December 5, 1997  
This Date's Issues: 1409  • 1410 •1411 

Johnson's Russia List [list two]
#1410
5 December 1997
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Moskovskiy Komsomolets: 'Transcript' of Kokh Phone Calls
on Rosneft.
2. Rabochaya Tribuna: Yevgeniy Rusakov, "The Planet's Sheriff 
Is Angry. U.S. Police Try To Make Russian Diplomats and Gas 
Officials Live by the Laws of the Wild West."
3. Interfaks-AiF: Sergey Kurbatov, "Boris Berezovskiy as a Public 
Politician. The Rich Man's Camel-Like Journey: Through the Eye of 
the Needle and Into Politics."]

*********

'Transcript' of Kokh Phone Calls on Rosneft 

Moskovskiy Komsomolets
28 November 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Feature comprising "transcript" of telephone conversations
between former Russian Vice Premier Alfred Kokh and "top- and
middle-level officials and financial magnates," with commentary by
Aleksandr Khinshteyn: "Let's Play Bridge. The Stake Is Rosneft.
At the Card Table Are the 'Writer' Kokh, Russian Federal Property
Fund Chairman Lipkin, Acting State Property Minister Gazizullin,
Financier Jordan, and Other Officials. Losing Is Ruled Out"

You are looking at a transcript of telephone conversations between
Alfred Kokh, former government vice premier and chairman of the Russian
State Committee for the Management of State Property, and top- and
middle-level officials, as well as financial magnates and retired
dignitaries.
The matter at issue is the upcoming sale of a raw-materials monster --
the state company Rosneft. Kokh and his comrades from Unexim and
MFK-Renessans want to "privatize" Rosneft. The officials are helping them
diligently.
All this put together has a one-word name -- corruption.
As you read the tapped conversations, pay particular attention to:
1) the unusual style of conversation between businessmen and
officials;
2) their frankness;
3) the identities of the players.
So, last Monday, 24 November. The office of the "writer" Kokh.
Dialogue No. 1 [subhead]
Alfred Kokh and Aleksandr Kazakov, former first deputy chief of the
Presidential Staff and chairman of the RAO [Russian Joint-Stock Company]
Gazprom board of directors.
Kokh: San [diminutive for Aleksandr], I'm gay.
Kazakov: Oh well... You know, they screwed our guys too.
Kokh: What do you mean?
Kazakov: When they went to remove Berezovskiy. You remember that? 
(The reference is to the first time Chubays and Nemtsov went to Yeltsin, on
11 September 1997. That attempt to remove Berezovskiy did not culminate in
success -- A.Kh.)
Kokh: No.
Kazakov: Before that, they put the president in front of a camera and
he said: "No, I give up on Boris Abramovich [Berezovskiy]."
Kokh: Oh.
Kazakov: He repented immediately. He says: "I won't drop you,
boys."
Kokh: Yes.
Kazakov: Well, what's wrong?
Kokh: Plenty. I just got drunk on Saturday, and that's how it is.
Kazakov: Me too.... Do you have Kostya Romanov's [not further
identified] telephone number?
Kokh: Yes, somewhere. Do you want him?
Kazakov: Yes.
Kokh: I'll get him now and tell him to call you.
Kazakov: That would be great. I'm on 415-09...
Kokh: (interrupting) Call his pager, get him to call you.
Kazakov: Is he back yet?
Kokh: I can't say. He went skiing. Khloponin (general director of
Norilskiy Nikel -- A.Kh.) came back yesterday, but not Vovochka [diminutive
of Vladimir; presumably Potanin]. He [Romanov] flew out with Vovochka. I
don't know, he may be back.
Kazakov: I have a feeling Volodya [Vladimir] is in fighting mood?
Kokh: Potanin?
Kazakov: Yes.
Kokh: In what sense?
Kazakov: Literally.
Kokh: Well, yes... Sanechka [further diminutive of "San"], I feel
embarrassed with you.
Kazakov: Stop it.
Kokh: I've stopped.
(Both laugh.)
Kazakov: I love you. What am I going to do?! ...Fine, I'll call him
now.
Kokh: When are they going to discharge you? [Kazakov was reportedly
hospitalized 18 November with a suspected heart attack]
Kazakov: Not soon.
Kokh: When do you go to Barvikha?
Kazakov: In a week or so.
Kokh: Are they treating you, or are you just lying there?
Kazakov: I'm like a sieve.
Kokh: They're sticking needles in you?
Kazakov: Yes.
Kokh: Those injections don't do any good. Maybe you should get
Doctor Akchurin [Yeltsin's heart surgeon] to do a bypass?
Kazakov: F--- off.
Kokh: Well, what can you expect, when you're f---ed.
Kazakov: Those little spikes [on the monitor] are going in the right
direction, there are less and less of them. I've figured it out for
myself. It's interesting. Professors every day.
Kokh: You found the right people.
Kazakov: It's fine. It's a good thing they brought me in in time and
didn't let it spread.
