 
costs may lead to a better hypothesis than simply stating that capitalism has 
won at the expense of socialism.
"Economic Convergence Reconsidered: Who Was Right? Who Was Wrong?"
sponsored by the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, was presented 
6 October 1997 by James Millar, Director, Institute of European, Russian, and
Eurasian Studies, George Washington University; former Fellow, Woodrow Wilson 
Center; and former Kennan Institute Advisory Council Member. Nancy Popson is 
Program Associate, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.

*******

#6
Russia: 'Big Four' Makes Progress on Critical Issues

MOSCOW, 9 December (RFE/RL) - Russia's President Boris Yeltsin held talks
today with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and the Chairman of each
house of parliament, and progress was reported on a number of issues. 
These are commonly called meetings of the "Big Four." 
Gennady Seleznyov, the Communist Chairman of the State Duma (lower house
of parliament), told reporters after the Kremlin talks that Yeltsin wants
to see the 1998 draft budget approved by the end of this year. The State
Duma approved the budget last week - on first reading. Four readings are
required for passage. 
At their meeting the four men also approved an agenda for Thursday's
planned "round table" talks between Yeltsin and opposition and trade union
leaders. These talks will focus on the difficult issue of land reform. 
Seleznyov said Yeltsin had also shown readiness to consider parliamentary
proposals for reforms in the way Russia's government works, but he hinted
that serious changes are unlikely before the next presidential elections,
due in 2000. 
The Communists want the government to be more representative of the
balance of forces in parliament. Under existing rules Yeltsin can approve
the cabinet without parliamentary approval, though the Duma must agree his
choice of prime minister. 
Yeltsin's spokesman (Sergei Yastrzhembsky) announced yesterday that
Yeltsin had decided to delay, until January, hearing a government report on
its handling of the economy. The meeting was expected this week, but the
spokesman said it was delayed to allow discussion of all of 1997. This is
the second time the report - called 'the day of reckoning' by Russian media
- has been postponed. 
*******

#7
Voice of America
DATE=12/8/97
TITLE=CHECHNYA / HISTORY
BYLINE=ANDRE DE NESNERA
DATELINE=LONDON

INTRO: THREE YEARS AGO THIS MONTH, RUSSIAN TROOPS ENTERED THE 
INDEPENDENCE-MINDED REPUBLIC OF CHECHNYA. IT WAS THE BEGINNING 
OF A WAR WHICH ENDED IN HUMILIATION FOR THE RUSSIAN MILITARY. 
TWO JOURNALISTS WHO COVERED THAT WAR -- THOMAS DE WAAL AND 
CARLOTTA GALL -- HAVE JUST PUBLISHED A BOOK ABOUT THEIR 
EXPERIENCES, "CHECHNYA -- A SMALL VICTORIOUS WAR." IN THIS FIRST
IN A SERIES OF REPORTS ON CHECHNYA, V-O-A'S ANDRE DE NESNERA 
TALKS TO THOMAS DE WAAL AND PLACES THE CHECHEN CONFLICT IN A 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT.

TEXT: ON DECEMBER 11TH, 1994, THOUSANDS OF RUSSIAN SOLDIERS 
BACKED BY TANKS AND ARTILLERY ENTERED THE REPUBLIC OF CHECHNYA IN
THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS IN AN ATTEMPT TO QUASH A DRIVE FOR 
INDEPENDENCE. FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS -- DESPITE MASSIVE MANPOWER 
AND FIREPOWER SUPERIORITY -- THE RUSSIAN MILITARY WAS NOT ABLE 
TO DEFEAT THE CHECHEN FIGHTERS -- AND RUSSIA HAD TO WITHDRAW ITS
TROOPS FROM CHECHNYA AFTER DESTROYING THE REPUBLIC'S CAPITAL, 
GROZNY.

