August 21, 1997  
This Date's Issues: 1134 •1135  •1136 

Johnson's Russia List
#1135
21 August 1997
djohnson@cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
1. John Danzer: Russian Idea.
2. Michael McFaul (Stanford/Carnegie): Cold War Legacies and 
Russian Trade Unions.
3. Reuter: Yeltsin offers prison amnesty to ease overcrowding.
4. Vek: Mikhail Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, RUSSIANS HAVE MORE 
TRUST IN THEIR GOVERNMENT.
5. Executive and Legislative Newsletter: Mikhail Malyutin,
RUSSIAN VOTER BEHAVIOR: MYTHS AND REGULARITIES.
6. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Sergei Mulin, TWO GENERALS.
Political Tandem of Lev Rokhlin and Alexander Lebed 
May Lead to a New Reality in Russia - "a party of coup."
7. Rossiiskaya Gazeta: Tatyana Shutova, WILL PEACE COME TO 
THE CAUCASUS?
8. Reuter: Yeltsin says US influence increasing in Caucasus.]

********

#1
From: Telos4@aol.com (John Danzer)
Date: Thu, 21 Aug 1997 02:22:21 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Russian Idea

Dear David:

After reading about the special committee to study the creation of
a Russian Idea I decided to think about it myself. This is what I
came up with:
Russia is not defined by large bodies of water like other great
nations. It is unique in that it is defined by its center. Russia
is the Great Eurasian Heartland. Land is important to Russians. 
They have more land than anything else. The people love their
land. They take pride in their garden plots. An idea that ties
the people to their land and shows their eternal affection for it
is essential to the Russian Idea. The great land mass has
protected the Russians. It is known to have swallowed up whole
armies. Enemies have tried to take Russian land and have ended up
as fertilizer for the next years potatoes. 

So here is my idea for Russia. 

"Conservators of the Great Eurasian Heartland"

This idea establishes the root of Russia's eternal dilemma. It is
a coming together of East and West. The land has saved Russians. 
Russians must save and protect the land.

Can I get a free trip to Moscow for the big anniversary? Wink
Wink.

I'm sure that the readers of this list can come up with a good
Russian Idea. Perhaps we can entertain ourselves with that task as
summer comes to an end.

********

#2
Date: Thu, 21 Aug 1997 
From: Michael Mcfaul <mcfaul@leland.Stanford.EDU>
Subject: Cold War Legacies and Russian Trade Unions

Cold War Legacies and Russian Trade Unions
Michael McFaul
Stanford University

Frequently on the pages of JRL, one finds articles and discussions about
Cold War legacies that haunt our analyses of post-communist Russia. The
collapse the communism has challenged the traditional cleavages between
left and right, both in Russia and the West, making it difficult for
like-minded folks to find their counterparts in the East and West. As a
consequence of the "method" and "extent" of change promoted by Yeltsin and
his allies earlier in this decade, he and his comrades were labelled
"radicals", "populists" and "revolutionaries." For those more interested in
the "aims" and "endpoints" of the revolution, however, Yeltsin et al were
labelled "conservatives" , "neo-liberals" and "Thatcherites." This presented
a big problem for both the left and right in the West as the means and ends
in Russia lined up in a different ways than we are accustomed to in the
West. As an old marxist phrase goes, "class consciousness is knowing which
side of the fence you are on." In this confused transitional time for both
Russians and analysts of Russia, many got confused at to where the fence
even was. 

Renfrey Clarke's article on trade unions provides a very excellent
illustration of this problem. It is obvious from his article that he still
sees the AFL-CIO as an enemy of labor both abroad (and betting from the tone
of article, here in the U.S. as well). At the same time, he implies that
the FNPR is the friend of Russian labor. For those that regret the collapse
of "communism" this is a perfectly understandable and even defensible
position. But for those interested in the plight of Russian workers, this
is not a defensible position. Oftentimes, these two are conflated. It's
time to make clear why they are different kinds of arguments. 

The FNPR is a vestige of the communist era, so those interested in communist
restoration should support it. But the FNPR only slightly resembles a
confederation of trade unions, and much more closely resembles a giant real
estate corporation with properties throughout Russia and allegedly abroad
now as well. Clarke laments that FTUI (the AFL-CIO international arm) "has
not endorsed the FNPR's consciously political strategy of calling periodic
mass protests centred on the wage payments." Well, I applaud FTUI for not
endorsing the FNPR's strategy, as this so-called political strategy is at
best a poor substitute and at worst a deceptive facsimile of a real strategy
for defending workers' rights in Russia. Clarke lamented that FTUI "had
little to show" for its first years of work in Russia, but the same must be
said of FNPR. After all, unlike FTUI which runs a shoe-string operation out
of Moscow (and, by the way, in known in the Western NGO world in Russia as
one the best, most efficient, least corrupt, and most dedicated groups
working in Russia which relies mostly on Russian employees and has only one
or two Westerners on its payroll at all) the FNPR has literally millions of
dollars in assets and boasts 60 million members. Yet, they have proven to
be very ineffective advocates for workers. Instead, they have cooperated
with plant managers in securing their own property stakes, with little
regard for workers collectives. 