Kokh: You don't have any dead patches on the muscle?
Kazakov: Not yet. The organism is fighting.
Kokh: They take him to hospital with a heart attack, and he's playing
soccer the next day.
Kazakov: What can you do.
Kokh: It's time to act your age.
Kazakov: Go and earn your money.
Kokh: Don't you think I'm making any?
Kazakov: That's true.
Kokh: I'm making money, and how. I've already earned enough to pay
for any operation you want. You want a head transplant? (Both laugh.)
Kazakov: Oh, Altoska [diminutive from Alfred]. That's enough.
Dialogue No. 2 [subhead]
Kokh and an unidentified man.
Unidentified man: Can you come here now?
Kokh: What's happened?
Unidentified man: It's about your problem with Jordan (head of the
MFK-Renessans financial group -- A.Kh.).
Kokh: Why do I have to come now? What's happened? Ask [them].
Unidentified man: It's about Rosneft.
Kokh: I know.
Unidentified man: The team's here now, thinking. They say they need
Kokh. We were given instructions to do everything with you.
Kokh: I've got other business. You don't need me. You need Jordan. 
Call Jordan.
Unidentified man: I don't even know him.
Kokh: I'll call him now.
Unidentified man: Tell him to call us back, then.
Kokh: OK.
Dialogue No. 3 [subhead]
Kokh and Boris Jordan, head of the MFK-Renessans financial group.
Kokh: Bor, where are you?
Jordan: I'm in the car. I'm on my way to see Dima Vasilyev (head of
the Russian Federation Government Federal Commission for Securities --
A.Kh.). He's getting people together. Two or three big players will be
there. For consultations.
Kokh: I've got a huge favor to ask you. You know that game of bridge
that Chubays and I were discussing, is anyone involved apart from you?
Jordan: No. You saw how much work we'd done, anyway?
Kokh: Yes.
Jordan: I live in this miserable place. But Borisych is holding up
the program on the banking side. I've already written down all the terms
of the tender for him, I've done it all.
Kokh: Boris who?
Jordan: Borisych (apparently [Anatoliy Borisovich] Chubays -- A.Kh.).
Kokh: No. The job's under way now. The group has already been
formed. There's Igor Lipkin (chairman of the Russian Federal Property Fund
[RFPF] -- A.Kh.), Malin (his first deputy -- A.Kh.), all those guys. Now
they want to know our terms, what we want to get.
Jordan: I've already set the terms. All of them.
Kokh: No, you don't understand. What is a financial consultant? What
does it actually mean? What must he do? What rights does he have, what
exclusive rights does he get, and so on?
Jordan: From our point of view?
Kokh: Yes. What do we want? We're paying 1.25 billion. What do we
want in exchange?
Jordan: Alik [Alfred], let's talk about it. I'm in the car now. I'm
going to the meeting right now. After that I have an important lunch at
MFK. And after that I want to sit down with you and discuss our strategy
in general. I've been planning to get in touch with you for several days.
Kokh: I agree. But we have to put all the necessary papers on
Borisych's desk by this evening.
Jordan: I'll do it now. I'll collect the team that can do this
business. And invite them to a meeting. I'll collect Lenya (the reference
is apparently to Leonid Rozhetskin, one of the leaders of MFK-Renessans. 
It was Rozhetskin who acted as agent for Unexim and Renessans at the
notorious Svyazinvest auction -- A.Kh.), you, and me. We'll sit down,
discuss all this, and get it done.
Kokh: When?
Jordan: This evening.
Kokh: Let's say by eight. Can we get it to him [by then]? If you
and I and Leonid meet at four?
Jordan: At my place.
Kokh: OK.
Jordan: Let's do it at MFK.
Kokh: Where's that?
Jordan: My office.
Kokh: On Masha Poryvayeva [Street] (the Moscow street named for the
Great Patriotic War heroine -- A.Kh.)?
Jordan: Yes. At four o'clock.
Kokh: Fine, I'll come.
Jordan: I'll call Leonid now, and he'll come.
Kokh: Shall I bring Lipkin or Malin with me?
Jordan: Fine.
Dialogue No. 4 [subhead]
Kokh and Farit Gazizullin, acting minister of state property of
Russia.
Kokh: Farit, I can report to you that I've agreed with Jordan that
we'll meet him in his office at 1600. I wanted to take someone from the
RFPF. Malin refused. He said he's got more important things to do.
Gazizullin: Because he's busy with the tender.
Kokh: I suppose someone else will be responsible for this matter, not
Malin. Right?
Gazizullin: Yes. Lipkin [Malin's boss] is responsible for this
matter.
Kokh: Tell Lipkin to come to Jordan's place...
Gazizullin: I'll tell Molozhavyy (deputy chairman [as published] of
the Russian Federation Ministry of State Property -- A. Kh.), and Chekurova
(deputy chairman of the RFPF -- A.Kh.) is there too. So the two of them
