August 22, 1997  
This Date's Issues: 1137 •1138  • 

Johnson's Russia List [list two]
#1138
22 August 1997
djohnson@cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Gordon Hahn's Last Response to Stephen Blank.
2. Pravda Rossii: Zyuganov Hits 'Antipeople' Course of 
Reforms.
3. Komsomolskaya Pravda : Sociologist Betaneli on Studies 
of Public Opinion.
4. Brian Whitmore: Russia: The Manevich Funeral--Tears 
And Vows Flow.]

*********

Date: Thu, 21 Aug 1997 
From: Gordon Hahn <hahn@hoover.stanford.edu> 
Subject: Hahn's Last Response to Blank

Hahn's Last Direct Response to Blank:
It is worthy of note that in a recent piece by Paul Goble (JRL 1128, 15 Aug
'97) an unidentified "senior Russian air force officer" boasted about the
impending introduction of a new generation of advanced military aircraft for
Russia as "'a kind of answer to NATO's eastward expansion.'" This
underscored the very point I have been stressing: that the expanision of
NATO is more likely to support the persistence of traditional behavior in
the Russian (but not only the Russian) defense industry - high government
expenditures, new lines of production for competition with the US on the
international arms market - and frustrate the resolution of other military
problems including settlement of wage arrears and military reform. Military
reform is a matter of financial resources (not to mention a will to reform
and most militaries are conservative bureaucratically and, parenthetically,
politically), Mr. Blank, and they are very limited in Russia right now. This
has to be understood. Any additional pressure by the civilian leadership to
civilianize the MO, reduce and change the direction of budget defense
appropriations is likely to meet, therefore, with greater resistance from
the military. By the way, Blank should stop fudging the distinction between
military affairs and civil-military relations.
I never stated that NATO had anything to do with the type of military
reform being touted per se, though it now appears one can make that argument
too. I noted NATO expansion would effect civil-military relations and
through that, we can now say it will effect military reform. Or it may work
the other way around (it doesn't really matter): NATO expansion reduces the
desire of the military to reform or make the right reforms - reduce
procurements, transition to volunteer service - conflicts with the civilian
leadership's desire to cut budgets and so attempts to cut procurements,
professionalize the army and civilianize the MO leads to more tension.
Militaries always use threats (or arguable ones) to maximize spending, and
spending on new technology will reduce resources availble for volunteer
servicemen's higher salaries.
A curious twist occurs in Goble's presentation: the statement made by the
Russian officer is transformed into "the threat implied by this announcement".

GOBLE: "This announcement of a new plane raises the further question: just
how pacific are Russia's intentions? ...
"By suggesting that the new plane represents an answer to NATO's decision
to include three former Warsaw Pact countries as members, Moscow is implying
that it will seek to build up its own forces to be in a position to block
any further growth of the Western alliance. For the immediate future, the
Russian government probably is not going to be able or even willing to
project that kind of power. But the threat implied by this announcement will
have an immediate impact on the debates taking place in each NATO country
about enlargement. Many opponents of any growth in the alliance have argued
that NATO's move to the east will prompt Moscow to rearm, a step that would
inevitably affect East-West cooperation and limit Russia's ability to make
the transition to democracy and free markets. They are certain to point to
this announcement of a new Russian plane as proving their case. But this
Russian strategy, if such it is, may have the unintended consequence of
actually strengthening the position of those who actively back NATO
expansion. To the extent that the new aircraft represents 'a kind of answer'
to the Western alliance, the Russian government has unwittingly provided
support for those who argue that Moscow continues to represent a threat to
the countries of Eastern Europe. And that will only increase the stridency
of demands by those countries to be included in the Western defense
alliance. At the same time, the introduction of this new weapons system now
suggests that at least some in the Russian capital will always seek a
military answer to any action of the West, something that could complicate
East-West relations more generally." 