>From 1992-1994, I worked on a project in Russia promoting employee ownership
and had the chance to visit over two dozens major enterprises undergoing
privatization at the time. At every single place we went, we met with
management and the FNPR guys as a team. It was obvious that they worked
together. Remember the FNPR people had worked for decades in the service of
the CPSU, KGB, and the state more generally. Why did we expect that they
would suddenly switch sides and work on behalf of workers in the post-Soviet
era? In trying to promote employee ownership, we were constantly denied
access to actual floor-shop workers, and we were not allowed to circulate
our printed materials on employee ownership. 

I am no expert on these matters, but I cannot remember a major strike over
the last decade in which the FNPR took a leading role. (I am sure those out
there who know more about this will correct me) They either openly opposed
strikes as they did in 1989 and 1991 or chased after wild cat actions
started from the ground up. The structure of the Soviet labor market and
organization of the enterprise in the context of an economic depression make
collective actions by workers difficult to organize. Yet, workers unrest
also has risen over the last few years and the FNPR has done very little to
channel this energy on the ground.

Politically, too, the FNPR cannot be considered "left wing." Those who
lamented Zyuganov's defeat last year should know that the FNPR's national
headquarters did not endorse him (though some individual trade unions did)
and took no public position on the election. Can you imagine any Western
trade union opting not to endorse any candidate for national office?
Amazing. Behind the scenes, FNPR people worked for Luzhkov and Yeltsin
during the campaign. On election night, I ran into Shmakov (the head of
FNPR) and his entourage at the victory party for Yeltsin at his campaign
headquarters, not at Zyuganov's digs. 

Workers in Russia, by the way, seem to understand that the FNPR does not
represent their interests better than the FNPR's supporters in the West. In
the 1995 parliamentary elections, the FNPR's electoral bloc garnered less
than 1 percent of the vote. They have 60 million members on paper, but only
managed to get only .02 % of their members to vote for their bloc. And they
ran as a bloc with the Industrial Party and the Russian Unity of
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs headed by Vladimir Scherbakov and Arkady
Volsky respectively -- two men firmly identified with Russia's directors
corps. And we are to believe that the FNPR is the voice of the Russian
workers?

I do not want to overgeneralize here. I do think the FNPR has some fine
people and the organization may have some future potential. But let's not
romanticize the "leftist", "pro-labor" role of the FNPR in today's context.
In the next presidential election, the FNPR will be firmly behind Yuri
Luzhkov, hardly a leftist candidate.

Moreover, its seems to me that Russian socialists and social-democrats are
well ahead of their Western comrades in understanding how best to think
about left and right in the new context. As early as 1990, Boris
Kagarlitsky and others were promoting privatization and the clarification of
property rights as fast as possible so that workers and their allies would
know who the enemy was. (As a politician later on, Boris said other things,
but he was right about this issue). Throughout the transition period, a big
problem for workers in making decisions about collective action is figuring
out who is or should be on the other side of the table. Is it the plant
director, the local government, or the national government? It's never
clear. This was true in 1989 and 1991, and its still true today. The sooner
it becomes clear, the sooner workers will know with whom to do business.

If you accept this premise (and I am sure many JRL do not), then the
strategy of the AFL-CIO has been the right one. They were right not to work
with FNPR when the FNPR was simply in the business of consolidating its
empire. FTUI is the business of building trade unions, not assisting real
estates corporations. Today, as the FNPR begins to look for new missions,
it may be good time to for them to come together. Likewise, the AFL-CIO was
right to back those independent groups that took the interests of workers as
their first priority. Few of thee groups exist today, and many of them have
become corrupt. But that does not mean that the original strategy was wrong.
Finally, FTUI's legal aid project provides a service that no one else does
in Russia. They have one some very major court battles on behalf of
workers. Given their budget and compared to what others are doing for
workers in Russia, their achievements are not simply "modest" , but
remarkable. And this operation does not burn AID money on $300 a night hotel
rooms, six-figure salaries, and swank office space to provide advise and
services that no one needs. My guess is that the head of FTUI in Moscow,
Irene Stevenson, has never even been inside the Metropol or Penta let alone
stayed there as she and her staff spend most of their time in the regions
with workers. While most consultants parachute in and out of Russia for
weeks at worst and a year or two at best, Stevenson has lived there for
eight years, working mostly in the trenches of Russia's byzantine court
system. The millions channelled to HIID (and others) to promote the rule of
law in Russia from above would have been much better spent promoting FTUI's
efforts at pushing for the rule of law from below.