will... Where?
Kokh: At Jordan's place. Get them to call me.
Gazizullin: They'll call you.
Kokh: They know Jordan well.
Gazizullin: Molozhavyy will call you.
Kokh: OK.
Dialogue No. 5 [subhead]
Kokh and Vladimir Molozhavyy, deputy chairman of the Russian Ministry
of State Property.
Kokh: Serezh [as published; diminutive for Sergey, although
Molozhavyy's name is given as Vladimir], as I understand it, they've dumped
this job on you?
Molozhavyy: Yes, at the Ministry of State Property. We've got Marina
Chekurova here, too.
Kokh: We're taking both of you to see Jordan at 1600. On Masha
Poryvayeva [Street].
Molozhavyy: I've already been given that information.
Kokh: Call Jordan's office, say... In fact, he's not there yet... 
I'll sort it out.
Molozhavyy: OK. On Poryvayeva, at 1600.
Kokh: Yes.
Molozhavyy: Agreed.
Dialogue No. 6 [subhead]
Kokh and Vladislav Reznik, chairman of the Rosgosstrakh [Russian State
Insurance] board.
Reznik: Hello. How are you?
Kokh: OK.
Reznik: We had a great time.
Kokh: Meaning?
Reznik: We drank a bit of vodka in the morning, and it was great... 
You can imagine how interesting it all is, about how we...
Kokh: Yes. Did Kogan [not further identified] arrive yet?
Reznik: No. As far as I know, he's arriving tomorrow evening.
Kokh: I see.
Reznik: This is the situation. I'll tell you the details when we
meet.
Kokh: Sure.
Reznik: I wanted something from you... (Pause.) I've remembered
what it was, but I can't tell you what I wanted.
Kokh: You mean, in THAT sense?
Reznik: In THAT sense.
Kokh: OK, I'm ready.
Reznik: If I say something to you, the next day it'll be in the
newspapers.
Kokh: I'm ready. Are you?
Reznik: No, I'm not.
Kokh: So why start?
Reznik: I wanted to talk about something else.
Kokh: What?
Reznik: OK, I get it... There's no news, nobody's been appointed to
your old department?
Kokh: No, nobody's been appointed yet.
Reznik: OK, I'll call you. See you.
Dialogue No. 7 [subhead]
Kokh and Vladimir Malin, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federal
Property Fund.
Malin: Hello. Borisych (Chubays? Lipkin? -- A.Kh.) asked me to call
you again. He suggests a meeting at the Finance Ministry in Vyugin's
(Russian Federation deputy minister of finance -- A.Kh.) office.
Kokh: I'm going to Jordan's. They're meeting there -- Chekurova,
Molozhavyy, and so on.
Malin: They've just been discussing it among themselves. It was
Chekurova who fixed it with Vyugin.
Kokh: I don't know what to do. Jordan's busy. There's no way he's
going to the Finance Ministry. It was all I could do to persuade him to
have a meeting today.... Vov [Vladimir], I don't understand, if you've
been put in charge of this matter, sort it out yourself somehow.
Malin: I'm not in charge of it.
Kokh: You may not be in charge of it, but we had an agreement.
Malin: Do I really have to say this to you?
Kokh: What do you mean by "this"?
Malin: I can't convince you at least not to call me, if other people
are dealing with it.
Kokh: Did I call you? You called me.
Malin: I'm telling you, I'm in a ridiculous situation.
Kokh: I didn't call you. I know it's Chekurova who's dealing with
it. It was you that called me.
Malin: When are you leaving?
Kokh: The car's downstairs. I'm going now.
Malin: Where's Jordan?
Kokh: On Masha Poryvayeva Street, where the MFK is... Guys, I'm a
private individual. It's all the same to me where we meet. You're the ones
doing the maneuvering. I don't have any problems. I can go anywhere you
like.
Malin: OK. Are you on your cell-phone?
Kokh: No, I'm on a city line.
Malin: Have you still got your old cell-phone, or a new one?
Kokh: A new one.
Malin: I'll tell Igor Borisovich (Lipkin -- A.Kh.) now. I don't know
what to do in this situation. It's physically impossible for me to go
myself at the moment.
Kokh: So don't go. What do you want from me? Why are you bothering
me, I don't understand it at all?
Malin: I'm upset. Because they tell me one thing, and I can't do it.
It's a ridiculous situation... Give me your phone number.
Kokh: (gives a number)
Malin: OK. Thanks.
Dialogue No. 8 [subhead]
Kokh and Arkadiy Yevstafyev, director of the Center for the Protection
of Private Ownership, former Chubays aide, and former deputy general
director of ORT [television].
Yevstafyev: Shall we meet there at nine?
Kokh: Are we going to call on Borisych (Chubays? -- A.Kh.)?
Yevstafyev: Yes.
Kokh: Fine.
Yevstafyev: How are things with you?
Kokh: OK.
Yevstafyev: I'm in the city now. I'll come straight there.
Kokh: Fine.
Yevstafyev: Is everything OK with you?
Kokh: Yes.
Yevstafyev: Your voice sounds kind of sad.
Kokh: I'm OK.
Yevstafyev: Good. [Dialogues end]