Hence, Russian weapons development and production, largely intended to
boost arms sales and produce badly hard currency, become a 'Russian threat'.
If observers in the U.S. use the bragadoccio of an officer of inidentified
name and rank to pose the spectre of a Russian threat to Eastern Europe,
should we really have been surprised that Russian observers interpret NATO
expansion as a threat? It's all very clever, in a sense. Politically, what
is happening is that extremists and supporters of their respective
military-industrial complexes both in Russia and among the NATO countries
with their multifarious vested interests have gained considerable initiative
in the development of Russian-American relations. They drive an inflation of
countervailing threats, while the those in the Wast supporting NATO
expansion tell those doubtful about its wisdom and its effect on Russia's
transition and Russian-American relations that they were wrong to argue that
enlargement would produce a reaction from the Russian military, its
industrial complex and play into hardliners' hands. But NATO expansion will,
they claim, not be used successfully by hardliners in Moscow to raise
concerns about NATO's deleterious effect on Russian national security. I
repeat, countries should base their foreign and security policies not on the
intentions of other states, according to former US Secretary of State George
Shultz, but on their capabilities. Are NATO's capabilities vis-a-vis Russia
enhanced or diminished by enlargement? If they are not, then how is it that
it improves the guard against a possible rise of Russian imperialism? If
they are, then can we expect that the Russian military will do nothing to
address the change in the correlation of forces? Is that professionalism or
imperialism?
As far as I can see the only way to redress this potential zero-sum outcome
is to make Russia's role in Partnership for Peace, in the consulting council
created by Founding Act, and in NATO manuevers the world as robust as
possible. While excluding any rhetorical or official Western acquiescence of
Russia's European power status, a de facto nod in this direction through
priority cooperation with Russia in PoP, manuvers, etc. might assuage
Russian sensitivities while simultaneously enhancing the kind of
Russian-NATO cooperation that would put an end to residual mutual suspicions
after the Cold War and facilitate a 'revolution' in Russia's military
affairs and civil-military relations. 
It is interesting that in Blank's response of 7 August 1997, he makes a
remark that stands in direct contradiction with one made in his 14 August
response to me. On 7 August he wrote that "NATO is not obliged to be an
agency for international democratization (which I subsequently pointed out I
had never said but that many proponents of NATO expansion had - GH), Mr Hahn
might remember it is not democratizing anyone in the Balkans either, this is
irrelevant, a red herring customarily used by people who do not want to
discuss the issues and resort to sarcasm, misplaced moralism, or ad hominem
attacks." On 14 August we get: "I do believe (NATO) strengthens democracy,
most particularly in the civil-military relations by its insistence on
effective democratic controls which were at some risk in Poland and are
utterly nonexistent in Russia and are part of the general crisis there."
Aside from the fact that I had never mentioned the democratization-by-NATO
issue in any way shape or form, until Blank raised and then tried to shoot
the strawman down, using ad hominem attacks to charge me with ad hominem
attacks, he seems to have contradicted himself here, though in a minor way. 
One might add that NATO's efforts in democratizing, for example, Turkey's
civil-military relations have failed up to now, given that the military just
had a government replaced because Turkish generals decided the
democratically-appointed government did not suit them. We might add in
response to Blank's regret that there is no conflict resolution mechanisms
or very effective federalism in Turkey unless one includes the Turkish
military's efforts to destroy the Kurdish opposition. Has Turkey been any
more successful in democratizing its relations with the Kurds than Russia
has with its some 20 fairly large Muslim nationalities? Is there
'no...democracy' in Turkey? Or is Turkey's a flawed democracy? Is Turkey
more or less democratic than Russia? Does the expansion of Turkey's sphere
of influence at the expense of Russia's serve the cause of global
democratization, American economic interests and/or NATO's organizational
maintenance?
In JRL-1128-8/15/97 Blank writes that "to say that there is democracy (in
Russia) when you have no legal or executive accountibility to anyone except
yeltsin, no effective, civilian, democratic controls over the multiple armed
forces no mechanisms of internal conflcit resolution..., a federalism whose
laws are made up as we go along is to abuse the term. ... (T)hose conditions
do not represent democracy and are absent in many of the more successful
transitioning states. ..."
Regarding Blank's exaggeration that there is "no legal or executive
accountibility to anyone except Yeltsin", he is uninformed. Chernomyrdin,
until the arrival of the 'young Russians' Chubais and Nemtsov, held