********

#3
Yeltsin offers prison amnesty to ease overcrowding
By Alastair Macdonald 
August 20, 1997
MOSCOW (Reuter) - President Boris Yeltsin has urged parliament to free 35,000
prisoners, including the sick and elderly, to help alleviate overcrowding in
Russian jails, the Kremlin press service said Wednesday. 

``I consider that the declaration of an amnesty will not only be a
humanitarian act on the part of the state...but also will allow the
alleviation of the extremely tense situation in our prisons,'' it quoted
Yeltsin as writing to the Communist speaker of the lower house of parliament,
Gennady Seleznyov. 

The chief prosecutor called in May for the release of nearly half Russia's
million prisoners to avert a ``social explosion.'' 

``The amnesty could affect about 445,000 people,'' Yeltsin said in his
letter. But of these, only 35,000 would be freed and a further 60,000 or so
have their sentences cut. 

An Interior Ministry official told Reuters the remaining 350,000 amnesties
would concern people, mostly convicted of minor offenses, who were serving
sentences outside prison. 

Human rights campaigners welcomed the move. 

``This is a good idea. This is the only idea that can work, taking into
account the terrible overcrowding,'' said Alexander Petrov, deputy head of
Human Rights Watch-Helsinki in Moscow. 

In a scathing report on prison conditions in April, which alleged physical
torture and beatings were commonplace, Amnesty International said the
overcrowding alone ``amounted to torture.'' 

The human rights group cited one case of overcrowding in Moscow's Matrosskaya
Tishina Prison where 140 prisoners were crowded into a room designed for 35
inmates. 

Official figures show inmates in some pre-trial remand centers have less than
one square yard of floor space each, a quarter of the European minimum. 

The latest Interior Ministry figures show 724,000 convicted prisoners are in
Russian jails along with 269,000 suspects awaiting trial and sentencing, or
993,000 in all -- an increase of some 50 percent since the collapse of
communism in 1991. 

Russia's prison population is proportionately nearly 10 times bigger than in
wealthy countries in western Europe. 

Officials says this reflects rising crime in the new Russia. Critics say
gangsters and contract killers are rarely caught. 

The number held in custody awaiting trial -- a wait that can last for years
-- has nearly doubled in that time, making conditions in pre-trial remand
centres particularly bad. 

Official figures show 18,000 remand prisoners are suffering from
tuberculosis, which is also rife in ordinary jails. 

However, remand prisoners would not be eligible for amnesty in the terms
quoted by Yeltsin, who speaks only of ``convicts.'' 

Yeltsin argued that many inmates could safely be let out and that war
veterans, the old and minors, pregnant women and women with dependent
children should get priority, along with invalids and TB sufferers, provided
they had not caused trouble in jail. The amnesty would not apply to
murderers, rapists or racketeers. 

Russian officials say prison reform is part of Moscow's plan of integration
into European political structures. But they say cash shortages mean there is
little hope of building new jails. 

Yeltsin plans to attend a session of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in
October. The body has condemned Russia, which became a member in February
1996, for continuing to execute prisoners on death row after that date. 

Yeltsin, apparently anxious to avoid being thrown out of the Council, has
instituted a moratorium on executions for the past year and has promised to
phase out the death penalty, much to the displeasure of many in parliament. 

As a measure of the state of prisons, even significant numbers of those whose
capital sentences have been commuted to life imprisonment have petitioned to
be shot instead. 

********

#4
>From RIA Novosti
Vek, No. 30
August 1997

RUSSIANS HAVE MORE TRUST IN THEIR GOVERNMENT 
By Mikhail Petrov and Andrei Ryabov

Russians have come to like their government more than
before. The latest polls conducted by the National Public
Opinion Research Centre, VTsIOM, show that in August, compared
to April, 7% more Russians thought that the government began
working better, while the number of those who believed in
March that the situation "is leading to a blind alley" has
reduced by 10%. People have come to have a better opinion of
concrete government members: the number of Russians approving
of Viktor Chernomyrdin's activities has increased, while that
of Anatoly Chubais's critics has decreased. The reason for
people's love is clear: according to VTsIOM, the adult
population who believed that the situation with the payment of
wages, pensions, grants and social benefits improved grew by
8% and the number of those who thought that it continued to
deteriorate fell by 9% between June and August.

