July 23, 1997   

This Date's Issues:   1075  •1076 •1077  1078

Johnson's Russia List [list two]
#1078
23 July 1997
djohnson@cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Moscow press conference of US Energy Secretary Federico Pena.
(Focused on security of Russian nuclear materials and Caspian oil).
2. Testimony of Under Secretary of State for Economic and Business
Affairs Stuart Eizenstat on Caucasus and Central Asia.
3. Krasnaya Zvezda: RUSSIA'S KEY MILITARY-POLITICAL ARGUMENT 
OF THE 21ST CENTURY. Interview with Col.-Gen. Vladimir YAKOVLEV, 
Commander of the Strategic Missile Force.] 

********

>From United States Information Agency
TRANSCRIPT: PENA PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW JULY 23 
(Signs MPC&A for security of Russian nuclear material) (3180)

Moscow -- U.S. Energy Secretary Federico Pena announced at a press
conference the signing July 23 of the cooperation agreement expanding
the Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program which
significantly increases U.S.-Russian non-proliferation cooperative
efforts.

Pena also discussed the 1998 energy ministerial meeting in Moscow, the
employment options for the Russian scientists and engineers working
with U.S. companies in Russia, and further development of the
important energy resources in Russia.

In discussing the issue of energy development and investment, Pena
said, "The fact is that Russia has vast energy resources, and by many
accounts, international companies are ready to invest $60 billion in
Russia's oil industry, but those investments are awaiting the
development of a stable and transparent legal and regulatory framework
to support them.

"A recent study by the Petroleum Advisory Foundation estimates that
just six large projects will create more than 500,000 Russian jobs and
generate more than $600 billion in wealth for Russia over the life of
these investments. So it is in everyone's interest to see energy
markets develop and open as quickly as possible here in Russia."

Responding to a question as to what role Russia should or should not
play in transporting oil out of the Caspian and Central Asian regions,
Pena said, "We are very hopeful about the extraordinary opportunities
in the Caspian region for the development of oil and gas for the
world. Our philosophy is to encourage all of the countries involved in
the exploration and transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea
to work together.

"So, for example, we support the concept of multiple pipelines and
multiple pipeline routes throughout the region as oil and gas are
extracted from the Caspian region."

Following is a transcript, provided by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, of
Pena's remarks at the July 23 press conference:

(Begin transcript)

SEC. PENA: Before we begin, I would like to take a moment to thank the
people of Russia for giving our United States delegation such a warm
and hospitable welcome here in Moscow. This is my first trip to
Russia, but it certainly will not be my last.

I arrived in Moscow on Sunday with three objectives in mind:

-- First, accelerating efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons and nuclear materials to rogue states and to terrorists;

-- Secondly, beginning the planning process for the energy ministerial
that will be hosted by Russia in 1998; and

-- Third, working to increase international investment in Russia's
energy sector.

In the last three days, I've been to the Kurchatov Institute; I've met
with Chairman of the Government Viktor Chernomyrdin, First Deputy
Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor
Mikhailov, Russian Minister of Natural Resources Viktor Orlov, and
representatives of the Defense Council and several members of the
Duma. And I believe we've made progress on these areas of concern to
both of our nations.

Let me talk about the first objective. Russia and the United States
have the world's largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons and
weapons-grade nuclear material, and we share the belief, formalized
through a number of agreements, that these dangerous weapons and
materials must not fall into the wrong hands.

One important component of our effort is the Materials Protection,
Control and Accounting Program, or, for those who use acronyms, the
MPC&A Program. Under the Materials Protection, Control and Accounting
Program, the Department of Energy laboratories work with the Russian
nuclear labs to develop the security controls that will keep the
nuclear material at Russian facilities secure.

The Russian government has installed sensors, portal monitors, fences,
radiation detectors, and established accounting techniques to secure
nuclear materials that would otherwise, at this critical transition
point in Russia, be at risk.

Today I'm pleased to announce that this cooperative effort is growing.
On Monday Minister Mikhailov and I signed a joint statement to include
a new facility, the Lytkarino Scientific Research Institute for
Equipment, in this effort. Lytkarino is a facility that deals with
sensitive nuclear materials, and its inclusion in the MPC&A security
effort bolsters U.S.-Russian non-proliferation cooperative efforts.