considerable sway over the government. Because Blank concentrates on
military and not economic, social, electoral issues and because the power
ministries are constitutionally subordinated to the president, whereas all
others come under the purview of the government, he clearly misses this. The
Duma, of course, approves presidential appointments. The Federal Assembly
with assistance from the "non-existent" Constitutional Court can impeach the
president, though its a belabored process to undertake the latter. 
Regarding Blank's claim that there is "no effective, civilian, democratic
controls over the multiple armed forces" I would agree and stated so in my
last response, though Blank in his last response argues as if I had not,
relying on the calculation that many probably don't read every one of our
responses and hoping to score points. I will stick by my point that you
won't see an improvement in this area due to NATO expansion. All other
variables held constant, NATO expansion will make that less likely because
it will undermine the civilian leadership, many of whom were tied to the
pro-Western forces who laughed at the idea that the Balts and 3/4 of the
Visegrad states would enter NATO (Kozyrev, i tak dalee). They're not
laughing now. Blank and others have and will, respectively, play down the
military's role in the Anti-NATO Bloc of now some 240-260 Duma deputies and
the fact that it is led by a Colonel, arguing, as Blank does, so what "the
entire government was against NATO enlargement (incorrect, though convenient
- GH) that proves nothing about civil-military relations and in any case
what are Colonels doing in the Parliament and what does that tell us." It
was here that Blank tries to appear he has 'caught' me in regard to 'what
are Coloels doing in Parliament'. As I noted, I addressed that one in an
earlier response.
Blank, of course, avoids addressing the fact that it is a Colonel who is
leading the Anti-NATO association. In an apparent lack of any comprehension
of what politics is all about, he ignores the matter of 'organization'. It
is one thing to have many individual deputies opposed to NATO and the
Russian regime wandering around the Duma. It is quite another that there
have been galvanized into an organized association that has garnered the
creation of a Duma commission (with the resources this will make available
to them for proselytizing their views has been provoked by NATO expansion.
Is this not an effect of NATO expansion that plays into the hands of the
hardliners, which the NATO expansionists denied would ever occur?
prefer to deny.
Regarding "a federalism whose laws are made up as we go along" (whatever
that means): Given the unitary nature of the Soviet state and its incomplete
federalization under Gorbachev, is it really surprising that with the USSR's
collapse, the attendant administrative breakdown, Russia then needed to
reconstruct a complex multinational state from scratch with 'laws are made
up as we go along'? Is this serious discussion or propaganda. Considering
that Russia's complexities rival India's is it surprising that Russia has
had its own kind of Pakistan (Chechnya)? 
Regarding Blank's claim that "Those conditions...are absent in many of the
more successful transitioning states", let's take internal conflict
resolution and the nationalities problem first: (see below on Turkey's
Kurds), see the recent problems in Basque Spain, the Hungarians in not all
that successful 'transitioning' Slovakia, Romi in Czechoslovakia and
everywhere, the Abkhaz in Georgia, see etc., etc., ...) We might mention the
Russians in Latvia and Estonia where there are mechanisms of a sort given
that there are elections, but the Seim has not been particularly open to
giving 35% of its population even citizenship. Though Latvian President
Ulmanis recently spoke out aginst these laws, he may have done so because
there is not a chance that the present nationalist-dominated Seim will
overturn discriminatory citizenship and property ownership laws. On this
background, the bilateral treaties between the RF and its autonomies may be
a temporarily suitable federal arrangement until the economy modernizes and
are they not a mechanism for conflict resolution? Even in the case of
Chechnya, say in comparison with Turkey's Kurds, conflict resolution and
mechanisms, at least for now, are far better along in Russian-Chechen than
Turk-Kurd relations. 
Insufficient legal or executive accountibility to anyone but the chief
executive is commonplace among many transitioning states, contrary to
Blank's ideas, including in Latin America (see Peru and Mexico for
starters), all of Central Asia, in the Transcaucasus (particularly in
Azerbaidzhan whose chief executive was just feted by Washington), Belarus
(often feted in Moscow), Slovakia. Whereas Russian could ill-afford to
alienate these authoritarian regimes given its economic crisis, post-Soviet
dependency on its economic relations with them, and the NIS Russian
diaspora's integral looby in the RF, the West could afford to so more
economically but is not, except in the case of Belarus, soon to be on NATO's
border. The pattern of inordinately strong executives (and bloated
bureaucracies) is typical in weak states (a compensation for that weakness)
