August 16, 1997  
This Date's Issues: 1131 • 1132 • 

Johnson's Russia List
#1132
16 August 1997
djohnson@cdi.org (info@cdi.org)

[Note from David Johnson:
THE NEXT JRL MESSAGE WILL BE ON WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 20.
I might note that if I had a laptop computer (with modem)
I could keep the flow going when absent from Winding Waye,
a likely more frequent occurrence in the future. Christmas
in August? PS: djohnson@cdi.org may not work this weekend.
1. AP: U.S. Halts Spending to Institute.
2. Juliet Johnson: FIGs and Bankers.
3. Reuter: Yeltsin to vet terms of major privatisations.
4. Reuter: Russian economy bumping along bottom in July.
5. Owen Johnson: re media ownership.
6. Fred Weir in Moscow on hockey.
7. Moskovskiy Komsomolets: Natalya Timakova, "The Top Power 
Does Not Bend, It Just Breaks -- Nemtsov Has Come Between 
Chernomyrdin and Chubays."
8. Chicago Tribune: Georgie Anne Geyer, BEING HONEST ABOUT
RUSSIA IS BEST U.S. POLICY.
9. Interfax: Poll Shows Nemtsov's Popularity 'Dwindling.'
10. Irish Times: E.D. Doyle, The Cold War Revealed. Stalin 
believed his ideology, archives suggest.
11. Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy: Commentator Andrey Cherkizov on 
'Scandals' Involving Kokh, Chubays, Others.
12. Rabochaya Tribuna: New Privatization Law's Provisions
Summarized.
13. NTV: Chubays Says No Change to Privatization Policy.]

********

#1
U.S. Halts Spending to Institute
August 15, 1997
By MAURA REYNOLDS
MOSCOW (AP) - The U.S. government has suspended a $890,000 grant
to a Harvard-affiliated Russian think tank, accusing it of stealing
a half-million dollars worth of office equipment.
The Moscow office of the U.S. Agency for International
Development said the grant to the Institute for Law-based Economy
(ILBE) may be restored if the equipment is returned.
``It is my hope that, through your actions, circumstances might
once again change and we might be able to continue funding this
important program,'' USAID officer Orion Yeandel wrote in a letter
dated Aug. 13.
The Russian institute has denied the charges.
ILBE, a Russian institute set up by Harvard to advise the
government on legal reform, was mostly funded by aid funneled
through the Harvard Institute for International Development.
USAID funding for Harvard programs was halted in April when a
preliminary investigation accused two advisers from the university
of using their positions in Russia for personal gain.
Last week, USAID also accused the legal institute of walking off
with $500,000 of U.S.-purchased office equipment. The money
suspended this week was the only USAID grant to bypass Harvard and
go directly to ILBE.
ILBE director Sergei Shishkin said Friday that his organization
is considering a possible slander suit.
``If this doesn't stop, we'll have to file suit against USAID,''
Shishkin said. ``I don't think we should be trying to defend
ourselves in a subtle way.''
USAID has accused the Harvard advisers - economics professor
Andrei Shleifer and legal expert Jonathan Hay - of permitting ILBE
staff to provide services for investment projects run by Shleifer's
wife and Hay's girlfriend. Both men deny the allegations.
In the wake of the charges, First Russian Deputy Prime Minister
Anatoly Chubais broke off a long relationship with Harvard and
publicly sided with the two advisers. Since May, Harvard has been
closing down its projects in Russia, including those at ILBE.
As a result, ILBE was compelled to move this month from offices
it once shared with Harvard, which brought up the question of how
to divide office equipment bought with U.S. money.
Shishkin contends that while the equipment belongs to the U.S.
government, Harvard had transferred the property onto ILBE's books
in order to stay clear of Russian taxes.
An official with the Harvard Institute for International
Development, who spoke on condition of anonymity, denied his
organization transferred the equipment to ILBE.
Shishkin said a letter ILBE sent to USAID on dividing up the
property went unanswered, so the institute took all the equipment
with it when it moved.
The Harvard official said the U.S. side had responded to ILBE's
letter with an offer to give ILBE one-third of the equipment.
Shishkin accused Harvard of owing ILBE about $170,000 in back
grant money, and insisted that any negotiations about the equipment
should include discussion of the alleged debt.
The Harvard official said an agreement had been worked out to
pay the money but would not comment further.