Question: "Do you think that the situation is developing
in the right direction or that it is leading to 
a blind alley?"
---------------------------------------------------------
Public Share of adult population Changes between
opinion in favour of the given opinion March and August
---------------------------------------------------------
March August
---------------------------------------------------------
Develops in
the right 14% 22% +8
direction
---------------------------------------------------------
Leads to a
blind alley 68% 58% -10
---------------------------------------------------------
Undecided 18% 20% +2
---------------------------------------------------------

Question: "Do you think that the situation with the
payment of wages, pensions, grants and benefits is
growing better or worse in your city, region, or you 
see no changes at all?" 
---------------------------------------------------------
Public Share of adult population Changes Between
Opinion in favour of the given opinion March and August
June 1997 August 1997
---------------------------------------------------------
Better 20% 28% +8
---------------------------------------------------------
See no change 40% 37% -3
---------------------------------------------------------
Worse 35% 26% -9
---------------------------------------------------------
Undecided 5% 9% +4
---------------------------------------------------------

Question: "Do you think that the government started
handling better the problems which confront Russia 
after Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov became its
members?"
---------------------------------------------------------
Public Share of adult population Changes between
opinion in favour of the said opinion April and August
---------------------------------------------------------
April August
---------------------------------------------------------
Better 15% 22% +7
---------------------------------------------------------
Neither
better, nor 54% 47% -7
worse
---------------------------------------------------------
Worse 9% 12% +3
---------------------------------------------------------
Undecided 22% 19% -3
---------------------------------------------------------

An analysis of all sociological data for the past 12
months shows that the attitude of Russians to the regime was
changing in a parabola-like manner. After the presidential
elections in September 1996, Russians' trust in the government
rested on hopes for the better, in February-March 1997, it
practically reduced to nought, and in August it returned to
the September 1996 level, that is, the pendulum again moved in
the side of the hopes for the better. It is indicative that
the parabola growth coincides with the time of the work of the
renewed government which continued to be headed by
Chernomyrdin with Chubais and Boris Nemtsov as his first
deputies. We will soon sum up the results of the first six
months of the presence of the so-called young reformers at the
top of the executive branch. Actually, one preliminary result
is already available--at least 10% of Russians have come to
think better of their government. The country has more than
100 million voters. So, the regime is just a step short of
having 10 million new supporters.
It seems that the following conclusion can be drawn from
the above mentioned statistics: the government is really doing
well. But people's likes tend to change quickly and figures
can be deceptive: another delay in the issue of paychecks and
pensions, a little bit more of the fears caused by the coming
money reform and the credit of people's trust may end.
Summer political holidays are about to be over. The State
Duma will resume its work and all will immediately remember
the drafts of the bills which the Russian government badly
needs but the State Duma dislikes. By the end of the year, the
government will have to pull the new budget through the Duma
and also answer to it for this year's budget performance. What
is more, wages, pensions, grants and benefits are to be paid
each month--you cannot pay them once and forget all about them
afterwards. That is why more than ever before the government
will need team spirit and the aptitude to pursue a common line
and find compromises within an intricate triangle
Chernomyrdin-Chubais-Nemtsov. It should also be borne in mind
that it will not have the same powerful support from the mass
media which it had in spring: the times of promises are gone
and only debts will be remembered now. In addition, whereas