Minister Mikhailov and I also discussed a number of key issues in
anticipation of the upcoming September meeting between Vice President
Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, including the following
subjects:

-- Additional measures to strengthen the MPC&A Program;

-- Cooperation to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium no longer needed
for defense purposes; and

-- Implementation of a tri-national or trilateral initiative among the
United States, Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

This initiative to monitor the storage of weapons-grade nuclear
material not required for military purposes is an important step in
creating an overall system of openness and transparency.

We also discussed moving forward to implement the agreement to stop
production of weapons-grade plutonium at three reactors in Tomsk and
Krasnoyarsk. The energy produced by these reactors is needed to
provide electricity and heat to those cities. Our mutual goal is to
eliminate the production of weapons-grade material by replacing the
cores of the reactors while at the same time meeting the heating and
electricity needs for the two cities.

At the Kurchatov Institute yesterday I signed a joint statement with
Academician Velikhov to expand cooperation on the following areas:
nuclear safety, environmental protection, nuclear technology research
and development, cessation of production of weapons-usable material,
plutonium disposition, non-proliferation, and nuclear materials
protection, control and accounting.

I also met with Russian Navy officers to review our MPC&A Program, and
we agreed to expand it.

In short, we're making progress accelerating efforts to prevent the
spread of dangerous weapons and materials, which is important to both
our countries' national security and to the security of the world. And
we expect to announce additional agreements at the September meeting
of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.

The second goal for my visit to Russia was to begin to lay the
groundwork for the 1998 energy ministerial meeting in Moscow. I
discussed possible agenda topics with the prime minister and with
Minister Nemtsov. I see this meeting, where eight energy ministers
will meet for the first time following the climate change negotiations
in Kyoto, as important both for its timing and its emphasis on the
importance of energy and environmental policy for the world economy.

I'm hopeful that the energy ministerial will discuss the following:

-- The energy market outlook;

-- Capital formation;

-- The policies that would increase interdependence and cooperation,
including transportation issues and interconnection among energy
systems;

-- Post-Kyoto and sustainable development strategies based on the
outcomes of the Kyoto Climate Change Conference;

-- And, finally, we should discuss improving opportunities for energy
investments in Russia.

Minister Nemtsov and I had an excellent discussion, and we will share
our ideas with our counterparts from Japan, England, Italy, France,
Canada and Germany as we work on an agenda and schedule for that
meeting. I'm also pleased that Minister Nemtsov expressed an interest
and willingness to work with us on our proposal to move forward with
an emissions-trading system prior to Kyoto.

There is still a lot of work to do before this can become a reality,
but we agreed to follow up on the discussions we began this week in
order to push this issue forward.

The third purpose of my trip was to address the issue of energy
development and investment. The fact is that Russia has vast energy
resources, and by many accounts, international companies are ready to
invest $60 billion in Russia's oil industry, but those investments are
awaiting the development of a stable and transparent legal and
regulatory framework to support them.

When I met with several members of the Duma, I described how the
United States, like many countries, relies on world capital markets
for investment. Many Russian leaders were surprised to learn that the
largest crude oil producer in the United States is British Petroleum,
that the biggest operator on our offshore Gulf of Mexico is Shell
International, and that Venezuela, through its company Citgo, owns and
operates more gasoline service stations than any other company in the
United States.

A recent study by the Petroleum Advisory Foundation estimates that
just six large projects will create more than 500,000 Russian jobs and
generate more than $600 billion in wealth for Russia over the life of
these investments. So it is in everyone's interest to see energy
markets develop and open as quickly as possible here in Russia.

In my meetings with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, Minister Nemtsov and
Minister Orlov, we discussed production-sharing legislation in
addition to the law on lists.

The Duma took a step in the right direction by passing initial
legislation in late June, and I offered my support and assistance to
Minister Nemtsov on the important effort to help create a stable legal
framework under which new investment can take place, and I have been
invited to speak to other members of the Duma when I return in
September.

I also invited the chairman of the Federal Energy Commission in Russia
and the deputy minister of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, Mr.
Bushuyev, to meet with the United States Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission and other experts on regulation from the Department of
Energy during the week of August the 18th, when they will be in
Washington, D.C.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me conclude my remarks by saying the United
States and Russia have important common interests. The issues in my
portfolio -- energy security and non-proliferation -- are at the heart
of the relationship and dialogue between our two countries. I look
forward to continuing the friendships developed during my time in
Moscow, and I'll be back in September with Vice President Gore.