If you did not know what kind of people were doing the talking, you
could not help getting the impression that we are looking at friends and
neighbors. They address each other using the familiar second-person form
and first names. They joke and laugh like kids.
Yet, in theory, these are people from different trenches. One set of
them -- Kokh, Jordan -- are businessmen. The second set -- Gazizullin,
Molozhavyy, Malin -- are state officials (top-ranking, at that).
The objective of the former (in theory) is to buy everything as cheap
as possible. To derive the maximum benefit for their own pocket.
The objective of the latter (in theory) is to sell everything at as
high a price as possible. To derive the maximum benefit for the state
coffers.
There is no visible difference between them, though. These are
like-minded people....
What one set of like-minded people is selling to the other is not just
scrap metal. It is one of the country's biggest companies: Rosneft.
Rosneft is a state-owned company at the moment. All 100 percent of
its shares are in the government's hands.
But next year, by a decision of the White House, Rosneft will be put
up for auction. Unexim and MFK-Renessans (two fraternal organizations)
long to buy it at any price.
They are preparing for this in advance. The point is that Rosneft
will not be sold in the usual way. Before that, before the end of this
year, the Russian Federal Property Fund and the Ministry of State Property
are supposed to conduct a tender to fill the vacant position of financial
consultant to Rosneft.
What is that? Very simple. The company that is selected from among
the numerous contestants and awarded the powers of Rosneft's financial
consultant invests credits in it. It develops the program for the
investment tender at which Rosneft will finally be sold. Like a sort of
guardian, in short.
Whoever buys the girl dinner gets to dance with her. The company
winning the tender for the title of financial consultant gains obvious
advantages at the 1998 auction. First, it will already have invested some
money in Rosneft by that time. Second, it is in charge of preparations for
the auction.
To put it crudely: The financial consultant is the potential owner.
As is clear from the conversations, Unexim and MFK-Renessans, with
whom Kokh is linked body and soul, are making every effort to become the
financial consultant. One of them, if not the other. (It makes no
difference which.)
The officials who are responsible for the tender not only make no
secret of the terms, they actually draw up the terms the potential buyers
dictate.
"The group has already been formed," Kokh tells his comrade-in- arms,
U.S. citizen Boris Jordan. "There's Igor Lipkin, Malin, all those guys. 
Now they want to know our terms, what we want to get."
Did you get that? "They want to know our terms, what we want to get!"
And then: "We have to put all the necessary papers on Borisych's desk
by this evening."
To translate that into terms that even a housewife could understand,
the situation looks like this: The Sportloto lottery is held every week. 
A few days before the next draw, the members of the draw commission meet
with the players. They fill in their cards together. They pick out the
numbers that will win a Volga car. Then they spin the lottery wheel. And
they show TV viewers the winning numbers. The very same numbers that their
"own" players sent in.
True, it is much more difficult to rig the results at Sportloto than
at auctions held by the State Property Committee and the RFPF.
The rules of the game are brilliantly worked out. Kokh and Jordan do
not even have to persuade the officials. It is a foregone conclusion.
"Shall I bring Lipkin and Malin?" the "writer" Kokh asks U.S. citizen
Jordan.
"Fine," he replies.
(As if they were not talking about a minister and his first deputy,
but about relatives from the provinces who have nowhere to stay the night.)
"Tell Lipkin to come to Jordan's place," the businessman [and former
minister] Kokh orders Gazizullin, the CURRENT acting minister of state
property, referring to Lipkin, a CURRENT minister. Minister Gazizullin
stands to attention.
"We're taking both of you to see Jordan at 1600," Kokh cursorily gives
the order to State Property Ministry deputy chairman Molozhavyy. (He is
"taking" Molozhavyy himself and RFPF deputy chairman Chekurova.)
"I've already been given that information," the deputy chairman
reports, Chernomyrdin-style.
You get the feeling that it was not Kokh who was expelled from the
government over unwritten novels and "love of certain banks," but his
interlocutors who are doomed to exile.
In a normal country it should be the other way around: Ministers give
orders to retirees, not retirees to ministers. In our country,
everything's all wrong. Retirees not only give the orders, but make people
live according to their own "writerly" ideas.
"I don't know what to do in this situation. It's physically
impossible for me to go myself at the moment," RFPF first deputy chairman
Malin declares sadly. "They tell me one thing, and I can't do it."
"What do you want from me?" -- the "gay" (to use his own expression)
Kokh replies, with [communist] party- style bluntness. "So don't go."
Look how he clings. The wimp!
Given such plans, Unexim and MFK-Renessans will surely become
Rosneft's financial consultants.
Everything is on their side: money, tame officials, rules of the game
known beforehand.
Kokh is in a hurry to resolve everything as quickly as possible. Speed
is his advantage. First, it is necessary to invest over a billion dollars
in Rosneft. Russian companies do not have that kind of money. They will
have to secure loans abroad. Unexim and MFK- Renessans have a billion. 
They had prepared in good time, they know what sum must be found.
Second, there is no knowing how long the "young reformers" will stay
in power. Without them, nothing will come of it.
Kokh and his comrades are in a hurry to resolve another matter too. 
Wednesday [26 November] evening, Nemtsov summoned Rosneft president
Bespalov (former industry minister). He tried to persuade him it was
necessary to write a letter of resignation right there in the office. 
Bespalov refused.
Bespalov is an open enemy of Unexim and company. He, of course,
cannot do the future owners much harm. But they do not like having a
"fifth column" on their doorstep.
It is clear why Nemtsov went for Bespalov they way he did. The prime
minister is out of Russia. He has left on a visit to Vietnam. And it is
not easy to remove Bespalov in Chernomyrdin's presence. Ch.V.S.
[Chernomyrdin, Viktor Stepanovich], although he does not openly intervene
in the redistribution of property, nonetheless tries to maintain some kind
of balance. 
Thus, we have identified another player among the bridge fans: Boris
Nemtsov.
The two first vice [premiers] skillfully shield the "card- sharpers." 
(It is surely Chubays that Kokh is being called to a meeting with by
Yevstafyev, former aide to the principal privatizer [Chubays] and a lover
of xerox paper boxes [Yevstafyev was one of the two men caught removing
$500,000 from the White House in a xerox paper box during the presidential
election campaign]).
Do not believe those who say that Chubays's team has been smashed and
thrown down. The "young reformers" from the Writers Union will prove their
worth yet....
A game of bridge -- that is how Kokh himself described the
machinations over Rosneft. It should be added: Not bridge pure and
simple. Bridge with marked cards.
The "writer" Kokh is an acknowledged master of the game of bridge. 
Even the president appreciated the game he played with Svyazinvest. After
which he [the president] fired the card-playing minister.
The Svyazinvest affair is very similar to the present affair. At
least, the players are the same -- Unexim, MFK-Renessans, Kokh, Jordan.
Strange people, these bridge players! They don't learn anything from
their failures.
Kokh has already gotten burned once, over Svyazinvest. Then he got
burned over the fees for his "bestseller." Anyone else in his place would
be treading as carefully as a mountain goat. But no! He still treads on
the same old rake.
I am not even talking about the rigging of the auction. (It's no use
blaming a dog for not being able not to bark.) But he could at least
observe the basic rules of secrecy!
Only a suicide permits himself to talk about THOSE things on the
telephone. To testify against himself. A suicide or someone who is
absolutely confident of his invulnerability.
"If I say something to you, the next day it'll be in the newspapers,"
Rosgosstrakh chief Reznik warned Kokh. (He must have second sight.)
But the valiant Kokh fears nothing. And he is right. He is in a
make-or-break situation. Either Kokh will do pretty well out of the
Rosneft sale. Or he will end up somewhere where he won't be able to call
ministers on the phone anymore.
"I'm making money, and how," he boasts to Kazakov, his colleague in
the "writers'" work, who ended up in hospital as a result of the literary
episode. "I've already earned enough to pay for any operation you want. 
You want a head transplant?"
Maybe they could really try it? Personally, I think a new head would
be no bad thing for Kokh.
People are shouting about corruption everywhere. (Just as at one time
they shouted about perestroyka and acceleration.) They are looking for
this corruption with lamps and fire hooks.
There is no need to look for it. Here it is, real corruption. Comrade
prosecutors! Ask the officials whose names were given in the transcripts
-- why are they so zealous on behalf of the financial-industrial groups? 
Is it really out of a love for literature?
And if the ministers and deputy ministers reply that they are cutting
the tender to suit the client's measurements purely out of the goodness of
their hearts, ask Chernomyrdin to send them the same way as Kokh. Into
retirement.
Only real fools would rig strategically important auctions without any
profit to themselves. And fools in power are perhaps even more dangerous
than people who are corrupt and take bribes.
We have plenty of both kinds nowadays. Not to mention "gays"...
S. When this item was ready, we called Kokh. We asked:
"Are you involved in the preparations for the Rosneft tender?"
"No, I am not involved," Kokh replied.
It seems he is a liar into the bargain....