there was no serious alternative to the "young reformers" in
spring and even such personalities as Yury Luzhkov and Yegor
Stroyev were pushed to the background, they now attack the
government's line ever more fiercely and come up with their
own initiatives.
Chernomyrdin, Chubais and Nemtsov has been out, since
they began to work together, to persuade the public that there
are no differences between them and that the government is a
closely-knit team. Such declarations per se are a compliment
for statesmen. However, doubts about their sincerity have
risen more than once. Since the end of spring the Prime
Minister was on vacation first and paid several visits to
foreign countries then. Hardly had he got back to work that
the doubts about the unity of the government team nearly
ceased to be merely doubts. As soon as the issue at hand was
no longer formal statements for the press but a real division
of property and explosive financial auctions began, the public
had a chance to judge who is the boss in the government.
Particularly indicative in this respect has been the Norilsky
Nickel scandal, when Chernomyrdin tried to stop the auction
but people from the "young reformers' team" prevented it. Also
indicative is that the "young reformers" started playing each
on his own. Only Nemtsov and Alfred Kokh openly and actively
supported the results of that auction, while Chubais preferred
to keep a low profile--something no one expected him to do. It
may happen that like President Boris Yeltsin, Chubais is
creating his own "system of restraints and counterweights" in
which there is room for Nemtsov and Boris Berezovsky alike.
Being in such a form, can the government serve the
President as an effective instrument of home policy? Does the
Prime Minister remain, as we are used to believe, a certain
living factor of stability and a compromise figure suiting the
Kremlin, the State Duma and his own deputies? Judging by
everything, Yeltsin will have to find answers to these
questions in autumn.
It is more likely than not that in the past few months
Chernomyrdin could not feel as confident as before. The Our
Home Is Russia (NDR) parliamentary faction, which is his own
formal political support, has split and there have been
scandalous developments in it. Chernomyrdin's former ally,
General Lev Rokhlin, has gone over to the opposition. The
Prime Minister's ability to find compromises with the State
Duma has been called in question: Gennady Zyuganov has
promised a powerful wave of public discontent in autumn,
Speaker Gennady Seleznev and other Duma officials are rather
sceptical about the new Tax Code, the program of cuts in this
year's budget, the draft of next year's budget and other
initiatives coming from the President and the government.
During the battles for Svyazinvest and Norilsky Nickel
Chernomyrdin made contradictory manoeuvres. His attempts to
confront the "auction line of young reformers", that is to
undermine their ratings, show that he has no resources to
improve his own ratings in the country's political scene.
Chernomyrdin has achieved some success: Kokh has retired, and
Chubais could not (or did not wish to) prevent this. But while
scoring personal points, the Prime Minister has unwillingly
undermined the positions of the government as a whole by
contributing to the formation of the "second opposition"--the
opposition of financiers who have declared an information war
on the government as a result of the auctions. By and large,
it seems that it is not the banks that depend on the
government but the government continues to depend on bankers.
The political future of Chernomyrdin, as well as those of
Chubais and Nemtsov for that matter, largely depend on
Yeltsin. It is only natural that the President does not want
any scandals in his own team and he wants behind-the-scenes
struggle even less. A very interesting psychological version
of Yeltsin's probable actions in the near future exists.
Having recovered from his illness, the President is gradually
assuming a new role: he has begun paying debts and combating
corruption and is introducing new money. He says that he feels
younger having the young first deputy prime ministers. Whom
can Yeltsin like more psychologically and emotionally--Chubais
and Nemtsov who have helped him to see that his promises have
started to be fulfilled or Chernomyrdin with whom he worked in
tandem at the times, which the President would rather like to
forget (1992-1996)?
But Yeltsin is a big time politician, while psychology
and emotions do not always motivate the actions of big time
politicians. 