Thank you very much, and I'll be happy to answer your questions.

Q: (Through interpreter.) Did you discuss with Mikhailov whether the
question of the concern that has been expressed by the workers of
Russian nuclear power plants that things might get out of control,
whether this issue was discussed in any of your meetings?

SEC. PENA: Out of control in what way?

Q: (Through interpreter.) Because of the lack of financing.

SEC. PENA: We have a program which is called the IPP Program, where we
work very closely with Minister Mikhailov in developing other
employment options for the Russian scientists and engineers working
with U.S. companies here in Russia. It is a very successful program,
and today there are several thousand Russian scientists and engineers
who are participating in that program and working in new jobs which
will help them continue to sustain their families. And we are very
hopeful that we can expand that program with support of the United
States Congress.

Q: Mr. Pena, your (own role ?) has strong support of new technologies
and research-and-development programs. Could you mention some new
programs you are going to launch?

SEC. PENA: I am very happy to say that these scientists and engineers
from the laboratories in the United States work frequently with the
scientists and engineers in the laboratories here in Russia. Yesterday
in my meeting with Mr. Velikhov we talked about the mutual work done
between our scientists in many areas, ranging from oil and gas to
plutonium disposition to environmental technologies, and I am
confident there will even be more areas in the future where we'll work
together.

I'm always amazed at how well our scientists work together, and they
have the ability not to worry about any potential political issues
because they are so focused in making the world better for humanity.
And I want to do everything in my power to support their work and to
give them even more encouragement to continue to work together.

Q: I was wondering if you think recent progress is enough to finally
get this mechanism moving on a more than individual, case-by-case
basis? And, if not, what more needs to be done? And specifically in
our talks did you discuss what projects might be added to the next
lists to go through the Duma.

SEC. PENA: We discussed both those subjects, and as I said, we are
pleased with the legislation that is going through the Duma now on
production-sharing agreements, and we are hopeful that additional
enabling legislation that will add more clarity will also be passed.

And I also had an opportunity to discuss the question of the next
lists that we hope will be developed later on this year, and our hope
and expectation that the regions where U.S. companies are involved
will also be included on those lists later on this year.

So I believe we're making progress, because this will be good for the
Russian economy, it will be good for the international companies
involved, it will produce jobs here in Russia, and it will help
further develop the important energy resources in Russia.

Q: Immediately before your visit to Moscow, you stated that nuclear
fissile materials kept in Russia are equal to 48,000 nuclear weapons,
yes? And can you just explain, could you imagine at least one of them
getting in the hands of Abu Nidal or something like -- someone like?
So are you by now sure, 100 percent sure, that each one kilogram of
weapons-grade plutonium and uranium is kept safe and is accounted here
in Russia? Are you sure that each nuclear weapon is safe nowadays in
Russia, in terms of physical security I mean?

SEC. PENA: The Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program we
have had for several years working very closely with the Russian
government has been very successful. I believe we are currently
involved in over 40 sites in Russia, and yesterday we signed an
agreement to include another facility to that list. And I also visited
the Kurchatov Institute, where I saw the multi-layered security system
that is now in place at the institute to protect the material they
have. And we are working very hard with the Russian government to
cover all the remaining facilities as quickly as possible. So we've
made great progress in just a few years.

Q: (Through interpreter.) You said that several thousand Russian
scientists have found new jobs because of this program. Where are
these Russian scientists working? Here in Russia or abroad?

SEC. PENA: They are working here in Russia, and in many cases they are
working with United States companies that have opened up operations
here in Russia and provided jobs that allow them to use their creative
genius and their high scientific skills in areas which may not be
necessarily in the defense area, but they might be in other highly
technical areas where their knowledge and great expertise is very
helpful.

Q: (Through interpreter.) Do you think that the MPC&A system in the
United States precludes, as you said, material falling into the wrong
hands? And do you think it should be -- this type of a system should
be applied in Russia?

SEC. PENA: We work very hard in the United States to have a secure
system in all of our facilities. This is particularly challenging in
those facilities that we are now beginning to close. For example, in
my home state of Colorado, where we have the Rocky Flats facility that
used to make the plutonium triggers, we are now closing that plant,
and it's a challenge to make sure that we have the right security
systems when you are reducing the size of the complex.