*******

#2
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 1997 
From: Juliet Johnson <jjohns@orion.it.luc.edu> 
Subject: FIGs and Bankers

Dear David,

In response to Eric Johnson's request for information on who owns what in 
the Russian media, here's a rough list of what the bankers are involved 
in (keep in mind that these do NOT necessarily represent majority 
stakeholdings):

Berezovsky/LogoVAZ: ORT, Nezavisimaya gazeta, Ogonek, TV-6 (plus rumors 
that he will sponsor a "new" Izvestiya, headed by Golembiovsky)

Khodorkovsky/Menatep: Independent Media Group (this includes the Moscow 
Times and the St. Petersburg Times), Literaturnaya gazeta

Guzinsky/Media Most: NTV, Segodnya, Itogi, Eko Moskvy, Sem Dnei

Potanin/ONEKSIMbank: Izvestiya, Ekspert, Komsomolskaya pravda (plus 
reports that BaltONEKSIMbank is making major loans to/investments in a 
number of St. Petersburg papers)

Smolensky/SBS-Agro (ie, Stolichny Bank): Kommersant-Daily, ORT, Novaya 
gazeta (and probably Kommersant as well - can anyone confirm?)

Additions and subtractions, if anyone knows differently, would be 
welcome. It can certainly be hard to know which Russian newspapers to 
trust. I read Finansovaya izvestiya, Kommersant-Daily, and Ekspert on a 
regular basis, but you need to digest them all (with barrels of salt) to 
get a decent feel for what's going on. 

Although I would like to comment on many more of the submissions about 
the bankers and their FIGs that have appeared on the list lately, the 
semester starts next week and duty calls. So, for those of you who would 
like more information on this subject, let me plug my article on Russian 
FIGs that will be coming out soon in Post-Soviet Affairs (most likely the 
November issue). It has plenty of information on who owns what and why 
(and who is doing what to whom), including analyses of both rounds of the 
shares-for-loans auctions and the Svyazinvest sale.

********

#3
Yeltsin to vet terms of major privatisations
MOSCOW, Aug 15 (Reuter) - A draft decree on Russian privatisation says
President Boris Yeltsin must approve the terms of sales of big state stakes,
the deputy head of Yeltsin's administration said on Friday. 
``Sales of big state stakes are to be governed by presidential decrees, which
not only approve the fact of sales, but their terms and rules,'' Alexander
Livshits told a news conference. 
The draft also says companies linked to the organisers of an auction will not
be allowed to participate, he said. 
Russia's latest privatisation -- a tender for 51 percent of voting shares in
the Norilsk Nickel metals producer -- was criticised for being unfair and
providing for a low price and winner known in advance. 
The stake was won by a unit of Uneximbank, which had held the stake in trust
for the government. An affiliate of Uneximbank organised the sale for the
government. 
Livshits said the decree requires the organiser of an auction to be chosen by
tender. The winner of the tender will be the company which promises to ensure
the largest revenues for the treasury at the auction. 
Participants are to be provided with full information about the state of the
company to be sold and the prosecutor's office is to supervise sales and how
the winner fulfilled its obligations, Livshits said. 

*******

#4
Russian economy bumping along bottom in July
By Jonathan Lynn 

MOSCOW, Aug 15 (Reuter) - Official figures released on Friday painted a mixed
picture of Russia's economy in July, with output stagnating for the second
month running, inflation edging up for the first time in two years, but
unemployment and wage arrears both falling. 
The State Statistics Committee said gross domestic product (GDP), the
broadest measure of an economy's output, had risen 4.2 percent in July after
3.6 percent in June, but was unchanged from a year earlier in both months. 
In the first seven months of this year GDP was 0.2 percent lower than a year
earlier. 
Ministers had originally hoped that 1997 would be the first year of recovery
in Russia since the economy started declining in 1990 but now say that output
will be at best flat this year. 
The recovery is now billed for 1998. 
President Boris Yeltsin's deputy chief of staff, Alexander Livshits, said on
Friday the 1998 budget currently being drafted by the government assumes two
percent GDP growth next year. 
Inflation next year is forecast at five to seven percent, said Livshits, a
former finance minister, adding: ``The figures are realistic enough.'' 
But year-on-year inflation accelerated to 14.7 percent in July from June's
record low 14.5 percent, the first increase in the year-on-year rate since
June 1995. 
Prices have now risen 9.6 percent so far this year, prompting First Deputy
Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais to acknowledge last week that inflation over
the whole year would be above the 11.8 percent target. 
The government could also draw some comfort from the figures. 
The overall trade surplus widened to $11.8 billion in the first half of the
year from $10.8 billion a year earlier. But the volume of exports and imports
both shrank, in another indicator of stagnation. 
The number of people officially estimated as unemployed fell for the third
successive month in July to 6.69 million or 9.3 percent of the workforce. 
And the amount of wage arrears due to a lack of funding from the federal or
regional governments fell to 10.94 trillion roubles ($2 billion) on August 1
from 11.35 trillion on July 1. Total unpaid wages also fell. 
The government has made a priority of eliminating wage and pension arrears,
part of a web of unpaid bills choking the economy, and is using privatisation
proceeds and taxes squeezed out of unwilling corporations to pay off the
debts. 

***********

#5
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 1997 
From: johnsono@indiana.edu (Owen V. Johnson)
>From FSU media list
Subject: Re: who owns whom?