********

#5
RIA Novosti
Executive and Legislative Newsletter, No. 32
August 1997
RUSSIAN VOTER BEHAVIOR: MYTHS AND REGULARITIES
By Mikhail Malyutin, political analyst 
for the Expert Institute foundation

In countries with a developed political system, election
campaigns typically realize the scheme "right-left-center," often
reduced under present conditions to a choice between two leading
political forces. Their leaders succeed one another in power,
imparting different shades to the course being pursued but
without really changing the basic principles of governance
agreed on by the nation as a whole.
Characteristic of the present-day Russia is not only sharp
ideological strife, which is the other, and inevitable, side of
the like-mindedness forced on its citizens for over seventy
years
of Soviet rule, but also a high degree of political instability,
with the state of the President's health or any political
conflict immediately becoming a national problem.
Attempts to rapidly impose from above representative
democracy intitutions, through the creation of a bipartisan
system with a loyal center, have been made since late 1993, but
have failed to bear fruit so far.
The Russian constituency is made up of adherents to mass
ideologies of the 20th century--such as liberalism, communism, or
chauvinism--as well as of electors standing behind Premier
Chernomyrdin's party and the small group of centrists. The
structure of the country's "electoral space" is determined
primarily by such factors as the polarization of the population
in relation to the axis "for" or "against" President Boris
Yeltsin and his reforms.
Yeltsin himself has always sought to be president of all
Russians rather than solely of democratically-minded ones. In an
effort to expand its social base, the Chernomyrdin-led party has
been trying, ever since 1994, to elaborate a national ideology of
its own, discoursing at the same time on the government's
responsibility to support the needy, the price of the reforms,
and so forth.
On the other hand, the traditionallistically-oriented
opposition, on coming to realize that the revival of the old
regime is hardly possible, and also inexpedient from the point of
view of its leadership's corporate interests, has more or less
reconciled with the market economy, the presidency, and the
representative democracy institutions. However, the Russian
Communist Party has failed to win over any new segments of
society of late. It is joined in certain political situations
only by a part of the nationalistic protest voters. According to
analysts, including communist-oriented ones, standing by this
party are now predominantly advocats of an "ameliorated
yesterday," who have no image of the future and are uncapable of
waging organized political struggle in the present.
The bottom line is, Russia's major political organizations
have had their ideologies rationalized in recent years; the
course of the government has become more pragmatic as well. The
liberals and the center have turned into an opposition with
little influence, while the nationalistic protest voters are
trying to play an independent role in the conflict between the
old and new authorities.
At the federal and regional levels alike, Russians
demonstrate a high degree of stability of their voter
preferences. Sociological and political analyses of the
election
campaigns run in the period between 1991 and the first half of
1997 have revealed that the much-talked-about unpredictability of
the Russian elector's behavior is nothing but a propaganda myth.
In real fact, Russia's major electorates show surprising
stability--in alternative voting (Yeltsin and his associates are
stably supported by 32 to 40 million voters while the left
opposition is backed by 22 to 30 million) as well as when
selecting a specific ideological and political course in
multiple-choice voting.
The orientations of the politically active population in the
overwhelming majority of the Russian regions have been rather
stable in the last five-and-a-half years, too--they have changed
in less than ten of the eighty-nine federation members. The
impression of some dramatic changes in the behavior of the
electors in ten more regions (with predominantly non-Russian
population) has been created by the shift in the political
orientation of the local authorities from one Moscow power
group to another.
The major motives lying behind voter choice in favor of this
or that candidate are oriented toward political and ethical
values. The first group of the motives considers political
consequences of a ballot: "This will be better for the nation,
for people like me," "I like their program," etc. Another group
has to do with the voter confidence in the candidate as a person
or in his professionalism. The results of the latest
gubernatorial polls show that as Russian electors accumulate
experience, the proportion of politics-motivated voting reduces,
while that of ethical voting grows. At the same time, other voter
motives come into play, among which are protest voting (against
the government, the rich, etc.) and survival voting ("lest it be
worse").
As for the population's electoral activity, it began
decreasing starting from 1989 (when on the average eighty seven
percent of all Russia's registered voters took part in
elections), and by the end of 1993, almost half of the Russian
constituents had stopped turning out at ballot stations. A 55 to
65 million voter turnout can be called "voting of those firmly
determined."
The stability of the Russian electorate was proved yet again
by the regional elections held in the period between 1996 and the
first half of 1997. The absolute constants of support for this or
that political course and for the leader personifying it (Yeltsin
and Vladimir Zhirinovsky from 1991; Gennady Zyuganov and Grigory
Yavlinsky from 1993), which depend only in a small measure on the
turnout fluctuations, form a reliable basis for predicting the
outcome of an election.
The gubernatorial elections have demonstrated a high level
of political activity of administrative and financial & economic
regional elites. Their returns have yet again made the problem of
instability of the power axis one of the most pressing problems
for today's Russia. In line with the Russian Constitution,
the situation in the Maritime Territory has showed that it is
impossible to oust an elected governor just by a mandate from
Moscow these days.
The electoral activity of the Russian population is a
phenomenon as yet new to this country: the inner regularities of
its functioning are predominantly of a socio-psychological
nature. Economics and ideology, political power and election
campaigns exist in the modern-day Russia separately; links
between them have not yet become stable.
The basic dichotomy "us-them," which now prevails in
elections, is determined not by the degree to which a voter is
aware of his personal interest and the interests of the group he
is affiliated to but above all by the place where he lives.
Chaadayev's proposition, formulated by him in the 1830s and
declaring that "Russia has no history, it only has geography,"
can be considered proven as applied to the behavior of most
Russians in elections.
The predominance of the "residential" model of voter
behavior with a strong influence of the geographic factor and of
the status of a particular federation constituent member (capital
cities, republics and regions, autonomous areas, remote and
central territories) makes it possible for political analysts to
predict from now on with greater accuracy the results of regional
elections to come. 