THOMAS DE WAAL IS A JOURNALIST WHO COVERED THAT CONFLICT. HE 
SAYS THE RUSSIAN MILITARY -- IN ENTERING CHECHNYA THREE YEARS AGO
-- TOTALLY IGNORED ITS APPALLING PAST PERFORMANCE IN TRYING TO 
SUBJUGATE THE AREA. 
/// DE WAAL ACT ///
THIS IS A REGION WHICH FOUGHT POSSIBLY THE LONGEST 
GUERILLA CAMPAIGN IN HISTORY AGAINST THE TSARS' ARMIES. 
VARIOUS TSARS THREW LITERALLY THOUSANDS UPON THOUSANDS 
OF YOUNG RUSSIAN TROOPS INTO THE CAUCASUS AND THEY 
THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE A FEW YEARS. IN THE 1820'S, THEY 
WERE ALREADY TALKING ABOUT HOW THE CAUCASUS IS CONQUERED
-- EVERYTHING IS OVER AND THE LAST POCKET OF RESISTANCE 
IS FINISHED. IN FACT, THE VERY BRUTALITY WITH WHICH 
THEY SUPPRESSED THESE MOUNTAIN TRIBES IN THE 1820'S 
CAUSED AN INCREDIBLE RESISTANCE AND THREW UP ONE OF THE 
MOST BRILLIANT GUERILLA COMMANDERS OF HISTORY, NOT 
ACTUALLY A CHECHEN BUT MAINLY WITH CHECHEN SUPPORT -- 
IMAM SHAMIL -- WHO ONLY SURRENDERED IN 1859.
/// END ACT ///
MR. DE WAAL SAYS RUSSIA HAS HAD ONLY ONE PLAN OF ACTION REGARDING
THE CHECHENS -- BRING THEM UNDER SUBMISSION.
/// 2ND DE WAAL ACT ///
YOU COULD SAY RUSSIA HAS BASICALLY ONLY HAD ONE POLICY 
IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS FOR THE LAST 200 YEARS, WHICH IS 
TOTAL SUBJUGATION. AFTER 1859, EVERY FEW YEARS THERE 
WOULD BE A REBELLION AND VERY, VERY RARELY WOULD THEY 
ACTUALLY HAVE SOME KIND OF POLITICAL TACTIC AGAINST THE 
CHECHENS.
/// END ACT ///
THAT ATTEMPT AT TOTAL SUBJUGATION CULMINATED IN 1944 WHEN SOVIET 
DICTATOR JOSEF STALIN DEPORTED THE CHECHENS TO CENTRAL ASIA. THE
OFFICIAL REASON -- THEY COLLABORATED WITH THE INVADING NAZI 
FORCES. HISTORIANS SAY THE REAL REASON WAS TO ELIMINATE THE 
CHECHENS. 

IN A MATTER OF DAYS, 400-THOUSAND CHECHENS WERE SENT IN CATTLE 
TRUCKS AND TRAINS TO KAZAKHSTAN -- AND CHECHNYA WAS ABOLISHED, 
SIMPLY WIPED OFF THE MAP.