Eric Johnson expresses surprise about the lack of interest on the part of
western
media moguls. Some observations on the basis of following Russian/Soviet
media since early 1980s:
1. At a conference of leading editors from the U.S. and Eastern Europe in
Prague in early July 1990, I asked Ben Bradlee, then editor of the
Washington Post, why his newspaper group didn't invest in Eastern Europe.
"We don't want to own a newspaper we can't read!" he replied candidly. He
said further that no newspaper organization would want to be associated
with newspapers tied in any way to a government, for fear of even giving
the impression that punches would be pulled in the coverage of that country
or of U.S. relations with that country.
2. At a very explorative meeting of Thomson media chain reps with a couple
Leningrad journalists in 1989 that I sat in on, the Thomson people
expressed skepticism about the lack of an advertising market long after the
fall of communism.
3. A leading official of the Murdoch chain visiting Indiana University
several years ago said he had made a trip to Russia to investigate possible
involvement. But Murdoch was scared off by the tremendous technological
and infrastructure backwardness. Chains or groups are not used to building
these things up on their own in a competitive market.
4. Most important, perhaps, is that media chains in the West don't like
competition. Most of their purchases are in markets that they can
dominate. In Moscow, the market is too diverse for the comfort of the
chains. If anything, one should be watching the regional and provincial
press for the first presence of western media chains. Smaller German media
chains have swallowed up most of the provincial press in Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary already. But even there, the ability to make a profit
rather quickly is important. So look for their presence first in the
regions where the economy is booming and advertising will prove attractive
to companies.
Prof. Owen V. Johnson, School of Journalism
& Adj. Prof., Dept. of History
Ernie Pyle Hall
Indiana University

**********

#6
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 1997
From: fweir.ncade@rex.iasnet.ru 

By Fred Weir
MOSCOW (CP) -- The Stanley Cup begins a five-day trip to
Moscow Saturday, during which the venerable North American trophy
can expect to be hailed by crowds on Red Square, granted a
private audience with President Boris Yeltsin and held up as an
inspiration to thousands of hockey-playing Russian youngsters.
``This is the greatest trophy in hockey,'' says Igor
Larionov, one of the victorious Detroit Red Wing's five Russian
players, who together arranged for the Stanley Cup's visit to
their motherland.
``We have millions of Russian fans, who rooted for us all
the way, and it would be unfair to them not to bring the Cup and
show it to them.''
According to NHL rules, each player on the winning team
has the right to take the Stanley Cup home for two days. Each of
Detroit's five Russians took the Cup for just one day, and pooled
the remainder to make the visit possible.
Three of them, Larionov, Vyacheslav Kozlov and Vyacheslav
Fetisov arrived several days in advance to accompany the trophy
on its Moscow itinerary of hockey rinks, receptions and
walkabouts. 
Another player, Vladimir Konstantinov, is in long-term
hospital care following a mid-June car crash that also injured
Fetisov, and the fifth, Sergei Fedorov, did not show up.
On Saturday the Cup will be displayed for fans and
students at Moscow's legendary Red Army Hockey School, from which
both Larionov and Fetisov graduated.
The next day it will be paraded through central Moscow,
culminating in a lavish celebration with fans and players on Red
Square. Later it will be shown at a charity game to kick off
Russia's most prestigious hockey series, the Spartak Cup.
``This is the most fantastic thing, like a dream come
true,'' says Boris Savkin, a 17-year old fan. 
``We cheered for our guys all through the Stanley Cup
games, but all the time we knew they were there, not here. Now
they're here, with the Cup.''
About 10 Russian NHL players are on hand to contest the
Spartak Cup, in a team called ``Russian All-Stars''.
On Friday several of them, including Fetisov, Vladimir
Malakhov, Alexei Zhamnov and Oleg Tverdovsky, faced off in a
controlled scrimmage with top young Russian players. 
Fetisov, who skated and moved the puck with ease, said he
has completely recovered from the June car accident, and will be
ready to play in Sunday's big charity game.
``I still can't talk about the accident, it gets me too
emotional,'' he said. ``But my health is fine and I'm ready to
play again.''
Boris Yeltsin will get his chance to privately inspect
the Stanley Cup on Monday, and will later appear with it before a
planned crowd of 100,000 at a newly-constructed Moscow soccer
stadium.
And on Tuesday the Cup will visit the famed Soviet hockey
academy in Voskresensk, about 80-km from Moscow, where the
majority of Russia's best hockey players have been trained
through the years.
``The best thing about the Stanley Cup coming here is
that it will be a huge inspiration and morale-booster for Russian
kids,'' says Gelani Tabulatov, vice president of Moscow's Spartak
hockey club.
``Things haven't been that great with Russian hockey
lately, but now the kids see that Russian players can win in the
big time and that they have a chance to make it too.'