as well as in imperial ones. Russia, is the case of the former, not the
later. 
It is quite clear that Blank is biased by his narrow focus on military
affairs, where problems executive accountibility, legislative oversight etc.
are writ large. If he would take the time to examine the state of economic
reform and policymaking he would laugh, one would hope, at those who
proclaim that there is 'no..democracy' in Russia and that the Federal
Assmebly has no power. Both the Duma and the Council of the Federation play
important roles in economic policymaking and legislation (passing the state
budget, Tax, Criminal, Land and other 'Kodeksy', minimum wage, housing
legislation, privatization laws, important laws on product-sharing for
foreign investment in oil, gas, and other resource-extraction industries,
election laws, etc.), despite the presidential veto and the flaws in much of
that legislation. Moreover, the inordinate power of the president to
prorogue the Duma and veto legislation is most often used to block laws from
passing that would hinder free market reforms. Reconciliation commissions
and negotiations have been the order of the day in executive-legislative
relations. If he studied economic and social issues, not to mention the
growing power of regional governors and local legislatures, he might
understand that blurtings about 'Tsar Boris' are absurd at best. But alas,
all is taken in through the prism of military affairs - the sphere in Russia
with the saddest state of affairs - and superficial historical analogies.
Tha same holds for his wild exaggerations about the "non-existent
judiciary". Here a look at economic and social issues might show that the
arbitrage courts, the Supreme and Constitutional Courts do have power and
make important decisions. It might be noted that judicial independence has
been considerably strengthened by the lifetime appointments of high court
judges at the federal and regional levels. The Constitutional Court (KC) ,
not Tsar Boris decided such federal-regional disputes as the right of the
regions to create new taxes, disputes between regional legislative and
executive branches over competences and electoral laws (North Ossetia,
Altai, Yakutia and Chita). In Bashkortostan it overturned a regional
electoral law that would have required candidates to gather the signatires
of 5% of the local poulation in order to be registered. It prevented
attempts by some regional and local officials to abolish elections of
legislative organs or establish discriminatory civil service legislation.
The Court has even laid decisions protecting citizens' rights against
judicial and prosecutorial errors, protections against personal harm
incurred due to environmental damage. The KC is likely to be the fora in
which a showdown between the federal administration and governors over the
powere of regional representatives of the president takes place. I suspect
that Blank has never given a second's thought to Altai, Yakutia, Chita or
any such issues. It's Tsar Boris and Russian imperialism that we must focus
on. 
In JRL-1128-8/15/97 Blank, claiming "I don't need to get personal about
this" (?) then proceeds to say that I am "uninformed", that I had not read
"what Felgengauer, Lebed, Rokhlin et al have said" (Hahn has), that "Hahn
does not know enough about the facts of the case in military affairs to make
pronouncements he made and when caught he resorts to adhominem attacks and
distortions of a record of which he knows sadly little." In this regard, I
can only repeat Blank's insincere, but wise words: "(T)hose who (sling mud)
only muddy themselves and betray their failings." Not only is Blank getting
a little muddy physically, but his thinking seems a little muddied as well.
He hardly has the right to make prononcements on who has the knowledge in
the field to be allowed to discuss the issues. 
Finally, I should like to define what I mean by anti-Russian writing. It is
replete with references and groundless inuendo regarding Russia's inexorable
drift to tsarist autocracy internally and imperialsm externally through
repeated and nonsensical references to an elected president as a Tsar
without any supporting argumentation, propagandistic charges of
"no...democracy" in Russia, and a condescending an unsubstantiated belief
that Russia can never become democratic; all this, so we can justify a NATO
expansion that has less to do with democratization or even security
vis-a-vis potential Russian revanchism and more to do with Clinton's
re-election, his attempt to mitigate the political consequences of his
failure to serve in Vietnam, and maximizing the economic advantages
available to the US by reducing Russia's spehere of influence as much as
possible on the Eurasian landmass, and a NATO exercise in organizational
maintenance. The kind of propaganda masquerading as scholarship that Blank
has has flung onto JRL hardly qualifies him to speak on the issues, though
it is possible that some of his other work does. However, I am glad that in
his last response, he made some attempt - amidst adhominems - to discuss
issues. To the extent that he did so, I consider this exchange to have been
an important learning lesson for 'all of us'.
Dr. Gordon M. Hahn,
Hoover Inst. @ Stanford