MR. DE WAAL SAYS IT IS ONLY UNDER SOVIET LEADER NIKITA KHRUSCHEV 
THAT THE CHECHENS WERE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND IN 
1957.
/// 3RD DE WAAL ACT ///
KHRUSCHEV WAS REALLY FACED WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO 
RESTORE CHECHNYA BECAUSE CHECHENS WERE JUST TURNING UP. 
THEY TRAVELED THOUSANDS OF MILES, OFTEN WITHOUT TICKETS,
ON TRAINS TO RECLAIM THEIR OWN HOMES, AND IN FACT, ONE 
PERSON REMEMBERS TRAVELING ON THE TRAIN BACK TO MOSCOW 
IN THE LATE 1950'S AND THERE WAS A TERRIBLE STENCH IN 
THE CARRIAGE BECAUSE ON THE UPPER BUNKS OF THESE TRAIN 
COMPARTMENTS, THERE WERE BOXES OF BONES : THESE WERE THE
CHECHENS CARRYING THEIR ANCESTORS BACK TO BE RE-BURIED 
IN THEIR ANCESTRAL GRAVEYARDS IN CHECHNYA.
/// END ACT ///
IN THE END, MR. DE WAAL SAYS THE CHECHENS WERE NEVER SUBJUGATED, 
ALTHOUGH IN THE SOVIET UNION, EVERYONE WAS TO A CERTAIN DEGREE 
"RUSSIANIZED." HE SAYS OF ALL THE VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS UNDER 
SOVIET DOMINATION, THE CHECHENS WERE PROBABLY THE LEAST 
ASSIMILATED.
/// 4TH DE WAAL ACT ///
THEY MOST KEPT UP THIS TRADITION, THIS ORAL TRADITION, 
THIS FOLK TRADITION OF RESISTANCE AND OF SEPARATENESS. 
AND ALTHOUGH ON THE SURFACE IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THEY 
WERE PART OF RUSSIA, THEY STILL HAD THIS VERY STRONG 
UNDERCURRENT OF BEING A DIFFERENT PEOPLE, A RESISTING 
PEOPLE. YOU COULD PULL THEM ONE WAY OR YOU COULD PULL 
THEM THE OTHER, BUT YOU HAD TO BE VERY CAREFUL AND VERY 
TACTFUL WITH THEM. AND OF COURSE, THE RUSSIANS HAD 
NEVER BEEN TACTFUL WITH THE CHECHENS. THEY HAVE ALWAYS 
SAID, "BANDITS, MAFIA, MOUNTAIN PEOPLE," AND THEY NEVER 
REALLY TRIED TO UNDERSTAND THEM.
/// END ACT ///
MR. DE WAAL SAYS ONE CANNOT DENY THE CHECHENS HAVE THAT MAFIA AND
BANDIT TRADITION. BUT HE SAYS THERE IS ALSO A VERY STRONG 
CULTURE AND ISLAMIC TRADITION WHICH IF TREATED WITH RESPECT, WILL
GIVE BACK RESPECT. BUT MR. DE WAAL SAYS THE RUSSIANS NEVER 
SHOWED ANY RESPECT TOWARDS THE CHECHENS. THAT FORCED MOSCOW TO 
MAKE ANOTHER GRAVE ERROR BY TRYING TO SUBJUGATE THE CHECHENS BY 
-- ONCE AGAIN -- USING MILITARY FORCE. 

******

#8
Date: Mon, 8 Dec 1997 
From: Albert Weeks <AWeeks1@compuserve.com>
Subject: Hollywood and "Anastasia"

Somehow, I can't imagine some of the contributors to JRL,
especially those engaged in arcane speculation about latterday 
Keynesianism in Russia, getting very worked up over a simpleminded, 
animated feature titled "Anastasia." So what that it will be seen by and 
influence over a billion people, most of whom are impressionable 
children? Anyway, I have already been criticized, perhaps in part 
rightfully so, for having gotten my dander up on JRL over some 
mindless joking about Lenin, that do-gooder "intellectual" (on 
the occasion of this past 80th anniversary of the Bolshevik theft 
of democracy in Russia marking the beginning of a 
monstrously-bloody two generations).
Still unchastened, let me hazard the following about 
this latest piece--of what? let others answer that--of fictionalized 
history out of Hollywood. In this case, $53 million's worth of innocuous 
(some say), well-crafted, animated cartooning by a displaced 
person from Disney's Mouse Factory. On my side in sharing my 
reaction to this movie is one "Mr. Atchinson," first name and other 