But we are confident of our security systems in the United States, and
we are pleased to see that Russia has installed many of these systems
in over 40 locations here in Russia. But it is something that we have
to pay attention to every day in both our countries.

Q: (Through interpreter.) Well, nuclear safety is a very important
issue, of course, but there is such a thing as environmental safety,
and perhaps you have heard of the disaster of the Aral Sea and the
greenhouse gases problem. While you were here, have you had a chance
to see, and what is your opinion of the environmental issue as applied
to Russia?

SEC. PENA: We have discussed how we can work together as we approach
the Kyoto Global Climate Change Conference in December of this year.
As President Clinton said very recently, we want to have realistic,
achievable and flexible targets that the world can agree to in Kyoto.
And while I cannot speak, obviously, for the Russian government, I can
say that we had very constructive discussions on how we can work
together -- the United States and Russia -- on approaches like the
trading credit system, which will be helpful both to Russia and the
United States as we fashion a global climate change treaty in Kyoto.

While we have a lot of work to do, I think we are making progress, and
I hope we can reach agreement on this over the next several months.

Q: (Through interpreter.) Could you name those six possible large
projects that could lead to such enormous economic benefits for
Russia?

SEC. PENA: The six projects are listed in a report that we produced
very recently. I don't have a report -- I don't have a copy of it
here, but I'm sure we can make one available to all of you. You can
get a copy of the report from the Petroleum Advisory Forum here in
Moscow.

Q: Reuters. What are views on the role Russia should or should not
play in transporting oil out of the Caspian and Central Asian regions?

SEC. PENA: We are very hopeful about the extraordinary opportunities
in the Caspian region for the development of oil and gas for the
world. Our philosophy is to encourage all of the countries involved in
the exploration and transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea
to work together.

So, for example, we support the concept of multiple pipelines and
multiple pipeline routes throughout the region as oil and gas are
extracted from the Caspian region. And we have had conversations with
leaders from many of the countries in the Caspian region, and we are
encouraging the United States companies that are involved to also
support the concept of multiple pipelines and regional partnerships.

So we believe that the exploration and the transportation of oil and
gas in the Caspian region will be helpful both to Russia and to the
other countries which are involved today, and we believe this helpful
to the United States because it will diversify the energy supplies
throughout the world, which is consistent with our own energy security
strategy.

I'm going to end my statement at this time. Let me thank the charge,
John Taft, for his strong support. And again I want to thank all the
people in Russia who have been so warm and cordial and have helped
make my trip here very successful. Thank you very much.

*********

>From United States Information Agency
22 July 1997 
TEXT: EIZENSTAT ON CAUCASUS, CENTRAL ASIA AT SENATE HEARING 
(Region is "of growing strategic importance" to U.S.) (1930)

Washington -- The eight countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia
constitute a region that is "of growing strategic importance to the
United States," Under Secretary of State for Economic and Business
Affairs Stuart Eizenstat told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
July 22.

The U.S. policy toward the region, he said, "is to promote sovereign,
prosperous, resilient, democratic states."

Eizenstat outlined the United States' five policy objectives:

-- Supporting these states' efforts to reform their economic and
political systems;

-- Encouraging their rapid integration into international political
and economic institutions;

-- Promoting rapid development of Caspian energy resources, with
robust U.S. commercial participation;

-- Promoting prosperous, cooperative regional relations and the early
resolution of conflicts in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan; and

-- Strengthening the stakes for Russia, Turkey, and other regional
neighbors in cooperating with these sovereign, independent states,
while isolating Iran.

"Our pressing challenge today is to assist these countries in securing
their own independence, stability, prosperity, and cooperation so that
the new millennium will greet nations increasingly able to manage the
multiple challenges of statehood in an increasingly interdependent
world," Eizenstat said.

Following is the text of his statement:

(Note: In the following text, "trillion" equals 1,000,000 million,
"billion" equals 1,000 million.)

(Begin text)

Testimony of Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat
Under Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
2:00 p.m., July 22, 1997

INTRODUCTION:

Senator Smith, Senator Brownback, thank you for holding these hearings
to focus attention on the Caucasus and Central Asia. An historic
upheaval occurred six years ago when twelve states emerged from the
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Much has been said and written
about the largest of these states, Russia, as well as its western
neighbors. Today I welcome the opportunity to focus your attention on
the eight states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, a region which
occupies the important geo-strategic location between Russia, the Near
East, and Asia. This region represents an area of growing strategic
importance to the United States.