*********

#7
History Repeated' in Kremlin Power Struggle 

Moskovskiy Komsomolets
August 12, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
in Russian 12 Aug 97 p
Article by Natalya Timakova under the "Patriot Games" rubric:
"The Top Power Does Not Bend, It Just Breaks -- Nemtsov Has Come
Between Chernomyrdin and Chubays"

The well-known founders of a well-known teaching [Marxism-Leninism]
never tired of repeating that history develops along a spiral. That each
time it returns to the same point, only on a higher level. Regrettable as
it may be, to all appearances one must agree with their conclusions. 
Instead of the usual summer political lull, we have gotten an explosive
mixture of scandals, sensations, and exposes that have been pursuing us
from television screens and the front pages of newspapers this entire past
month. The first week of August has shown that, although some key figures
have left on vacation, Russian politicians and the businessmen who
sympathize with them have smoothly made it back to the starting point: The
new spiral in the power struggle is unwinding, as the founders taught us,
on the next level.
How relatively quiet the future seemed one year ago! The Communists
had won. Korzhakov was dismissed, and there was no one left to ask to kill
the objectionable rival. Viktor Ilyushin, the most silent master of
Kremlin intrigues, was sent to do "remedial work" -- to look after social
issues in the government. Surprisingly to everyone, probably including
Boris Nikolayevich himself, Anatoliy Chubays came to head the Presidential
Staff. The battle for access to the "body" was clean won. Bankers, having
calculated their profits from Yeltsin's victory, went back to managing the
banks, and the restless Boris Berezovskiy got the chance to demonstrate his
many talents in Chechnya. Enthusiastic over ideas of reform, B.N.
[Yeltsin] practically conquered his own death by heroically surviving a
serious operation and confidently returning to the Kremlin.
The new cabinet of ministers should have been the next step toward
peace and prosperity. They came to the White House [government] like a
storm and an onslaught: Anatoliy Chubays and Boris Nemtsov, Yakov Urinson
and Alfred Kokh, Oleg Sysuyev and Aleksey Kudrin. Professionals and
technocrats who never tire of repeating that they only came to work, not to
share out power. "The government should and will work in a
well-coordinated, harmonious manner, work to produce results," Viktor
Chernomyrdin said in an interview with Moskovskiy Komsomolets in April of
this year. Back then he also did not tire of repeating that, in principle,
there could not be any conflict of fathers and children between the
"moderate liberals" and the "young reformers." Even when the interests of
his own dear brainchild Gazprom were affected, Ch.V.S. [Chernomyrdin]
preferred to keep silent until the matter resolved itself. In the
atmosphere of general love, some unbelievable rumors began appearing about
how the "big seven" bankers were prepared to do the impossible: nominate
and support the candidacy of Anatoliy Chubays at the next presidential
elections. But the friendship between the ministers and the capitalists did
not last very long -- only three months. The first skirmish over
Svyazinvest showed that, in spite of all the assurances of eternal love and
devotion, the interests of individual financial-industrial groups and the
officials lobbying them remained as they had been. The situation with the
cancellation of the Norilsk Nickel auction is yet another confirmation of
this. Neither General Prosecutor Yuriy Skuratov's appeal, nor Viktor
Chernomyrdin's virtual ban on holding a tender led to anything. After
Berezovskiy, who persuaded the prime minister to postpone the auction,
Potanin came to Chernomyrdin's office, and Ch.V.S. changed his mind. The
tender took place, Norilsk Nickel went to Unexim. The position of Yevgeniy
Yasin, minister without portfolio, is also significant in this case. Like
the premier, he was also against the Norilsk Nickel auction. But up until
this moment Yasin had been one of the "old" members of the government who
supported the "young" [members]. Apparently, however, even he was bothered
by the activity of Unexim and the ministers supporting it.
In the past two weeks it has finally become clear that the government
has once again broken up into groups. The main confrontation is between
the "young reformers" and the "moderate conservatives." Chubays is trying
to build a clear-cut structure which could replace individual groups
lobbying their interests. Anatoliy Borisovich [Chubays] himself is like the
brains of this structure. Nemtsov, Kokh, Urinson, and Kudrin are the
executors. Unexim, headed by Potanin, is the financial basis.
It is entirely clear that a situation like this is hardly likely to
suit the others, be it Chernomyrdin or Berezovskiy. It is natural to
assume that they will combine their efforts to oppose the aggressive
Chubays and Co. After all, the initial attempt at persuasion was simple: 
It is still a long time before the next presidential elections, Boris
Yeltsin is entirely able to function, and if this is so, then let us
abstain from sharing out future offices in the Kremlin for the time being. 
Especially since an excellent tandem for the future is forming: 
Chernomyrdin as president, and Chubays as prime minister. But here, like a
devil out of a snuffbox, Boris Nemtsov popped up, whose behavior reminds
one of a capricious successor to the throne, and disrupted the "phony
truce." He brought the unhealthy spirit of rivalry to the hitherto
friendly cabinet of ministers. His constant insinuations that he knows who
the next president will be are designed to severely irritate not only
Chernomyrdin, who is also preparing to take part in the [election] campaign
in the year 2000, but the rest of the cabinet members as well. Picture it
-- this eccentric guy is walking around and saying over and over again: "I
am still considering whether you will be working in the government when I
become president...."
It turns out that the reformers have once again come up against the
issue of how to share out power, and are again prepared to fight for
influence over the head of state. Once again a race to Yeltsin's ear is
being organized: Whoever runs up to him faster will be the winner. To all
appearances, a situation like this suits the president completely. After
all, he is also a great lover of playing at the "system of checks and
balances," and it is entirely possible that Yeltsin will deliberately use
Boris Nemtsov in the role of a sort of "irritant."
It is not for nothing that at first Boris Nikolayevich promised Viktor
Stepanovich [Chernomyrdin], who came to see him in Volzhskiy Utes, that he
need not worry about his post. And a few days later not only did the
president announce that he knows where the "pressure" on Nemtsov is coming
from, but he even comforted his "protege": as if to say, I have fixed it
so that "there will not be any more pressure like this." At the same time,
Yeltsin is leaving unanswered the question of who is the initiator of this
"pressure," with whom he had to "fix it."
And here is a strange thing. In the past it was always possible to
understand who the motor of reforms was, and who its brakes were. Who was a
democrat and who was a sworn retrograde. In the Gaydar- Soskovets or
Filatov-Korzhakov confrontations any normal person would automatically
choose the "democratic" side. But now just try and figure out who is
really defending the interests of Russia, and who is defending those of his
own financial-industrial group. To use the terms of those founders of
Marxism, we no longer have a dialectical confrontation, but an all-out
battle for a place in the sun. They wanted a single and indivisible
government of reformers: they got more shakedowns between "young" and
"old," "radicals" and the "moderates." The founders were right --
everything does repeat itself.