*********

Zyuganov Hits 'Antipeople' Course of Reforms 

Pravda Rossii
August 13, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
"Topical interview" with CPRF leader Gennadiy Zyuganov by
Mikhail Levchenko; date and place not given: "If You Can't Cope,
Quit!" -- first paragraph is introduction

The People's Patriotic Union of Russia [NPSR] is one year old. The
more than 150 parties and movements that have joined it within this time --
which are of widely differing political and social orientations, but which
are united by anxiety for Russia's future -- have transformed the NPSR into
the country's largest political organization. About this, and other
problems connected with the fate of Fatherland we talk to NPSR Chairman
Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian
Federation].
[Mikhail Levchenko] Gennadiy Andreyevich, a year is not a long time,
of course, for a union. Therefore, omitting its undoubtedly impressive
quantitative characteristics, can it be said objectively that the NPSR
bears all the hallmarks of a "mature" organization?
[Zyuganov] Given the way the question is put, it is possible that the
NPSR should not be described as fully mature. The reason is this. We have
not managed to achieve our main aim -- to force the authorities to change
the so-called "course of reforms," which has proved ruinous for the
country. But we must achieve this goal. For this, patriots should focus
all their efforts on the Russian provinces. The answer to the question of
whether our state is to exist or not is to be found there. The spiritual
roots of our great people are preserved there.
The list of our shortcomings should also include our poor work with
young people. And after all, young people show great interest in politics
and in their own existence. Although, to tell the truth, I will say that
real life today, which is exposing the antipeople regime, works better than
any agitator. So that our task is to channel the actions of young people
in the right direction and to help them correctly determine true moral and
spiritual values. There is also the Russian intelligentsia, which,
unfortunately, according to the Russian tradition, are pulling in different
directions, like the swan, the crab, and the pike in Krylov's fable. We
must work with the intelligentsia as well.
Returning to the qualitative characteristics of the NPSR, I will all
the same say that it is already a mature creature. Essentially, within one
year a patriotic belt has been formed in the country. Around 1,200
grassroots organizations are operating. The NPSR is representated today
both in the executive and in the legislature at local level. Despite the
"democrats'" predictions, we won the gubernatorial elections in 36 out of
more than 50 Russian regions. Nor should we forget the Federal Assembly,
where we have created a powerful structure. In the State Duma alone there
are 220 deputies who belong to the NPSR.
[Mikhail Levchenko] Brainwashing society with the aid of the press
and the electronic mass media, which have been usurped by the regime, fill
a separate page in the history of the defamation of the Russian people by
the authorities. It is almost impossible for the truth to break through
this wall. Is the NPSR able to somehow change the situation? [Zyuganov] 
That is a very important question. The policy of imposing a news blackout
on the country's opposition, particular its patriotic forces, is a
phenomenon that was implanted from the moment that "democracy" arrived in
Russia. The scale of the pressure on the opposition as a whole is simply
astounding. Nevertheless, a squabble for control of the press has started
inside the "victors'" camp as well. Financial-industrial groups and
political groups are doing their utmost to take the mass media under their
wing. You don't have to look far for examples. There is the change of
ownership at Komsomolskaya Pravda and Izvestiya and the behind-the-scenes
skirmishes in ORT [Russian Public Television], and even in the Russian
state television channel. Everything suggests that the dividends obtained
by them from control of Russia's information field are huge. The
recipients of these dividends are also known, as is their specific use. 
Such things can no longer be tolerated. The State Duma has long been
fighting to set up a state TV channel. The NPSR too, of course, is
fighting for its own place-under-the-sun in the press.
To mark the anniversary of our union, a Patriotic Information Agency
(PIA) has been registered. It is geared to modern information
technologies. Work is under way to create a single information area for
the entire opposition. The prerequisites for this exist.
The influence of the central mass media in the provinces has
substantially decreased. First and foremost because of their clearly
pronounced bias. People mainly read the local press. And if we are more
or less doing okay as far as the regional press is concerned, there are
problems with the electronic mass media. Therefore, today we are on the
verge of forming our own television channel. I believe it will begin
operating soon. Today, for example, 10 out of 100 people, say, use the
services of the central mass media. Fifty out of the same 100 people read
the local press. When our television station starts operating in the
regions, the audience will increase in comparative terms to 70-80 percent. 
Let us see then how "successfully" journalists from the center continue to
lie.
[Levchenko] Nevertheless, Gennadiy Andreyevich, the opposition is
accused of passivity and scaling down its activity. Critical voices are
being heard even in the patriots' camp. Only quite recently State Duma
Deputy Aleksandr Pomorov, a Communist, remarked that the "party of power's"
blows against the economy had not met with an adequate response form the
opposition. That the opposition should carry out a major rethink of its
activity. And the basis of this could be the work of the recent Fourth
CPRF Congress?
[Zyuganov] Well, at the congress we did indeed adopt the correct
decisions, and this is precisely why we have started to call ourselves the
implacable opposition. And I would approach an assessment of the NPSR's
activity somewhat more cautiously.
The union today is actively implementing the following programs:
"Integration," "Eternal Russia," "The People's Orphanage," "The People's
Army Is the People's Concern," and others. We regularly produce
assessments of the president's and the government's activity
-- that the mass media pass over them in silence is another matter.
Incidentally, the authorities' latest "novelty" is the redenomination of
money. The opposition has already expressed a negative opinion on this
subject. Indeed, I myself, in particular, said that this "growth" of the
ruble is the authorities' latest attempt to darn the holes in the budget at
the expense of the already depleted pockets of the people. Incidentally,
the president, in issuing the corresponding edict, violated the Russian
Federation Constitution yet again. This is the Russian parliament's
prerogative.
Incidentally, the NPSR has already collected around 4 million
signatures calling for the resignation of the antipeople regime and of
Yeltsin personally. In September we will add up the final results and send
the documents to the Kremlin, the Russian Federation Government, and both
houses of parliament. If they do not listen to us this time, and the
antipeople course of the reforms is not changed, we will bring out millions
of people for an all- Russia political strike under the slogan: "If you
can't cope -- quit!"
[Mikhail Levchenko] In connection with your mention of the
president's "constructive role" in the life of the country, I cannot help
but ask one more question. How do you assess Yeltsin's statement on the
inexperience of President Lukashenka and the threats to revise the treaty
on the union with Belarus before the ink has dried on the signatures of the
two states' leaders? How should we view the actions of the governor of
Kaliningrad [Yuriy Matochkin], who has declared himself a loyal servant of
Yeltsin's, and on this basis refused to allow a working visit to our
westernmost Russian city by Alyaksandr Lukashenka? [Zyuganov] How should
we assess it...? Like this: He either embraces you, or he threatens you
with his fist. He is bad at anything in between those extremes. As for
the NPSR, our entire union resolutely supports the restoration of all ties
with Belarus. We will support the Belarusian leadership and work with it
actively. All legislators and the executive organs who have a proper
understanding of our historical fate will never cease to advocate a Union
of this kind. As for the behavior of Mr. Yeltsin, who threatens President
Lukashenka at one moment, General Rokhlin at another, and the Communist
Party at another -- it is absolutely unworthy.
[Mikhail Levchenko] Thank you, Gennadiy Andreyevich.