Despite its rich historical and cultural diversity, much argues for
dealing with this vast region as a whole. Historically, this area has
been both a cradle of civilization and learning and a transmission
belt to Europe and Asia for scholars, traders, soldiers, and
missionaries. Today the area is viewed as a promising new source of
hydrocarbon resources. The Caspian Sea Basin contains potentially one
of the world's largest oil and gas reserves, perhaps over $4 trillion
in value. This can help reduce U.S. and Western dependence on energy
from the Persian Gulf. The Caucasus/Central Asian region also has
great promise as a trade and transport corridor linking Europe with
Asia. Finally, in one of the great experiments of our time, the region
has become a laboratory for vital economic and political reforms
designed to overcome more than one hundred years of colonial misrule.
Earlier this year the Clinton administration made a policy decision to
further enhance our engagement with the Caucasus and Central Asian
region in recognition of our growing national interests there.

Simply put, our policy is to promote sovereign, prosperous, resilient,
democratic states. In increasingly active exchanges between our
peoples and leaders -- including the recent visits of Kyrgyz President
Akayev and Georgian President Shevardnadze and the upcoming visit of
Azerbaijani President Aliyev -- this is our message. I would like to
outline the five essential elements of our enhanced policy toward the
Caucasus and Central Asia -- a road map for the future -- and discuss
each of them briefly.

OUR FIVE POLICY OBJECTIVES:

-- Vigorous support of these states' efforts to reform their economic
and political systems, develop market economies, pursue
democratization, and respect human rights.

-- Encouragement of their rapid integration into international
political and economic institutions.

-- Promotion of rapid development of Caspian energy resources, with
robust U.S. commercial participation, including supporting
construction of multiple pipelines and the further expansion of the
Eurasian transportation corridor, and the communications,
transportation, and other infrastructure necessary to develop stronger
ties among the countries of the region and between them and the West.

-- Promotion of prosperous, cooperative regional relations and the
early resolution of conflicts in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan
assisted by international mediation.

-- Strengthening the stakes for Russia, Turkey, and other regional
neighbors in cooperating with these sovereign, independent states,
while isolating Iran.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM:

It is one thing to declare adherence to market economics and pluralist
democracy. It is another to make it reality. The task is daunting, but
in varying degrees all eight states have embraced the objective of
forging new institutions modeled on market economics, rule of law, and
democracy.

Initially, most of our assistance was focused on addressing
humanitarian needs, but we are now focusing on developmental
assistance. Our assistance is designed to promote economic reform, for
example, establishing commercial codes and environmental regulations
and advising on legal and regulatory reform.

The struggle to promote political reform, including democratization,
rule of law, and respect for human rights, has been more difficult and
progress overall more limited. Working with such international
organizations as the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe) and UNHCR (U.N. High Commmissioner for Refugees), as well
as NGOs (non-governmental organizations) like the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) and the International Fund for Electoral Systems
(IFES), the United States has consistently urged greater adherence to
democratization and human rights throughout the region.

INTEGRATION:

The United States has been at the vanguard of welcoming these states
into the international community. We have supported their membership
in such organizations as the United Nations, Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and NATO's Partnership for Peace. We
have also promoted close ties with the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund, Council of Europe, European Union, and other
international financial and political institutions. We have encouraged
the Caucasus and Central Asian states to join the World Trade
Organization, and have worked closely with them to address the
structural changes necessary to complete the process.

CASPIAN ENERGY:

The United States supports the rapid development of Caspian energy
reserves to the benefit of both suppliers and consumers, and we
believe foreign investment to be crucial to this development. Rapid
development will require establishment of attractive investment
climates, a Caspian legal regime which clearly defines property rights
over seabed resources, and multiple export routes to carry these
resources to the world market. We are encouraging regional cooperation
on oil production and transport, while emphasizing the importance of
commercial viability and meeting international standards. We support
the development of multiple pipeline routes to transport Caspian
energy resources to world markets.