*********

#8
Chicago Tribune
August 15, 1997 
[for personal use only]
BEING HONEST ABOUT RUSSIA IS BEST U.S. POLICY
By Georgie Anne Geyer. Universal Press Syndicate. 

"Mir y druzhba"--"Peace and friendship"--the Soviets always said to us
Americans over the 70 long years of communism, usually over the endless
drinking bouts they favored in order to defeat the capitalists.
Not surprisingly, those words reverberate discordantly today. Every day
the newspapers and television bring new horror stories of the latest version
of "Mir," the 11-year-old Russian space station-in-the-sky, as it bungles
and bangs its way around the heavens, hitting everything that is not tied down.
At last sighting, the station was running on half-power and with one of
its six modules sealed off. The Mir's oxygen-generating system was not
working, and the crew was using special oxygen "candles" (containers that
convert solid fuel into oxygen when ignited) to provide enough air to
breathe. At this writing, two fresh cosmonauts had arrived aboard a Soyuz
TM-26 capsule to try to save the poor creature, looking very much like heart
surgeons arriving at the bed of a desperate patient.
But the real question of this effort of mutuality in space is one that
reaches far beyond those essentially scientific issues. The real question
revolves around the use of space as a laboratory, not for science but for
friendship:
Is this `peace' going to actually lead to a new `friendship'--or are we
witnessing only the most serious ersatz attempt yet in which the American
administration insists upon pretending that today's Russia is still a great
country, thus inadvertently but genuinely humiliating her across the
airwaves of the world?
We thought, you see, that we had learned from the disastrous Versailles
Treaty in 1919, which ended World War I. Germany's punishment in that era
was so cruelly punitive that it led to World War II. Following that war, the
Allies this time rebuilt Germany and Japan, leading to one of the greatest
periods of history.
Once Soviet Russia was collapsing of its own internal weight between 1985
and 1991, the Western foreign ministries thought that this time, again, they
were opting not to humiliate Russia. But the Allies were victorious in 1945
and thus were able to dictate the terms of postwar Europe's and Japan's
prosperity. Russia in 1991, when the Soviet Union officially disbanded, was
a country defeated only by itself.
But American efforts to build up Russia have been willy-nilly--the
ill-fated Mir "adventure" is merely one of the disastrous examples--in ways
that broadcast to the world her failings. Remembering the "Potemkin
Villages," the false-front villages created to deceive Catherine the Great
in the early 19th Century, might we not call this a policy of "Potemkin
Greatness"?
Even the counterproductivity of the policy would not be so bad if 1) it
did not actually endanger American lives, and 2) it did not open the way to
the watering down of many of our precious international principles (mostly
Western-originated) by bringing "Potemkin Russia" into them when she clearly
does not meet the important membership requirements.
Take, first, the Mir again. On a purely scientific basis, American
scientists and diplomats will relate that the United States, which is
providing hundreds of millions of dollars to have the American space program
hook up with the Russian one, will have the benefit of some of the excellent
Russian space technology. That part is fine.
But at least one American life--that of U.S. astronaut Michael Foale--is
reeling around in that banged-up Russian space station, and the attitude
here is that that is a small price to pay for American/Russian "friendship."
(Another comparison: One reason often given for keeping American troops in
Bosnia is that they are serving alongside the Russians and becoming "friends.")
Then, take the question of Western institutions and their principles. The
Council of Europe, which has now admitted Russia, acknowledges freely that
Russia did not meet the requirements for membership. And the "G-7"
industrialized nations have tacitly taken Russia in, making it, rhetorically
at least, the G-8, even though Russia remains a failed economy.
Paul Goble of Radio Free Europe, one of our finest analysts on the East
Bloc, wrote recently that "including Russia on this basis inevitably
devalues the principles on which the organizations were built. These
concerns have real consequences: They further reduce American influence and
credibility in Europe. They give Moscow a status in the region that its
currently reduced circumstances don't justify."
Some of our best analytical foreign policy minds questioned from the
beginning whether eschewing honesty about Russia's true situation was the
best policy. Scholar Zbigniew Brzezinski said early on that we should
respect Russia, yes, but that we should also be honest in telling her that
she is not a Great Power anymore, all the while advising her to make the
painful reforms necessary so that she will be one again in the future.
Goble sums up in words our policymakers should heed: "The ways in which
the West does move to include Russia in various forums will have
consequences, for these international groups, for the West, and for Russia
itself."