particulars omitted, as he was referenced in "Moskovskiye Novosti" 
(30 Nov/7Dec 1997). According to `MN,' Mr. A. has let it be known 
(on the 'Net ) that as a Russian specialist, he finds the film, 
"Anastasia," repulsive and contemptible. 
Atchinson complains that the movie will be seen by 
upwards to a billion people worldwide, but only some 10,000 of 
whom will take the trouble to examine the authentic historical 
record that is so irresponsibly distorted by the movie. (For 
instance, by its acceptance of the pseudo-Anastasia myth 
and by its deliberate underplaying of the role of the Communists 
in murdering the Romanov family--and along with it, democracy--
80 years ago, 50+- million victims ago.) MN adds, quoting 
Atchinson: "On the other hand, if [upwards to a billion] believe 
what is shown in the film to be true to history, incredible harm 
will be inflicted on the truth."
But I wonder, when has Hollywood been interested 
in truth? What? With, say, its World War II whitewash of Stalin, 
titled "Mission to Moscow"? Or When Chaplin did "The Great 
Dictator," pillorying Hitler and Mussolini, craftily leaving out the 
daddy of them all, Stalin? Even "Ninotchka, " fluffy Lubitsch c
omedy that it was that starred Garbo, was so naive and misleading 
as to have surely amused, if not inspired Stalin (who watched 
Hollywood films) as another example of what Lenin called 
those "deaf, dumb and blind capitalists" (yes, comrades, this 
Lenin quote is authentic). 
Disney's "Aladdin" has been criticized as a deliberate 
distortion of Arabic culture and mores. Maybe that's an exaggeration. 
After all, that feature, like "Cinderella," et al., was intended as 
nothing more than a fairy tale based on a fairy tale. But does 
"Anastasia" fall into that category? Writes a Web movie critic, 
one Louis Hobson, of "Anastasia": "Let the historians howl. 
They're missing the point." Another commented about the 
Russian revolution of "1916," as she dated it, stressing the 
importance of Rasputin's "role" in it. Her implicit Bottom Line: 
Thank heavens for Lenin. He got rid of all such evil. (Sounds 
a lot like ABC Peter Jennings' repeated, unrepentant error: 
That--according to him--the "Communists overthrew 1,000 
years of Tsarism." (I have two videos on which Mr. J. makes
this profoundly misleading statement. But who can reach His
Excellency to correct him?)
So, what is the "point" that we are missing? Isn't
it that the deutero-Hollywood, like the Hollywood of the '30s, 
loves to indulge itself in distorting history (as per Oliver Stone, 
et al.) when it "does" history? By contrast,. JRL provides the 
chronicles of history, in which the chaff gets winnowed out, 
we trust, leaving the wheat for study. That is as it should be.
Well, OK. History will always be partly mythologized, 
as Herodotus might have had it and latterday historian R. G. 
Collingwood has suggested. But in just what way the "historians 
make history" (Collingwood), the way in which the past is 
synthetically depicted, it seems to me, is critical. The
absence of outright dishonesty and of gross distortion
is a must. Even, or maybe especially, in the case of "pop culture" 
and a full-length animated feature targeted on the young--not on
the ivory, ivied towers of Academe.