*********

U.S. Seen Too Eager To 'Show Who Is Boss' 

Rabochaya Tribuna
3 December 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Report by Yevgeniy Rusakov under the "Keep the Change" rubric:
"The Planet's Sheriff Is Angry. U.S. Police Try To Make Russian
Diplomats and Gas Officials Live by the Laws of the Wild West"

New York -- At the end of October the New York police put on another
show in the spirit of the Wild West right outside Russia's UN Mission. The
guardians of the law did not like the fact that the Russian ambassador's
driver sounded his horn to stop a patrol car blocking the traffic. A few
minutes later the enraged policemen caught up with the car carrying Sergey
Lavrov, Russia's permanent representative at the United Nations, switched
on their flashing lights, blocked the road, and snatched the driver's keys.
Well, Russian diplomats have "gone through" all this before, when at the
end of last year the guardians of order broke the arm of one of them and
lumped the blame onto him. City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani feted the heroes of
that "exploit" in his official residence.

No One Honks at America? 

And why not?! Rudi needs the White House only in some special
financial or political situations. As for the State Department, as
experience shows, the freely elected U.S. mayor can afford to ignore it
altogether. This is why democracy and local self-government exist in
America. To play on great-power and xenophobic sentiments is one pleasure
that brings popularity and extra votes. Theoretically, it would seem to be
not allowed to violate federal laws, but in fact diplomatic immunity and
other international norms are interpreted "New York-style."
Just imagine if the U.S. ambassador were treated like this in some
other capital! In an instant almost all of America, including Giuliani,
would rise up as one in the spirit of unity around the flag! The matter
might end in a show of force with aircraft carriers and economic sanctions.
"No one honks at America." This is the reality of contemporary world
politics, unbalanced by the might of the sole superpower.
Democracy is respected in America. But "for themselves," above all,
in their own interpretation. Even in instances where this interpretation
runs counter to the understanding of their allies on the continent of
Europe.
Russian Permanent Representative Sergey Lavrov was hastening to a
meeting of the UN Security Council's permanent members for a further
discussion of what to do with the dictator of Baghdad. The latest Iraqi
crisis was just flaring up. Saddam Husayn needs no introduction: He has
unleashed several wars and rules by means of persuasive "arguments,"
personally shooting at once-high-ranking compatriots who have displeased
him. In short, he is undermining international stability and violating
human rights in every possible way.
The question is a different one: how to influence the Baghdad
dictator more effectively and how to ensure the geopolitical and economic
interests of countries which intersect with Iraq, ranging from the United
States and Saudi Arabia to Russia and France. This problem was highlighted
with the utmost clarity by the conflict, which was eased somewhat thanks,
above all, to the efforts of Russian diplomacy. Even Washington has now
been forced grudgingly to acknowledge the transparency of its hopes of
breaking the political old-timer in Baghdad by means of economic sanctions
or air strikes. To acknowledge also that the victims of the trade and
economic siege are essentially the ordinary people, descendants of the
Arabs who came to the motherland of the most ancient Sumero- Akkadian
civilization (incidentally, historians are now sounding the alarm about the
serious damage that the sanctions are causing to the archeological
monuments of this mother of all civilizations).
No one disputes the need for Iraq to abide strictly by the Security
Council's resolutions -- above all, Resolution 687 on the controlled
destruction of all installations, stocks, and materials of weapons of mass
destruction. But for three of the five UN Security Council permanent
members -- Russia, France, and China -- and the overwhelming majority of UN
member countries it is clear that Baghdad should be persuaded not only and
not so much by means of a stick (economic and military sanctions) but also
by means of a carrot ("light at the end of the tunnel," as French President
Jacques Chirac put it), that is, with the prospect of easing and ultimately
lifting the economic sanctions.