*******

#9
Poll Shows Nemtsov's Popularity 'Dwindling' 

MOSCOW, Aug 14 (Interfax) -- Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Boris
Nemtsov's popularity has been dwindling since April though he remains one
of Russia's most popular politicians, opinion polls suggest.
While 45% of Russians trusted Nemtsov in April, only 33% did so in
July, Russia's Public Opinion foundation said in a report made available to
Interfax on Thursday. The report sums up surveys the foundation made
weekly between April and early August, questioning the same 1,500 people
every week.
The proportion of those who distrusted the deputy prime minister rose
from 19% in April to 30% in July.
Nevertheless, 53% of those questioned early this month were satisfied
with Nemtsov's political decisions and only 19% disapproved of them.
Fifty-three percent of Russians did not change their attitude to
Nemtsov during July, while 21% came to like him better. Twelve percent
grew to like him less during last month.
Asked who would be Nemtsov's most serious rivals if he ran for
president, 29% of those polled named Communist Party leader Gennadiy
Zyuganov, 13% said it would be former security chief Aleksandr Lebed and
11% thought it would be Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov.
If the election were held today Nemtsov would win, the poll suggests,
though he would beat any of his three hypothetical rivals by narrower
margins than he would have done in April.
If he faced off against Zyuganov, the first deputy prime minister
would score 44% of the vote in August, compared to 49% in April, while
Zyuganov's figure remained unchanged at 28%.
Nemtsov would beat Lebed with a vote of 38% versus 26%, the figures
for April being 52% and 25% respectively.
A contest with Luzhkov would bring Nemtsov 37% of the vote in August,
compared to 47% in April, while the mayor's result would have stayed at 24%
since April.

********

#10
Irish Times
August 16, 1997
[for personal use only]
The Cold War Revealed 
Stalin believed his ideology, archives suggest 
World View: By Col E.D. Doyle 
Col E.D. Doyle is a former chief military observer for the United 
Nations in Sinai 