********

Sociologist Betaneli on Studies of Public Opinion 

Komsomolskaya Pravda 
July 29, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Interview with Nugzar Betaneli conducted by Sergey
Chernykh; date and place not given: "Half of Russia Is Confident
That There Are More Good People Than Bad"

[Chernykh] For a quarter of a century you have been following
the changes in people"s consciousness. What have been the
trends in recent years?
[Betaneli] If we compare them with 1989, the changes are striking.
Please recall, at that time the very question "do we need a multiparty
system?" was astonishing. The boldest assumed: Of course, several
parties can be created, but they should be based on the CPSU [Communist
Party of the Soviet Union]. And the attitude toward private property?
It evoked, to say the least, wariness.
Of course, the changes are tremendous, but they have not been
consolidated. To this day we remain a society, which greatly yields
to suggestion. It is no accident that Russian business tries to
get into the media. It represents power over the mind, which simply
turns into power.
[Chernykh] If a person does not like the press, he can choose
not to buy it, or to turn off the television.
[Betaneli] That"s just the point&mdash;he cannot.
He will buy the newspaper, because journalists exploit people"s
needs for communication, knowledge, and new information. A person
buys your newspaper not because it is good for him, but because
it enables him to satisfy his natural information needs. If someone
began to sell air, people would also buy it.
[Begin box]
We Introduce Our Interlocutor
Forty-six-year old Nugzar Irakliyevich Betaneli is considered
one of the best known sociologists in the world. The Institute of
Sociology of Parliamentarism headed by him is famous for placing
special emphasis in its surveys not so much on figures as on human
psychology.
The accuracy of forecasts is the main evaluation criterion.
Specialists claim that Betaneli"s indicator approaches
100 percent.
In 1993 Betaneli"s team was the only one that forecast
Zhirinovskiy"s victory in the elections to the State Duma.
In 1996 the institute received Komsomolskaya Pravda"s
first prize for the best political forecast of parliamentary elections.
At the beginning of last year the Institute of Sociology of
Parliamentarism was the only sociological service, which announced
to B.N. Yeltsin, Russia"s presidential candidate, that
his rating was extremely low. [End box]
[Chernykh] Please tell us how to get a truthful answer from
the respondent. After all, a person always tries to look better....
How do you manage to give accurate calculations?
[Betaneli] Sociology is not questions and answers. Like any
science it is similar to a tree&mdash;with its strong philosophical
and psychological roots. Often, however, sociology becomes the victim
of the "illusion of simplicity."
What an artist paints seems very simple, but try to reproduce
it. The same is in science. However, in contrast to a landscape,
it is more difficult to recognize dilettantism in sociology.
With regard to sociological research, personally I am an advocate
of elegant experiments. You are interested in whether people read
Komsomolskaya Pravda and what they read mostly. You
can do the following: Gather separately several groups of 20 to
30 people of different occupations, ages, and levels of education.
Put several bundles of different newspapers on the table and ask
these people to wait for you. Now let your assistants simply observe
who reaches for what newspaper and what he reads.
[Chernykh] Please tell us, like a physician, what is now going
on with our society?
[Betaneli] Society is in a normal state. I ask to be understood
as a specialist. There is the following anecdote: A person fell
from the 12th floor and, flying past the fifth, he said: "Well,
for now everything is normal." The level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction
with life is virtually the same as during past years&mdash;this
is a normal state. This is not a normal level, but it has not become
worse.
[Chernykh] That is, it is too early to paint apocalyptic pictures
of popular riots.
[Betaneli] Now it is summer. In summer, usually, states of
mind are calmer. This is because certain economic problems are absent.
Prices of products drop, there is no need to worry about heat, and
so forth. Now, as last year, 12 to 14 percent of all Russians live
below the poverty line.
[Chernykh] Where does this line pass?
[Betaneli] Along the line of self-evaluation. The same
percent&mdash;12
to 14&mdash;of the people themselves think that they live below
the poverty line. However, here we encounter another phenomenon:
Some of those who live badly number themselves among the middle
class.
[Chernykh] What do you think? Are our politicians interested
in people"s self-consciousness?
[Betaneli] Often politicians are not inclined to react either
to public self-consciousness, or to voters" social expectations.
Many of them live according to the following principle: He heard
the "voice of the people" and acted in his own way. Did the politician
act correctly or not? Usually, only the next generations find this
out.
Nevertheless, the "voter"s hour" comes (even if during
elections) and its duration increases every year. For example, at
first glance, the forthcoming presidential elections in the year
2000, owing to their time distance, should have excited only the
minds of politicians and journalists. However, as our recent all-Russian
poll has shown, right now 26 percent of the Russian voters are ready
to name "their" presidential candidate. As compared with the preelection
situation of past years, this is an indicator of quite a high political
activity.
[Chernykh] Will today"s political leaders be called
tomorrow?
[Betaneli] Yes, of course. We analyzed the situation. Most
probably, Yeltsin will not repeat last year"s feat. According
to the rating, today he has returned to the state of January-February
of last year. However, Zyuganov is also losing some of his supporters
and is not likely to win. Today there are 47 names on "people"s"
lists of presidential candidates. There are no unknown politicians
there. How seriously should the electorate be considered? Perhaps
we should study pensioners from morning till evening and spit at
the younger generation? It makes no difference, it will not get
to election precincts. Psychological types, not merely age groups,
should be studied. In politics there are no old women and young
people. There are politically passive and politically active people.
There are those who convince and those who ask their wives how to
vote.
There are politically active groups in Russia. The fact that
they also easily yield to the suggestion of the media, of their
milieu, and of their past or present is another matter. One must
simply work with these people. The main thing is that, if you like