Reminder of the Future: Oil Embargo 

Literally until recently, however, Washington had its own
interpretation of the Security Council resolution. Even if the UN Special
Commission for disarmament concludes that it is being fulfilled by Baghdad,
the Americans will find new grounds for keeping the sanctions as long as
Saddam Husayn remains in power in Baghdad. I repeatedly heard this
interpretation from U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and from
James Rubin, a current official spokesman for the foreign policy
department, while they were U.S. permanent representative at the United
Nations and press secretary to the U.S. mission respectively.
Another diplomatic battle is developing in the Security Council now,
following the UN specialists' return to Iraq: The Americans are refusing
point-blank to acknowledge progress in the elimination of nuclear and
missile weapon components in Iraq and raising the level of toughness of the
demands on Baghdad. The campaign against the threat from that country's
chemical and bacteriological weapons is being mounted with such intensity
that it leaves the continued danger of a U.S. military strike in no doubt.
The explanation is quite simple: Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
are just one of Washington's concerns in the Persian Gulf region and maybe
not the most important one. In any case, back in 1980 the Carter
administration proclaimed this region, along with West Europe and the Far
East, a zone of U.S. vital interests, for the sake of which Washington was
prepared to use nuclear weapons.
The present U.S. strategy of "dual deterrence" of Iraq and Iran is
aimed, above all, at ensuring control of the world's largest treasure-house
of oil. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union the Caspian region -- the
third-largest repository of oil and gas stocks after the "Gulf" states and
Russia -- has also found itself drawn into this strategy. NATO and the
U.S. Armed Forces Central Command are now dividing up the zone of
responsibility also for this geopolitical trophy from the USSR's breakup.
The waters of the Persian Gulf and its environs are being plowed by
U.S. aircraft-carrier flotillas, and large air groupings are concentrated
at bases in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. They are "deterring" both Iraq and
Iran, which is the target of a separate foreign policy vendetta by
Washington. They are ensuring the preservation of the U.S.-friendly
medieval authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries --
both against possible encroachments by Iraq or Iran and against internal
threats.
Strictly speaking, if we reduce Washington's overarching concern over
radical Islamism to the "dry residue," then the main subject of its
strategic nightmare will be fear of Islamists' accession to power in the
Persian Gulf countries, and in Saudi Arabia above all. Then it will be
farewell to amicable deals with local owners of oil riches, and hello to
the threat of an oil embargo and other "charms" of the seventies oil
crisis. Moreover, the international sanctions against Baghdad and the U.S.
trade sanctions against Tehran are helping to reduce the flow of oil on the
world market, keeping prices low [as published] there and holding back the
positions of Saudi Arabia and other U.S. clients.
You would expect the White House quite fervently and unceremoniously
to champion U.S. oil and other interests in the Persian Gulf region. But
this is not enough for U.S. admirers of naked force. They still cannot
forgive G. Bush for not issuing the order to occupy Iraq in 1991 and not
putting an end to the master of Baghdad once and for all (literally a few
weeks ago the ex-president had once again to justify himself during the
opening ceremony for his library). The "hawks" are now continuing to
insist on a massive missile and bombing strike against the entire territory
of Iraq.
A unilateral U.S. trade and economic embargo against Iran is not
enough for them either. Taking the path trodden by the Helms-Burton law on
"punishing" foreign companies which maintain commercial relations with
Cuba, in 1996 the U.S. Senate approved the D'Amato- Kennedy law on
sanctions against foreign business partners of Iran and Libya. It provides
for sanctions against companies which invest more than $20 million in the
oil and gas industry of those countries, including a virtually complete ban
on U.S. bank loans.
This juridical act clearly violates the norms of international law by
imposing U.S. embargo legislation outside the United States. It elicited
harsh criticism from the EU and from many countries on other continents.
To this people in America reply: We have democracy, we have the
separation of powers and a system of "restraints" and "counterweights." 
Since we have democracy, much is permitted. The U.S. Congress is free to
violate the norms of international law for which the administration
campaigns. Before breaking up for the long vacations, the Capitol killed
the partial payment of debts to the United Nations.