Generals wonder what is happening "on the other side of the 
hill". Cold War historians wonder what is in the other side's archives.
During the Cold War, information was readily obtainable from open 
Western societies: information overload was the problem. Kremlinology 
and guess-work flourished. Espionage provided serious information for 
both sides.
East European and former Soviet archives, and some Chinese ones, are now 
being opened - gradually - to scholars. What are we learning?
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London 
recently organised a valuable discussion on "Re-thinking the Cold War", 
led by Prof Sir Michael Howard and Prof John Lewis Gaddis, the respected 
American "student of containment", whose latest book is We now Know: 
Re-thinking Cold War History.
Historians can now consider where they got it right or wrong. Gaddis 
cautiously spoke of an initial scholarly assessment rather than a 
definitive account. His finishing point was the Cuba missile crisis; 
documents are still emerging.
For him, the biggest surprise was the "role of ideology" in 
decision-making. Stalin's ruthlessness and real politik were known. But 
in his "world view" speech of February 9th, 1946, he predicted a third 
world war, not between the Soviet Union and the West, but between 
Britain and America; capitalists would be unable to cope with each 
other's contradictions.
The new information seems to show that this was not rhetoric, but a 
serious view. It helps to account for misjudgments after 1945, such as 
Stalin's failure to appreciate the co-operative processes which 
culminated in the Marshall Plan.
Despite good espionage information, Stalin still took the ideological 
view. The documents show his belief that the attractions of the system 
in a Communist East Germany would make all West Germany communist.
At the time, thousands of German industries were being dismantled and 
moved to Russia. An estimated two million German women were raped by Red 
Army soldiers. Chinese documents showed Mao in greater and longer 
deference to Stalin in the 1930s and 1940s than previously thought. When 
Stalin realised that the Marshall Plan was sealing off the spread of 
communism in Europe he shifted to Asia, where success seemed more 
likely.
Khruschev was concerned about a US invasion of Cuba, to crush communism 
in the hemisphere. Installing missiles was an ideological reaction.
Cuba then involved itself in Africa, without consulting Moscow. 
Ideological arguments were used to the Soviets: "You must support them 
or lose credit."
A Russian politburo member remarked that the Cubans were "realists" 
rather than "romantics" - people carried away by visions, ideas, 
opportunities. Stalin, Khruschev and especially Mao were all affected.
Sir Michael Howard said that both sides had peered over the brink during 
the Cuba crisis and pulled back. Things were never the same again.
Were the lengthy arms control discussions taken seriously by the 
Russians? Once multiple warheads (MIRVs) were invented control would 
have been extremely difficult.
In the 1970s America was undergoing the "tragic experience" of Vietnam 
and became, like the Soviet Union, cautious and conservative. For the 
first time, Germany took an initiative with Brandt's Ostpolitik. The 
State Department was not keen on this, but Kissinger used it.
The State Department saw the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) as a victory for the Soviets. But in the 1970s, when 
Vietnam, the Israel/Arab conflict and Watergate took up Americans' time, 
the CSCE agreement eased communications by human contacts with the 
satellites.
The many professors and students coming to the West saw the differences 
in living standards. By the end of the 1970s the only remaining genuine 
Marxists were in US and Western European universities.
The Soviet economy was sinking, the American view was apocalyptic. The 
Iranian revolution and the imprisonment of American diplomats 
strengthened the mood.
In the US, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was seen as a disaster for 
American policy. We saw it as a good sign; we knew the Afghans.
The US saw the strength of European opposition to cruise missiles 
(including Greenham Common) as the result of "Finlandisation". But we no 
longer saw the Soviet Union as the threat it had been.
And then, suddenly, it was all over.
Reagan's achievement lay in restoring US self-confidence, by a huge 
military investment, the implications of which remain.
Written pronouncements may not reflect politicians' actual thoughts, but 
as Prof Gaddis points out, historians are stuck with what has survived 
in documents. Significant things may not be written down. Finland was a 
good example. Stalin had good reason to expect Finnish resistance and an 
American reaction if he re-entered Finland after 1945. He said nothing 
about it.
Was the Cuba missile crisis more dangerous than was thought? The Soviet 
commanders obeyed orders not to use the missiles, but fired on American 
spy-planes against orders. Accidents are possible at lower levels.
Eric Hobsbawm, in Age of Extremes, is at odds with many of the ideas 
(should one say ideology?) presented above. Our world survived; let us 
be thankful.

********

#11
Commentator on 'Scandals' Involving Kokh, Chubays, Others 

Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy
August 13, 1996
[translation for personal use only]
Commentary by Andrey Cherkizov

Official reports say that Russian privatization chief Alfred Kokh, the
chairman of the State Committee for the Management of State Property,
tendered his resignation of his own accord because he intends to work at a
big private company. Why?
Two scandals began to brew in Russia last week. Both are connected
with auctions, and both have something to do with tasty tidbits put out to
tender, and one and the same winner is involved in both. I am talking
about Norilsk Nikel and Svyazinvest and, of course, about Oneksimbank.
How did Kokh find his way into the Russian Government? Rumors say
that when the cabinet was formed Chernomyrdin made one condition--[former
Deputy Prime Minister] Potanin was not to be a member of it. This is clear
because the interests of the Prime Minister and the former deputy prime
minister did not coincide at all.
Chubays is said to have asked: Are you saying that you do not want
Potanin in the cabinet? All right, then let it be Kokh. And Kokh did
come. One can draw a conclusion that Kokh became a member of the
Government to represent Potanin's interests and he became, as it were, his
deputy in the Government. At the same time he remained Chubays' man and
represented Chubays at Oneksimbank.
What did Chubays want? Money, money, and more money. It is easy for
the President to make promises that holes in the budget will be patched up
and debts will be paid off and he can also have words about deadlines with
the same old Chubays and Nemtsov. But those two are the people who are to
carry out the President's promises. Chubays needed money and he needed it
quickly, from a domestic source and with an opportunity for the Government
to control properties which were allegedly gone or were going--the same
good old Norilsk Nikel and Svyazinvest. Which of the bankers is the most
docile and obeys the Government? Of course, not Berezovskiy and Gusinskiy;
this is obvious without a visit to a fortune teller. But Potanin--he was a
member of the Government, and he invited Vavilov to work with him. Not
only is Potanin transparent and under the thumb but he is still loyal of
his own accord. All levers, all connecting threads, all subtleties in
influencing him are in Chubays' hands. However, the Government is not
Chubays and his guys only. The Government is also Chernomyrdin and his
boys. Therefore, it is quite possible that Chubays came to an agreement
with Kokh and Potanin. Kokh will make sure that auctions proceed in the
required direction, Potanin will win them as required, and Chubays will get
the money he needs and will immediately use it to patch up all the holes,
and then he will let Kokh free, to his coveted place of work.
What a wonderful plan! However, Berezovskiy and Gusinskiy kicked up a
fuss because of Svyazinvest. Who benefits from this scandal? The Prime
Minister. It is his greatest pleasure to annoy Potanin and put obstacles
in his way. On the other hand, Viktor Stepanovich [Chernomyrdin] would
love to play the role of an arbiter.
But Chubays is bound by his word. Kokh has done his bit and demands a
due reward. Chubays does not want to keep all his eggs in one basket. 
Berezovskiy and Gusinskiy are useful for him, too. Chubays has no reason
whatsoever to make them his enemies. But Chubays does not want to share
the money and his role of the arbiter with anyone. This is why, as we can
assume, Chubays suggests that the President should accept Kokh's
resignation.
The President again confirms that he is the boss. Kokh, who is not
very popular with quite a few people, gets his coveted job. Berezovskiy and
Gusinskiy are told to turn a new page and drop their demands for
justice--the money has already been spent, your interests will be taken
into account later, and you will be happy.
As far as Chernomyrdin is concerned, he is being left out again.
Maksim Boyko, the new chairman of the state property committee, is again
Chubays' man and has not been caught red-handed while staging intrigues. 
There is hope that nobody will raise again the issue of transforming the
property committee into a ministry and that everyone gradually will forget
all these things. This is a brilliant combination indeed!