people, not yourself leading them, only then are you a good politician.
[Chernykh] Do we have "good politicians"? And with what can
they "buy" voters?
[Betaneli] The voter can be "bought" only with one thing:
A system must be created, under which the value of each individual
life and of each individual person is considered paramount. All
of Russia"s achievements, all its famous history, and all
the greatness of the country end for you in a flash if you are dying
and there is no one to give you water, if you are convicted illegally
and executed by a firing squad. At this moment the entire planet
becomes completely unjust. But we often forget this. Probably, we
are made that way. Perhaps people survive because of this indifference.
[Begin box] Eighty percent are "against." So what? Twenty
percent of politically active people will carry out their will.
This is how revolutions and reforms are conducted. [End box]
[Chernykh] Not long ago newspapers wrote that a tree pressed
down on the leg of a Canadian woodcutter. He was completely alone
and, therefore, in order to survive, he cut off his leg and crawled
to where there were people. Psychologists say that this is normal
for America. But, probably, in our country not many are capable
of this. How do we differ from Americans?
[Betaneli] And if it pressed down on the head of this woodcutter?
I am not being ironic&mdash;I am reflecting. We are used to dividing
everything into black and white, but life is much more complicated.
Approximately the same polls were conducted here and in Western
Europe. Approximately the same&mdash;values of a high standard
of living&mdash;dominate everywhere. That is, everyone wants
to live well. Next there is the problem of law and order&mdash;both
here and there. Then the differences begin.
There participation in state and political decisionmaking
is in third place. But our voters do not want to engage in this.
During the Gorbachev period there was a tremendous desire to look
through the keyhole. Everyone approved of glasnost. But glasnost
without participation in political life is merely a show, the same
peeping through the keyhole. This difference has the most disastrous
effect on Russia"s fate. We want to live well, we want
to have order, but, at the same time, we want others to make decisions.
[Chernykh] A historical habit....
[Betaneli] The people should not be flattered&mdash;their
interests should be protected. For example, in Russia women make
up 55 percent. Most of them are mothers, grandmothers, and sisters.
Around what are their main interests and concerns concentrated?
I can suggest&mdash;the child and his health and safety. If it
is a question of sons, they are worried about army service. The
army problem is extremely important for Russia. Forty-eight percent
have confidence in the army&mdash;this is the highest confidence
indicator; 12 percent, in the government, and 11 percent, in the
president.... The army permeates our entire society. This was formed
historically.
[Chernykh] Are many people now interested in Chechnya?
[Betaneli] Eleven percent. Last year it was 48 and, in general,
it reached 51.
[Chernykh] What else disturbs the people?
[Betaneli] To the greatest extent, wages&mdash;49 percent;
late payments&mdash;45; lack of social rights and protection&mdash;39.
[Chernykh] Somehow we keep talking about material things.
Give us figures on spirituality.
[Betaneli] Certainly. In fact, people are concerned not only
about material things. Every third Russian (34 percent) is very
worried and anxious about the "unhealthy psychological situation
in society and inhumanity in relations" and every tenth, about the
"lack of opportunities to meet spiritual and cultural needs and
to get an education."
Now everyone says that the level of spirituality is declining
in society. Who disputes this? We read less and we go to the theater
less frequently. However, our research convinces us that the problem
does not lie in a lack of spirituality. Give a person the opportunity
to meet his minimal material needs and he will have a need for
spirituality.
Any individual is unique and interesting. However, if it is a question
of the masses, they are, so to speak, less intellectual and spiritual
and are more subject to blind imitation. Unfortunately, in this
life the individual is suppressed and, as before, the masses, which
on their own are capable of turning, at best, only into a mass of
identical consumers or "new Russians," dominates.
This is in earnest, but in jest...we asked Muscovites whether
they are happy in their private lives&mdash;65 percent are happy!
[Chernykh] Why not be happy in Moscow? They eat frankfurters
there.
[Betaneli] According to general psychological parameters,
Moscow does not differ from Russia as a whole. What do you think,
are there more good or bad people in society? Forty-eight percent
believe that there are more good people.
[Chernykh] Great!
[Betaneli] Do you remember the names of your great-grandfathers
or great-grandmothers? Twenty-one percent remember the names of
all, 34 percent, of some, and 44 percent do not remember anyone"s
name. At the same time, 58 percent want their great-grandchildren
to remember them. Here it is&mdash;our egoism. Nevertheless,
21 percent think that, if there is life after death, they will go
to paradise, 20 percent think that they will go to hell, and 59
percent had difficulty answering.
[Chernykh] Can I ask an absolutely stupid question?
[Betaneli] Of course, it is the most interesting.
[Chernykh] From the sociological point of view, how do men
differ from women?
[Betaneli] A woman is more cautious and conservative. Women
are, as it were, the golden mean. There are few extremists among
them. On this the world stands. They, with their caution, do not
permit "progress" to lurch forward sharply. Previously, I was ironic
about this, but later I realized that everything is correct&mdash;the
risk is very great, but one should not take risks. Men can permit
themselves to adhere to extreme points of view, but often cockiness
puts them in a spot.
Once we amused ourselves: We asked women what they dream about
and men what, in their opinion, women dream about. Men think that
women dream about love, personal happiness, flowers, and dresses.
But, in reality, women dream simply about normal life, about feeding
the family, and about the future of their children and grandchildren.
Male cockiness is also manifested in politics: I know better
what you need. And there is no need to conduct any polls. The government
knows everything and everything is clear to it. The government does
not need sociology. It is a pity to spend money on it. This is what
I will say: The large number of sighs about spending on sociology
will hasten the ultimate sigh.
[Chernykh] We thought that you will crush us with figures,
but you almost did without them.
[Betaneli] Of course, I can also use figures, but they are
not the main thing.