Bill Complains to Friend Boris 

It is easy to imagine the reception given in America to the $2-
billion contract signed in September by the French Total firm, the Gazprom
Russian Joint-Stock Company, and the Malaysian Petronas Company to open up
the major South Pars gas field in Iran. Despite the commercial nature of
this deal, it was perceived, particularly among the Republicans in
Congress, as a direct challenge to U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf
region -- not only commercial but also military-political interests. As a
challenge to the policy of "dual deterrence" of Iraq and Iran.
But "people do not honk at the New York police." It is not permitted
to encroach on U.S. "world leadership." Otherwise Washington's authority
and trust in its might will be undermined. This argument is now being used
by supporters of Saddam Husayn's physical elimination and of massive
missile and bombing strikes against the entire territory of Iraq. This
argument coincides with the explanation for the New York police's
inclination toward physical violence and cruelty. It turns out that
violence is a consequence of the psychological need of the guardians of
order to show who is boss. Washington -- particularly the right-wing
Republicans on Capitol Hill -- also considers it its duty to remind people
who is the "boss" and the "chief" of our planet.
At the hearings in the Senate Banking Committee at the end of October
D'Amato, chairman of this committee, threatened to block the floating of
Gazprom bonds on U.S. financial markets and to suspend the U.S.
Export-Import Bank's guarantees for loans for purchases of U.S. equipment
by the Russian company.
Washington has a rich choice of means to exert pressure. It has not
yet opened fire on the Russian gas company with the legislative artillery. 
Efforts have so far been aimed at cutting off Gazprom's access to credits
and tying the hands of its U.S. partner -- Goldman Sachs, one of the major
investment banks. Admittedly, in view of the financial upheavals on world
markets connected with the decline of the "Asian miracle," now is, in any
case, not the best time for the flotation of Gazprom bonds, which Goldman
Sachs was intending to carry out. The Russian company's application to
world financial markets for credits has been deferred. Washington's clash
with the Russian gas giant has also been deferred accordingly.
The U.S. press reports that Clinton has already managed to complain to
Boris Yeltsin by telephone about the difficulties being created by the
Iranian contract and to urge the Russian president to take a "more serious"
attitude to problems associated with Iran. In mid-November the White House
held a conference with the participation of the main figures in the
administration on the question of sanctions -- both against Gazprom and
against Goldman, Sachs, whose former Cochairman Robert Rubin now holds the
post of U.S. treasury secretary. The whole tangled knot of issues was
discussed during the debate: U.S. national security interests,
"deterrence" of Iran, relations with the NATO allies and Russia, the impact
of new sanctions on the reputation of U.S. financial markets. And, of
course, the position of Congress.

Has a One-Sided Game Commenced? 

At the same time a battle over the Iranian deal is getting under way
between the United States and the EU. Leon Brittan, EU commissioner for
trade, has declared that Total's decision to participate in it is of an
exclusively commercial nature and concerns that company alone. He
emphasized that U.S. attempts to impart an extraterritorial nature to its
legislation violate the norms of international law and create tension in
transatlantic relations, thereby hindering the partnership in achieving
common goals in Iran policy.
As for Russia, on the one hand Washington is encouraging market
reforms, calling for improved conditions for U.S. companies' investment and
trade activities in our country, and taking up a proprietorial position in
the oil repository of the Caspian region, not particularly concerned about
Moscow's interests. On the other hand, when it gets down to business, it
opens its markets very reluctantly (Congress froze the repeal of the point
in the trade law adopted at the beginning of the distant seventies
concerning the Russian economy's status as "centrally planned") and
interferes actively in the Russian company's exclusively commercial
relations with a third country on the Capitol's say-so in the spirit of
"democracy for themselves."
The economic and political stakes are high. Washington is raising
them even higher by trying to ensure a one-sided game in the world arena.

********

Berezovskiy Chances in Electoral Politics 

Interfaks-AiF, No. 46
November 17-23, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Sergey Kurbatov, under the "Personalities" heading: "Boris
Berezovskiy as a Public Politician. The Rich Man's Camel-Like Journey:
Through the Eye of the Needle and Into Politics"

Much has been said of the reasons for the dismissal of B. Berezovskiy
(hereafter BB). We will not engage in repetition and guessing about the
past—it is more important to come to understand what role he could
play in the future. BB himself has said that he does not want either to go
into the state service again or to return to business, but is planning on
becoming a "public politician." Does he have a chance?

I Would Go Into Politics...

What kind of personal qualities was BB able to demonstrate during
those five or six years when he attracted the attention of the media and
society to himself?
He is well educated (a doctor of sciences, a corresponding member of
the Russian Academy of Sciences). Intelligent, canny,
stubborn--otherwise, he would not have been able to create his
financial empire.
He is not a coward--suffice it to recall his meeting with the
Cossacks at the beginning of the year. BB was warned that it would be
better not to go there: The Cossacks are too worked up, too angry, and
there's no telling how things could end. He was not afraid; he went...
Generally speaking, he is not afraid of confrontations: Let us recall his
recent tough statements addressed to the Chechen leaders and his open
warfare with the young reformers.
He is a diplomat, and knows how to solve complex tasks (as his puppet
said in the famous NTV [Independent Television] program: "And who went to
the infidels for kerosene?"). In the estimation of people who know him
well, he easily comes together with people whom he needs, and easily turns
away from them when that need is gone. A trait that is vile in personal
life, but probably necessary in politics.
BB loves and knows how to work. Once he arrived for a press conference
at a time when he was on vacation. Afterwards, one on one, I asked him: "So
are you on vacation or at work?" "On vacation." "And when do you relax?" "I
am relaxing now; my work is my relaxation," answered BB. He was hardly
acting greatly against his character. At the same time, he is not a
dried-up stick locked into his work. There are in his biography many wives
and even more children. This, in my view does not make him in the eyes of
the majority a playboy and a Casanova, but imparts to him the charm of a
lover of life, a real man, appreciated by women and a good judge of life's
joys. In any case, Russia is no longer patriarchal enough for such facts to
harm a politician.
He is witty and does not have to grope for his words. I have an idea
for the television hosts: Invite two wits for a live on-air dialogue on any
topic (best not political)—BB and Lebed. I am sure that the spectacle
would be fun and without brawling—both of them know how to behave.
Incidentally, BB is not a great orator, but he knows how to change the mood
of an audience. Again, let us recall his meeting with the Cossacks: He came
out to the rostrum to spiteful remarks, and walked away to cries of "All
right!" For this, it is true, he had to promise to give weapons out to the
Cossacks, which in the future was not done.
Let us recap. Intelligent, educated, persistent, industrious,
courageous, "combat-ready," rather cynical and cruel, but flexible... Aha!
It turns out that a "public politician" is entering the political arena,
capable of crushing the small fry and throwing down the gauntlet to heroes.
Although the fate of politicians depends not only on their personal
qualities but also on the circumstances of life.