Albert Weeks 
(who is neither a grinch nor a grouch, 
and who wishes everyone a Merry Christmas 
and a Happy [Let's-Get-It-Straight-in-'98] New Year)

********

#9
Regional Leaders on Expectations of Center 

Rossiyskiye Vesti
28 November 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Comments by Khabarovsk Kray Administration Head Viktor Ishayev,
Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Governor Ivan Sklyarov, Yaroslavl Oblast
Governor Anatoliy Lisitsyn, Novgorod Oblast Governor Mikhail Prusak,
and Saratov Oblast Governor Dmitriy Ayatskov: "Regions Also Present
Bill to Government" -- first paragraph is editorial office
introduction

The full government will soon have to report to the president for the
first time. In connection with this our correspondents put the following
question to a number of governors: How do you assess government
cooperation with the regions, on which the authorities' effectiveness
directly depends?
Khabarovsk Kray Administration Head Viktor Ishayev:
"As concerns cooperation between the regions and the federal organs of
power, I think that its obligatory nature should be paramount. In this
respect the Far East region has several complaints against the government. 
A program for the eastern regions' development through 2005 has been
confirmed at the federal level and has received presidential status. 
However, to date a mechanism for its implementation has not been activated
and it has no management and funding. When on earth will we implement this
program?
"It has become a tradition in Khabarovsk for government leaders to be
given an obligatory tour of the rebuilding of the bridge over the Amur. We
began this work ourselves, although it has great significance for Russia a
whole as it gives the country an outlet to the Pacific seaboard. But why
then is the Federal Highways Service not carrying out its obligations and
appropriating only a fifth of the planned funding for this construction
project this year?"
Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Governor Ivan Sklyarov:
"Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast has received its fair share of attention from
the Moscow authorities. In recent years Russian President Boris Yeltsin
has visited us on three occasions. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has
visited several times. In addition, many ministers are very familiar with
the road leading to the banks of the Volga. All visits by Russian
Government representatives end as a rule in the signing of very important
measures which are designed to develop the region's economy and improve the
social sphere. But, unfortunately, by no means all the plans are
implemented and not all promises are kept.
"For example, our high-ranking guests made several benevolent
decisions concerning the conversion of local defense enterprises. However,
the majority of them simply have not been implemented. Decrees on our
defense enterprises' access to the international market are proceeding
slowly through government. The state has not finally settled up with
defense sector collectives for orders previously met by them.
"We have heard many promises about the center supporting the
development of small business. Unfortunately, Russian businessmen in the
provinces are not experiencing any paternal concern from their own
government. It is time the government indicated its views on the agrarian
question more precisely and forcefully. Peasants have long been waiting
for the authorities to keep their word and make them genuine masters on
their native land.
"I would like to draw the government's attention to one other
important aspect of the matter. We must support the domestic commodity
producer comprehensively and more decisively. And create to this end a
flexible system of tax collection and credits, and provide various
concessions and priorities to stimulate Russian industry."
Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Anatoliy Lisitsyn:
"Our complaints against the federal authorities have been the same for
the last five years. We insist that the center listen to our opinions and
analyze regional experience. Even if only one specific proposal is
received from each region, even this adds up to 89 practical ideas whose
implementation can take us successfully down the path of reforms.
Unfortunately, the federal authorities do not take notice of the regions'
experience, or to be precise, do not take much notice of it. They count on
the elements located within the Moscow beltway. So what the government
should do is find out what is best in the regions and use this in its own
work."
Novgorod Oblast Governor Mikhail Prusak:
"Relations between region and government are a two-way process, and
for Novgorod Oblast they are proceeding in a normal businesslike fashion. 
But the working partnership between government and regions would be more
productive if interlinked normative acts -- for example, on foreign
investment, free economic zones, and licensing and certification -- were
adopted as a single package.
"The regions participating in foreign economic activities should be
given timely information about changes to the normative base. We believe
the retroactive enactment of documents to be simply ridiculous in the
present circumstances. More powers have to be given to the regions in the
resolution of organizational questions, for example, the autonomous
registration of organizations with foreign investments of more than 100
million rubles, and the registration of shares in enterprises. And to make
things absolutely fine, the policy of the Central Bank and the Russian
Federation Ministry of Finance on providing credit for projects guaranteed
by the regions must be coordinated precisely at governmental level."
Saratov Oblast Governor Dmitriy Ayatskov:
"By making tough demands of the Cabinet of Ministers and not dividing
up members of the government into 'friends' and 'foes,' the president once
more demonstrated his political will. The Cabinet of Ministers should be
accountable to the president. And here there can be no excuses from the
Cabinet of Ministers that the ministers and vice premiers have, it claims,
not succeeded in doing something because, say, taxes are not being
collected properly, so there are delays in wage payments.... The
president, who has the situation well under his control, does not like
excuses. Failure to carry out the president's instructions causes serious
damage not only to ordinary citizens but to the country's international
prestige. This has absolutely obvious economic consequences -- the global
market is very sensitive to the problem of Russia's governability.
"The demands made of the government must be serious and not just for
'form's sake.' So that officials do not go around whispering to each other
that Boris Nikolayevich is frowning again but afterward everything will be
fine once more.... All issues that have not yet been resolved by the
federal center must be resolved in the immediate future. The regions
expect this."

******

#10
RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol 1, No. 175, Part I, 9 December 1997

ZYUGANOV ALLY DEFENDS COMMUNISTS ON BUDGET
VOTE. Duma deputy Aleksei Podberezkin defended the
Communist Party stance regarding the recent budget vote in an
interview with ITAR-TASS on 8 December. Podberezkin, an
adviser to Communist Party leader Gennadii Zyuganov, was one
of 29 members of the Communist Duma faction who voted to
approve the budget in the first reading on 5 December (see
"RFE/RL Newsline," 8 December 1997). Contrary to those who
depict the vote as evidence of a "schism" or "retreat" within the
Communist Party, Podberezkin argued that the budget vote
reflected the "democratic" practice of the Communist faction,
which, he said, is willing to take minority views into account.
Podberezkin argued that Yeltsin's visit to the Duma shortly
before the vote influenced the position of several Communist
deputies who might otherwise have voted against the budget.
LB

GOVERNMENT PROPOSES SALES TAX. The government has
submitted to the Duma a law that would establish a sales tax of
5 percent on retail purchases of alcohol and tobacco products
and 3 percent on other goods and paid services, "Segodnya"
reported on 9 December. Food, medicine, and children's
products would be exempt from the new sales tax, as would
payments for rent, medical services and utilities. The proposed
sales tax would not replace or affect the value-added tax of 20
percent already levied on most Russian goods. The Duma is
expected to consider the law on the sales tax on 17 December,
the same day deputies are scheduled to vote on other
government-backed tax laws. LB

*******