REGIONAL COOPERATION, STABILITY, AND CONFLICTS:

These states are faced with common challenges, including regional
conflict, smuggling of drugs and nuclear materials, and environmental
disasters. In addition to encouraging rapid integration into
international security structures, we have welcomed steps to promote
regional cooperation as a means of more effectively addressing the
host of problems cutting across national boundaries.

The persistence of several unresolved conflicts also poses a
continuing threat to the stability and security of this region. The
United States, working with the international community, is committed
to playing an active role in the search for balanced and lasting
settlements of these conflicts, many of which reflect the violent
resurfacing of historical animosities suppressed but unresolved during
the Soviet period. We welcomed the June 27 signing of a U.N.-brokered
agreement ending Tajikistan's five-year civil war and are looking at
new ways we can assist the peace process. We are working actively with
the U.N. and OSCE to translate ongoing cease-fires in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia into lasting political settlements. Earlier this year,
we joined Russia and France as co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group
working with the parties to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

NEIGHBORS:

As Senator Brownback noted during his recent visit to Azerbaijan, this
is a "tough neighborhood." In part, he was correctly observing the
challenge to the relatively small countries of the Caucasus and
Central Asia in developing mutually beneficial relations with their
larger neighbors. Senator Brownback, you are to be congratulated for
your initiatives in supporting the economic and political independence
of the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Russia: We are hopeful recent trends in Russian foreign policy reflect
a more realistic attitude toward relations with its southern
neighbors. Reform and prosperity in the Caucasus and Central Asia will
benefit Russia by providing stable, reliable neighbors and offering
new economic opportunities. Our recent enhanced cooperation on
Nagorno-Karabakh and commercial participation by Russian companies in
Caspian oil projects are just two examples of the altered Russian
attitude. We will continue to explore opportunities to work
constructively with Moscow in this region. We do not believe this
region is in any nation's sphere of influence.

Turkey: Enjoying strong cultural and historic ties to the region,
Turkey has pursued close economic and political relations with its
Caucasus and Central Asian neighbors. We have developed a solid
bilateral dialogue with our Turkish allies on the problems of this
region, and will continue our close consultations.

Iran: The United States is watching closely the development of ties
between the region and Iran. While acknowledging that geographic
proximity may make some relations necessary, if not desirable, we
remain highly suspicious of Iran's motives. We have all too much
experience with Iranian support for terrorism, efforts to obtain
weapons by all possible means, and other unacceptable behavior NOT to
be deeply concerned. We have made our concerns known to our friends in
the Caucasus and Central Asia and will continue to do so.

It is essential the United States has a pro-active policy to assure
that the Caucasus and Central Asia remain free of Iranian influence. A
political vacuum would only give Iran the opportunity to fill it. We
must not create this situation. Developing stronger political and
economic ties between these countries of the region will foster
stability and prosperity in the region.

CONCLUSION:

In days gone by, Central Asia and the Caucasus were the subject of a
"Great Game," wherein Russia and Britain vied with one another to
impose their will on weak local regimes. As long as the Caucasus and
Central Asia remain vulnerable to internal instability and ethnic
conflict, the danger of external dominance exists, compounded by the
presence of a militant fundamentalist regime in Iran intent on
destabilizing its neighbors. But another, more promising path beckons,
and the United States can help. Our pressing challenge today is to
assist these countries in securing their own independence, stability,
prosperity, and cooperation so that the new millennium will greet
nations increasingly able to manage the multiple challenges of
statehood in an increasingly interdependent world.

As you know, the administration continues to seek repeal of Section
907 of the Freedom Support Act, which restricts U.S. assistance to
Azerbaijan. Section 907 hinders our ability to act as an unbiased
honest broker in our role as co-chair of the Minsk Group and prohibits
technical assistance to Azerbaijan in support of market reform and
democratization.

We also need to spread the word about our strategic and commercial
interests in these countries. I urge you to follow in the footsteps of
Senator Brownback and Congressman Archer and their colleagues in April
and Senators Gramm, McCain, and Hutchison this August to travel to the
region. We should reinforce these visits with invitations to decision
makers to come to the United States.

Thank you for this opportunity to enunciate our policy in the Caucasus
and Central Asia, and I welcome your questions.