********

#6
>From RIA Novosti
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
August 20, 1997
TWO GENERALS
Political Tandem of Lev Rokhlin and Alexander Lebed 
May Lead to a New Reality in Russia - "a party of coup"
BY Sergei Mulin

Prospects
The politically unsophisticated "best defense minister after
Zhukov," paratrooper general Pavel Grachev has succeeded in
creating a new Russian army, which is not only harmless in the
event of a seizure of power in the Kremlin, but also helpless if
the situation gets out of control, as was the case on the eve of
storming of the White House on October 3-4, 1993.
Hostilities in Chechnya did more than just created a new
political reality, the movement of officers fed up with
fighting.
Fortunately for the powers-that-be, the spontaneous protest
movement was channelled into two separate organizations in the
fall of 1995 - first, Alexander Lebed's and Igor Rodionov's
"Honor and Motherland" movement, who mainly critiqued from the
outside the degradation of the armed forces; and second, the
pro-government "Our Home is Russia" bloc, where army general Lev
Rokhlin, who had rejected the Hero of Russia title for his
performance in the Chechen campaign, was made one of the nominal
leaders. Both stakes were successfully played then: the two
generals got State Duma seats; however, the post of the Committee
for the Army chairman, which was the target of both, went to an
NDR member.
Alexander Lebed's Kremlin biography, brief as it was, still
abounded in suspicious actions on the part of the President. The
desperate attempt of the general, whose presidential ambitions
never faded, to include in his retinue Alexander Korzhakov, the
"bodyguard" whom the President had demoted personally, became the
final brush-stroke in the activity of the "party of coup."
The lack of success of Lebed's "Third Force" union, and the
Russian People's Republican Party of his, which failed to grow
into mass movements, has cleared a niche for a
"general-presidential hopeful" in the public consciousness,
according to Lev Rokhlin's supporters. This must have been the
reason for the famous open letter to the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief. (See Daily Review of June 25 and 27, and July
1). However, Lev Rokhlin's move, which quickly got him out of the
ranks of Viktor Chernomyrdin's NDR allies, was duly made use of.
What at first seemed a political move of genius was appropriated
by the main left patriotic opposition force, that is Gennady
Zyuganov's party, which immediately put its members on all the
organizing committees of Rokhlin's DPA (Army Support Movement).
It looked like the long-conceived optimal scenario of left
opposition winning the presidential polls could now be
materialized: united opposition and a popular personality, one
like Lebed of 1996. However, Rokhlin lacked Lebed's charisma.
In addition to his lack of political experience, he is tongue-tied,
which may be OK for the army, but obviously not for the political
arena.
What surprises me though, is the decision by Lebed's "Honor
and Motherland" to join forces with DPA: the former's leader is
superior to Rokhlin in almost every respect. What we are
witnessing is most likely a "brotherhood in arms": an honest
officer helps his comrade, who had fallen under bad influence, to
improve. It is nothing more. Otherwise it could most probably
suggest that the two generals are on the verge of
disappointment
with peaceful means of coming to power, and are ready to rely
exclusively on the military circles and defense industry. Their
"party of coup," which narrowly missed the resurrection of the
sentenced to death Soviet Empire, can again provide a match for
the ruling oligarchy. These August days, one tends to believe
that our society can readily stop any attempt to impose a dictate
on it. However, one cannot be so sure that this "democracy's"
social base is more solid than that of possible "dictatorship" of
army generals - whatever their names.

********

#7
>From RIA Novosti
Rossiiskaya Gazeta
August 21, 1997
WILL PEACE COME TO THE CAUCASUS?
By Tatyana Shutova