*********

#12
New Privatization Law's Provisions Summarized 

Rabochaya Tribuna
August 13, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Report by Andrey Tarabrin: "Mass Privatization Turns Into
'Specific' Privatization. Will Abuse Become Less Persistent?"

The new Federal Law "On the Privatization of State Property and on the
Principles of the Privatization of Municipal Property in the Russian
Federation," which came into force 2 August, is designed to help complete
the privatization of remaining state property.
Since most state property has already been privatized, the fundamental
innovation in this document is that it is geared not to mass privatization,
but to "specific" privatization. There will be around 30 such major
"objectives" in the next 18 months, including Domodevovo Air Lines. The
law's main developers -- Academician Pavel Bunich and Aleksandr Braverman,
first deputy chairman of the State Committee for the Management of State
Property -- told journalists about this on the eve of the law's
implementation.
Land is the one thing that is not going to be bought and sold under
the new law. The fact that the law does not extend to the privatization of
land is a concession which the developers had to make to the left-wing
majority in the State Duma in exchange for the adoption of the document. 
However, Bunich noted, really no more than 8 percent of the land, mainly
kolkhoz and individual farm land, is coming out of circulation. Privatized
enterprises have every right to buy up the land which they occupy.
The introduction of what is known as the state "golden share" in
exchange for the previous controlling share -- the special right of the
Russian Federation to participate in the management of joint- stock
companies -- is an innovation.
One way or another, the existence of a new law on privatization,
elaborated in detail, is better than nothing. The document's merits
include the fact that investment auctions and shares-for-loans auctions,
which, as we know, were the seats of numerous cases of abuse, have been
eliminated from it. The protection of domestic producers is also envisaged
in the law.
Assessing the legal document as a whole, P. Bunich described it as
"the best law on privatization in the world." This is a binding statement.
Let us see how true it turns out to be.

*********

#13
Chubays Says No Change to Privatization Policy 

NTV 
August 14, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
>From the "Segodnya" newscast

We have just received the statement First Deputy Prime Minister
Anatoliy Chubays made in the government building, and again, he is talking
about the most topical problems
-- the situation at the State Property Committee, Kokh, and its new
boss.
[Begin Chubays recording] You don't often hear kind words here,
especially about an outgoing senior official, but I think that Kokh
deserves kind words more than anyone else. He has spent a year in one of
the most difficult and thankless posts, but, along with us, and with their
hands on their hearts, as they say, I think that thousands and thousands of
people should be saying thank you to him, thousands of pensioners in
Russia, thousands of servicemen, doctors, teachers, those who were able to
get their wages, wages owed them by law, but which they would not have
received had Alfred Kokh not been involved.
I know that some have wanted to see a certain political motive, but I
can immediately say that whoever thinks that Maksim Boyko represents some
kind of move backward, or a departure from the principles of privatization,
or of the way we manage state property, they are very wrong. Maksim Boyko
is one of the most professional people in this sphere, in which he has not
only worked from the end of 1991, which is when I started working with him,
but which he virtually set up. He is known for his firmness, his
absolutely impartial attitude to any commercial entity. But I think this
will all become clear as soon the next auctions are organized. [end
recording]

********