*********

>From RIA Novosti
Krasnaya Zvezda
July 22, 1997
RUSSIA'S KEY MILITARY-POLITICAL ARGUMENT OF THE 21ST CENTURY
Krasnaya Zvezda's Nikolai POROSKOV Interviews Col.-Gen.
Vladimir YAKOVLEV, Commander of the Strategic Missile Force 

Question: A few days ago President Yeltsin signed a decree
on the creation of a new Strategic Missile Force, which will
incorporate the Military Space Command and Missile Space
Defence. Is it expedient?

Answer: This is necessary above all in order to maintain
combat readiness of the armed forces requisite for ensuring
national security, and find the necessary financial, material
and manpower resources for reforming the armed forces. Today
this can be ensured only through inter-arm integration and the
sophistication of weapons against the background of their
reductions.
The new Strategic Missile Force will rally the strategic
deterrence systems (combat missile systems of the Strategic
Missile Force, early warning systems, Missile Space Defence,
and boosters and spacecraft of the Military Space Command),
pool the efforts of designers and producers, and create common
spheres of application of our weapons. 
The merge will reduce the demand for resources and the
range of weapons and hardware, preclude overlapping in research
and design work, and narrow the number of enterprises which
should cooperate by standardising technologies. The latter will
reduce production costs of weapons and hardware by 10-15% by
raising the number of orders given to defence enterprises in
the next 5-7 years. 
One of the aims of the merge is to simplify the command
system and make it more effective.

Question: It has been said more than once that the
ratification of the START-2 Treaty will weaken the Strategic
Missile Force, which is Russia's main military-political
argument today and whose existence alone guarantees the
inviolability of the country. Will you comment, please?

Answer: The arsenals of strategic offensive weapons
created during the decades of the cold war exceeded all
reasonable limits necessary for deterrence and should be
reduced. The improvement of the situation in the world, above
all in Russo-American relations, paved the way to signing
agreements on slashing strategic offensive weapons. 
I think that after the ratification of the START-2 and
possibly a START-3 treaties, outlined in the Helsinki
agreements, the Strategic Missile Force will still play the
crucial role despite reductions. Like today, the Force will
fulfil at least 50% of the combat tasks of the strategic
nuclear forces in the reply strike, and over 90% in the
reply-retaliatory strike. 
Reductions will not just level off the combat capabilities
of the Russian and the US groups of strategic nuclear weapons
in all types of hostilities; they will bring down the general
level of military confrontation. Mutual trust will grow
stronger, and the burden weighing down on the national economy
and taxpayers will become lighter. 
The establishment of a balance of nuclear forces is not
an aim in itself. It is not just an attribute of
Russo-American relations in the framework of the deterrence
concept as it is traditionally interpreted. It is a major
condition for creating a barrier to a resumption of the arms
race and armed confrontation. 
That is why we will unconditionally fulfil all conditions
of the START-1 Treaty and consistently prepare for implementing
the START-2 Treaty, bearing in mind the possibility of the
signing of a START-3 Treaty. 

Question: How do you assess nuclear disarmament prospects?

Answer: Anti-nuclear sentiments were so strong in the
second half of the 1980s that prominent scientists and public
figures raised the question of the expediency of preserving
nuclear weapons. Regrettably, it is impossible to get rid of
all nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. The world has
not become a safer place to live; old threats have been
replaced with new ones, above all regional conflicts and
crises. As long as they exist, there will be no alternative to
nuclear weapons. The liquidation of nuclear weapons should be
linked not to the catastrophic consequences of their use, but
to the liquidation of prerequisites for the settlement of
international contradictions with the use of military force. 
Every new conventional war resulted in a 3-5 increase in
the number of casualties. This scheme of calculating potential
casualties prompts that losses in a hypothetical third world
war, even if a conventional one, will amount to at least 200
million human lives. And I mean only a limited number of states
in Europe, Asia and North America. It was largely thanks to the
existence of nuclear weapons that a world war was not
unleashed. That is why nuclear states still have a concept of
nuclear deterrence. 
I think that the nuclear status of the Russian Federation
should be maintained as long as there is a threat of the
proliferation of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons.
Reliance on nuclear deterrence in an unfavourable economic
situation will guarantee a requisite balance of forces and a
margin of time needed to reform and improve the national armed
forces. 

Question: The advancement of NATO towards Russia's borders
can create a threat to some facilities of the Strategic Missile
Force, in that they will become accessible even to NATO's
tactical aviation. Do you plan additional security measures?