The Russian Security Council met on Wednesday, August 20,
in Moscow, under the chairmanship of President Boris Yeltsin
to discuss measures for settling the situation in the North
Caucasus. Three groups of questions were in the centre of its
attention: Chechen, Ossetian-Ingush and Daghestan.
"The situation in the North Caucasus is improving very
slowly. Explosive areas still exist. It is necessary to take
additional measures to stabilise the situation." This was said
by President Boris Yeltsin in opening the session of the
Security Council. 
The decisions taken for stabilisation are not fulfilled
satisfactorily, pointed out Boris Yeltsin. This concerns 
political, financial and coordinating issues. The system does
not work as it should to, said the President. According to
him, it sometimes happens that we ourselves give occasion to
stir up passions in the North Caucasus.
Apart from that, remarked the head of the state,
sometimes the problems of each republic are considered
separately from others. That is absolutely incorrect. Boris
Yeltsin believes that all the problems in the North Caucasus 
should be united, because they are almost similar in all
republics in that region. "Today, we need a common Caucasian 
approach which should be worked out here, in the Security
Council," emphasised the President. 
The recent meeting in the Kremlin between Russian
President Boris Yeltsin and the head of the Chechen Republic,
Aslan Maskhadov, was rather one of the stages in the
negotiation process because of the lack of coincidence of the
sides' views on the status of Chechnya. We should quietly and
painstakingly work on drafting Russia's treaty with Chechnya,
stated Boris Yeltsin. 
According to him, in the near future it is necessary to
set up a joint commission in which the Russian side will be
represented by Security Council Secretary Ivan Rybkin, the
presidential administration's head Valentin Yumashev, Minister
of Ethnic and Federal Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhailov and Deputy
Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Ramazan
Abdulatipov. Boris Yeltsin believes that the Chechen side
should be represented by officials of similar ranks.
The Russian President emphasised that the work over the
similar treaty with Tatarstan lasted for about eighteen
months, and, as a result, "we have achieved such accords that
made it possible to create a normal situation in the republic,
and it has remained within the Russian Federation." Quite
possible that we shall be able to give something more to
Chechnya "from the point of view of sovereignty," said Boris
Yeltsin. 
Boris Yeltsin sharply criticised the recent statement by
Security Council Deputy Secretary Boris Berezovsky and NTV
company President Igor Malashenko. "Malashenko does not know
the situation in Chechnya as good as we know it, and we know
it in all minutest details," stated the President. 
He pointed out that it is impermissible to offend the
leadership of the Chechen Republic after the negotiations of
the Russian President with Aslan Maskhadov. Security Council
Deputy Secretary Boris Berezovsky should not have either to
hot up the situation through the mass media, emphasised Boris
Yeltsin. 
As to the Ossetian-Ingush differences, after Boris
Yeltsin's meeting with the heads of North Ossetia and
Ingushetia the Security Council and the Government of Russia
were instructed to draft a tripartite agreement on joint
actions of the state bodies of the North Caucasian republics
and the federal centre for overcoming the consequences of the
armed conflict in the autumn of 1992.
The situation in Daghestan was qualified by analysts as 
explosive. The crisis of the power has been exacerbated by the
difficult social and economic situation in the republic. This
is a result of the fact that in the years of the Chechen
crisis Daghestan found itself cut off from other regions of
Russia and also because the federal centre, according to
Ramazan Abdulatipov, did not pay the necessary attention to
the republic. Urgent measures should be taken to bring
Daghestan out of its difficult situation and thereby to
prevent the appearance of a new seat of tension. 
The settlement of the situation in the North Caucasus
meets the interests of our national security, stated Russian
President Boris Yeltsin. That region is a crossroad of the
interests of many countries, not only of the members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States but also of other foreign
countries.
The President drew attention to the fact that while our
interest in that region is weakening, "the Americans have
started penetrating that area and say openly that it is the
region of their interests."
In view of this, Boris Yeltsin believes, the settling of
the situation there meets the interests of our security. In
this case Russia has the right to count on the understanding
of the world community. And this matter, pointed out the head
of the state, is in the competence of the Russian Foreign
Ministry. 
The Caucasian policy is a subtle thing, and such things
are most vulnerable.
To prevent unfavourable developments in the North
Caucasus is an urgent task of the Russian leadership. Its
accomplishment will call for coordinated actions of all the
state structures. The main thing in this matter is patience
and caution.

********

#8
Yeltsin says US influence increasing in Caucasus

MOSCOW, Aug 20 (Reuter) - President Boris Yeltsin said on Wednesday he was
concerned by increased U.S. influence in the Caucasus, a region long seen as
strategically vital to Russia. 

``Already the United States is declaring that (the Caucasus) is in their zone
of interest. Our interest is weakening but the Americans, on the contrary,
are beginning to penetrate this zone and, without reservation, declare
this,'' he said in televised remarks during a session of Russia's Security
Council. 

``(A settlement for the region) must respond to the interests of our national
security, we have a right to count on understanding on this point from the
international community, and this is the task of (Russia's) Foreign
Ministry,'' he said. 

He said increased U.S. involvement in the region was just one of a ``series
of new worrying tendences'' in the Caucasus, which includes Moscow's
breakaway province of Chechnya where Russian troops fought a bloody but
unsuccessful 21-month war against separatist guerrillas. 

Moscow has long regarded the Caucasus as a strategically soft underbelly and
has reacted nervously when Western officials have visited the region. 

``The situation there is being sorted out extremely slowly. The northern
Caucasus remains an explosive region and serious additional measures and
efforts are needed,'' Yeltsin said. 

Yeltsin said Russia's Foreign Ministry, Federal Security Service (successor
to the Soviet-era KGB) and other state organs needed to coordinate their work
better in the region in the wider interests of national security. 

He said he sometimes received contradictory intelligence reports from the
different bodies. 

``All this makes me very worried because the integrity of Russia is at
stake,'' he said. 

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