If There Is Anything To Eat. He Will Eat It

A politician without voters is a car without wheels: It makes noise,
puffs, stinks, but it cannot run. On what voters can BB count?
In answer to journalists from Ekho Moskvy as to whether he did not
have any plans on becoming president, BB reacted in a flash: "That's a good
one." An intelligent man, he understands that he cannot raise all of
Russia. But what is in his power? Here is the main barrier.
Yes, our society is fragmented, and people's views are different. But
there are indeed reigning opinions. For example, the attitude toward "new
Russians." One does not need polls and scholarly research; let us recall a
simple fact: In the past three or four years, jokes about Jews, Chukchis,
Vasiliy Ivanoviches, even the authorities, have almost disappeared. The
"new Russian" has become the new hero. His generalized portrait: a
super-rich dull-witted thug. Rich people have never been beloved in Russia
(the proverb "You don't earn stone palaces through honest labor" was born
centuries ago). Now this also has an objective basis: Almost none of our
nouveaux riches has gotten rich by doing anything at all useful to society.
And that means that none of them can count on broad voter support.
The experience of Mavrodi and Bryntsalov are telling. They were each
able to seduce with promises and miserly handouts one electoral district
apiece. But Bryntsalov's nationwide game ended in failure. Judging by
everything, the political limit of the upstart rich is a seat in the Duma,
and not always that: Madame Mavrodi was not able to achieve it.
It is clear that BB is not a "new Russian" of the jokes. He is no
match for Mavrodi and Bryntsalov: His "smokestack is higher and the smoke
is thicker." But he is a rich man—and for the man on the street, that
says it all. I doubt that situation could change; no generosity will help.
If BB builds a church, the man on the street will say: "He has a lot of
sins on his conscience, and he is trying to get absolution." If BB builds a
children's hospital, the man on the street will say: "He has more money
than he knows what to do with; he could build 10 hospitals like this."
Big money has the right to say to the rich man going into politics: "I
spawned you, I can kill you as well."
The more educated portion of society, which follows the media and
politics, is also hardly likely to support BB. He can simply be asked too
many unpleasant questions.
Is it true that LogoVAZ made money on fictitious exports? Where is our
"people's automobile," and how is the AVVA concern doing? And what about
the transfer of Aeroflot's money to Switzerland? And what about what the
magazine Forbes wrote? And who in actual fact is in charge of our Public
Television? And why did BB need Gazprom? And what is going on with Sibneft?
And is it true that BB said to Lebed after the end of the Chechen war:
"What a business you wrecked!"? Should I go on?
I am prepared to believe that there are clear, plain answers to each
of these questions. Moreover, I think that BB is as clean as a mountain
stream before the Law. But the turbid waves of compromising materials have
made him a dubious figure in the eyes of society. The majority believe that
where there is smoke there is fire, and there has been smoke enough for the
entire country...

Where Is a Rich Man To Go?

It is a poor politician who does not dream of becoming president. It
is a naive politician who wants to get all or nothing, now or never. The
Army needs not only generals, and politics needs not only aspirants to the
highest post.
BB is not naive; he is not aiming for the presidency. He probably
understands better than anyone that he cannot be the leader of a party or a
movement. In general, one cannot really believe in his success as a public
politician. But that is not a reason to retreat. I think that his personal
qualities, big money, and extensive connections will allow him not only to
remain in politics, but also to be an influential figure in them. And to
play a special role—the role of a sponsor, a "financial papa," a
shadowy leader, a gray cardinal..
Probably, BB understands, as a businessman, that here before him is a
colossal market and mighty prospects. After all, there is no strong
left-center party in our political spectrum. But Russia needs one badly.
Big capital has still oriented itself on the radical reformers, and it has
remained to the left-wingers to rely on the "new poor." As a result,
irreconcilable positions collide: The desire to remake the country on the
faraway Western model (which has turned out to be basically harmful) and
the desire to return to the USSR, "the whole package deal" (which is
unrealistic, which means stupid). The country is weary of conflicts. More
and more often, politicians and political scientists speak of a "third
way." In its general form, its slogans are already being taken up by many:
a market economy, support of everything national (from ideas to vodka), a
strong social policy that reliably protects the needy, the cultivation of a
middle class, and so on. The embryos of such parties do exist. The thing is
to create an influential movement. Without money, it is not worthwhile even
to try. And here BB's role could be decisive...
So the tender for use for political ends of "Berezovskiy's treasure"
is open. Hurry to make your bids, ladies and gentlemen! Who knows, maybe
cows financed by BB will vote not "for Ivan"?

*********