Answer: Even before its enlargement to the east, NATO had
a potential ability to deliver tactical aviation strikes at the
facilities of the Force located in the western and southern-
western regions of the country. That is why routine
preparations of theatres of operation included measures
designed to protect our facilities there. But now that NATO is
moving eastward it will have the ability to use most of its
tactical aircraft to deliver strikes at our facilities. In
addition, they will be able to spend more time in our
deployment areas, which will increase their combat load.
There is no direct threat of this now, but the Strategic
Missile Force is doing research designed to increase the
viability of launching sites and command stations. This is done
as part of the work to ensure high combat readiness and
effectiveness.

Question: It is very difficult to outline the prospects
for the development of weapons. And yet, how is the work on the
Topol-M complex progressing?

Answer: In the past four years we received only a half of
the planned allocations to this project, which slowed down the
work considerably. 
We expect to find several fundamentally new, breakthrough
technological solutions for individual systems and elements.
This concerns above all the Topol-M system. The project has
entered the final stage. The fourth, successful launch was made
on July 8 and I think that we will start mass producing the
system already this year. 

Question: Has the safety of nuclear weapons been affected
by the irregular provision of funds and the fact that warranty
life of some systems is quickly running out? Is the control of
the exploitation of such systems reliable?

Answer: We have changed the procedure for modernising
weapons by gearing it to the task of maintaining the safety of
missile systems. Nuclear safety research and development enjoys
priority financing. 
Documents related to control have been overhauled; we have
compiled lists of the most dangerous operations and
responsibilities of officials, and detailed action plans for
crews in emergency situations. And lastly, a package of
complicated experimental and theoretical safety projects is
being carried out specifically for the Topol-M. 
The system we have now enables us to control the safety of
weapons at all stages of their exploitation. The probability of
the appearance of conditions precipitating emergency situations
has been reduced to a minimum, and there is no possibility of
accidents involving nuclear weapons.

Question: What changes are planned for the new Strategic
Missile Force within the framework of the military reform?

Answer: The changes in the structure of the armed forces
made public by our Supreme Commander-in-Chief are the first
steps of the military reform. We plan to maintain the
deterrence potential, yet create a new, more flexible structure
for the Force. We will do this on the basis of personnel
sufficiency for combat duty, the provision of requisite
logistics, effective combat use of missiles and their safe
exploitation. 

Question: How will the Strategic Missile Force look in the
next century?

Answer: Today we have 756 launchers and 3,535 megatonne-
class warheads, or over 60% of the overall nuclear of warheads
of the national strategic nuclear forces. The prospects for the
development of the strategic nuclear forces have been
determined in the state armaments programme designed until the
year 2005 and approved by the President, the economic
possibilities to implement it and treaties on strategic
offensive weapons.
The Strategic Missile Force is developing in accordance
with the START-1 Treaty, but its development would be more
streamlined within the framework of the START-2 Treaty, which
has not been ratified yet. The ratification would create a
balance of combat abilities of the world's strategic forces
that would be more favourable for Russia. In addition, the
START-2 Treaty will reduce development costs by 1.5-2 times. 
On the other hand, it would not be easy for Russia to
implement the START-2 Treaty in the current economic situation.
That is why a favourable way for establishing a rough nuclear
balance with the USA would be deeper reductions of strategic
offensive weapons, down to 2,000-2,500 warheads, as provided
for in the Helsinki agreements. Given such deep reductions, we
will ensure the maximum value of the retaliation potential of
the strategic nuclear forces. 
This can be explained above all by the growth of the
viability of the strategic nuclear forces owing to the
reduction of the counterforce effects of any potential opponent
on them, and an increase of the nuclear of highly effective
missile systems in the force. That is why I think it would be
expedient and timely to elaborate and sign a START-3 Treaty. 
As for the Strategic Missile Force in the 21st century, it
will be centred on the stationary and mobile Topol-M systems in
any case. The deployment of these systems will create the core
of a group which would remain stable despite any potential
changes in the military-political situation. The group of such
systems will be always kept on combat duty, ready to be used,
and will be highly viable even if the other countries elaborate
better reconnaissance equipment. 
Besides, we expect our forces to have a more reliable
combat control system enabling them to use their combat
potential even in emergency situations. The exploitation of
missile systems will become safer, precluding any hazardous
effects on the environment.

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