*******

Russia: The Manevich Funeral--Tears And Vows Flow
By Brian Whitmore

St. Petersburg, 22 August 1997 (RFE/RL) - St. Petersburg bid an emotional
farewell Thursday to Vice Governor Mikhail Manevich as Russia's First
Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais vowed to find those responsible for
his assassination. 
Saying that Manevich "paid with his life" for trying to make Russia a
better country "where the young can choose their profession and the old can
receive their pensions," Chubais and other speakers likened the
assassination to an attack on reform, an attack that must be answered in
kind. 
"We leave them no choice," said Chubais in reference to Manevich's
killers. "It's either us or them. There is no middle ground." 
Chubais, a St. Petersburg native and close friend of Manevich since the
late 1980s, threw down the gauntlet to those responsible for the
assassination, vowing to find them "sooner or later." 
"I want to say to those who pulled the trigger and those who paid for
this with their dirty stinking stolen money, we will get all of you," said
a resolute Chubais, his voice cracking with emotion as he fought back
tears. "Now or later, quickly or in due time, we will get all of you." 
Hundreds of friends, colleagues and other dignitaries gathered Thursday
morning at the Russian State Ethnography Museum where Manevich lay in state
before being buried at the Literatorskiye Mostki in the Volkovo Cemetery in
southern St. Petersburg. The Volkovo Cemetery is a favored final resting
place for locals, including actors Yevgeny Lebedev and Vladislav
Strzhelchik and the poet Olga Berggolts. 
Manevich's close friends and colleagues wore red arm bands and took
turns -- four at a time -- flanking the open casket where a full-dress
military honor guard stood at each corner. 
Yury Kravtsov, speaker of the Legislative Assembly summed up the mood in
his eulogy to Manevich, saying: "The city has changed. It has become darker." 
Alexander Kazakov, speaking for the Kremlin, said that "the bullet that
killed Mikhail was a bullet aimed at the heart of reform." 
Russia's former acting prime minister Yegor Gaidar called Manevich's
murder a tragedy for the whole country. "This isn't only about St.
Petersburg, this is national," said Gaidar. 
But the most emotional moments in the two-hour long ceremony took place
as Manevich's old colleagues spoke. They were members of the so-called
"Chubais group" of economists that joined the city government and pushed
for reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
"Misha, you were the kindest, most decent and most principled person,"
said Alexei Kudrin, Deputy Russian Finance Minister and like Chubais a St.
Petersburg native and close friend of Manevich since perestroika. "We know
that they killed you, but what happened? How did you stand one on one
against such bandits?" 
Also present were Albert Kokh, the recently fired chair of the Russian
State Property Committee, and Maxim Boiko, his successor. 
"It is difficult to talk, because it is too hard to believe what has
happened -- that Misha Manevich won't be with us anymore," said Boiko. "He
was a person who loved everything. It's very scary when such a person is
killed. Forgive us that we did not protect you." 
"We don't know who was behind this. We only know that he (Manevich)
could have only disturbed those who did not want honest privatization,"
said Boiko, who is now in charge of controversial federal privatizations,
vowing to press on. "We will continue. We have no right to stop. We have a
responsibility to Misha." 
Local political figures paying their last respects included St.
Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev. 
After the eulogies, Manevich's funeral procession moved slowly through
the city center, passing the very spot where he was killed at the corner of
Nevsky Prospect and Ulitsa Rubinshteina, as mourners pointed to the attic
window from which the sniper fired. Hundreds of on-lookers lined the
streets to view the procession. 
As the casket was lowered into the ground, our St. Petersburg
correspondent overheard one mourner to say: "It was a wild, brazen act, and
now we are waiting for the consequences." 

*********