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Johnson's Russia List
 

 

July 11, 1997   

This Date's Issues:   1032  • 1033  1034

Johnson's Russia List
#1034
11 July 1997
djohnson@cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Nation magazine: Calvin Trillin, U.S. Policy on NATO Expansion.
2. Dmitry Mikheyev: Imperialism.
3. Reuters: Yeltsin Blames Factory Heads for Wage Delays.
(DJ: Are factory directors wrecking again?)

4. Interfax: Yeltsin Calls For Replacement Of Factory Directors. 
5. Matt Bivens (The St Petersburg Times) passes on article by 
Charles Digges on Yeltsin's fishing vacation.

6. Trud: RUSSIA AND US CAUGHT "WITH THEIR PANTS DOWN."
(Interview with Georgy Arbatov).

7. Paul Goble (RFE/RL): After Madrid.
8. Reuter: Dmitry Solovyov, Russian Cossack revival irks 
Kazakh leaders.

9. AP: Russia Editor Ousted by Businesses.
10. Moskovskiye Novosti: Teachers', Doctors' Wage Protest Movement 
Continues.

11. Zavtra: Army Prying, Yeltsin Depression, Damning Videos Claimed. 
12. MSNBC: Richard Gizbert, Big Trouble for Russia's Famous 
Bolshoi Ballet.
13. Christian Science Monitor: Ira Straus, The Real Problem With 
NATO Expansion.]

*********

#1
The Nation 
July 28, 1997
U.S. Policy on NATO Expansion
By Calvin Trillin

At last a NATO policy
That makes some sense to me:
Reject two former Red-bloc states
But take the other three. 

So why can't NATO take all five,
If three would be all right?

My theory is that NATO needs
Some countries left to fight. 

The cost of soldiers, tanks and planes
Will then seem rather teeny -- a
Mere trifle for protection from
Romania and Slovenia. 

*********

#2
Date: Fri, 11 Jul 1997 09:51:18 -0400
From: Dmitry Mikheyev <dfm@nicom.com>
Subject: Imperialism

Dear David, I would like to thank Dr. Shenfield for very thoughtful
remarks. He asked: “How coercive does the exercise of power have to be
to qualify as imperialism? Does only direct military conquest or
intimidation qualify? [What about] the use of calculated economic
pressure?”
Indeed, this is where a serious discussion should start. Otherwise
cultural, religious or economic expansion, political influence and a
brutal coercion into total submission are all manifestations of
imperialism. Such mixing up can ignite passions and violence, or, at the
least, lead to wrong and costly mistakes, such as NATO enlargement. For
example, last year, Russia exported about $1 billion worth of popular
music to Ukraine. Is this a cultural “imperialism” or a deliberate
strategy of consolidating the sphere of influence? The USA sells
annually about $12 billion worth of TV programs world wide (I think my
numbers are not far off). Some call it cultural imperialism threatening
the very foundations of ancient civilizations and even take arms to
resist it. How do we distinguish between imperialism, economic
neo-imperialism, natural cultural expansion or spiritual influence?
Clearly, the question is about the forms of power used to propagate
one’s influence. I suggest that the power of ideas (spiritual,
religious, scientific), arts (music, movies...) don’t qualify as
imperialistic, while the power of arms does. A fair economic expansion
should not be regarded imperialistic, while economic arms-twisting is,
and so on.
On a sad note: Is it not strange that after all the seminal works of
great minds of political science on the subject of imperialism, we still
have to struggle with definitions?

*********

#3
Reuters
July 11, 1997
Yeltsin Blames Factory Heads for Wage Delays 

MOSCOW -- Russian President Boris Yeltsin blamed incompetent and corrupt
factory directors on Friday for huge delays in wage payments and called on
workers to throw out such bosses. 
Yeltsin, whose new reformist government has promised to pay off public
sector wage arrears by the end of the year, said in a nationwide radio
address that companies owed much more. 
Workers should not be afraid of using newly acquired stakes in their
companies to get rid of bad directors, Yeltsin said. 
"Unfortunately, there are many directors who have adapted to the market
in a crafty way, turning the factory into their own feeding trough," he said. 
"They understand the market as the right to uncontrolled pumping of the
factory's profit into their own fake companies, including those abroad." 
Yeltsin said the state owed only 20 percent of the vast debt to workers. 
"The other 80 percent is owed by the enterprises. For this the directors
are responsible," he said. 
"Behind each director are hundreds, thousands of people -- his workers.
And if he can't do the job, the strength and energy of the whole collective
is wasted," Yeltsin said. 
"And then people don't get paid for half a year. As a result the workers
and their families suffer. And we have more than enough of such directors
today, unfortunately." 
On Tuesday, Yeltsin, who had earlier promised to pay the state's debts
to public sector workers by Oct. 1, appeared to acknowledge that finding
the funds would not be as easy as he first thought. 
He signed a decree saying wage arrears to the armed forces should be
paid in two months, but that a deadline for clearing the backlog to other
employees on the state payroll would be moved back to Jan. 1, 1998. 
In his radio address, Yeltsin did not dwell on the government's debt,
but instead targeted factory directors who enriched themselves at the
workers' expense. 
"We need a more decisive renewal of the directors," he said, adding that
it did not matter what political hue they were. "Stockholders must remember
that the director is not the owner of an enterprise, but a hired worker." 
Yeltsin said workers should not fear the bankruptcy of their enterprises. 
"Bankruptcy is not the death of the enterprise," he said. "Above all it
is the mechanism for changing unfit leadership." 
There were organizations to deal with such enterprises, he said. "They
have threatening names, but they have yet to become a threat to directors,"
said Yeltsin, referring to the fact that very few enterprises had been
declared officially bankrupt. 
Yeltsin said he had ordered First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov to
prepare a state program over the next two weeks for the training of young,
talented people, who would also be sent on internships abroad. 
"Each year we will prepare 5,000 top and senior managers and
25,000-30,000 middle managers," he said. 

*********

#4
Yeltsin Calls For Replacement Of Factory Directors
MOSCOW, July 11 (Interfax) - Russian President Boris Yeltsin Friday called
for a serious shake-out of Russian factory directors. 
Unfortunately, quite a few of them cannot do their job properly, he said
in his regular radio address. 
"If a director is inefficient, this affects hundreds or thousands of
people, workers and their families. The factory produces nothing or what
nobody is going to buy. Then wages are not paid," Yeltsin said. 
"Initially, the politics of directors were all-important for us.
Directors who were quite useless as managers were allowed to stay provided
they shouted 'Down with the Communist Party,'" for they were 'our people.'
But now the state does not care for their political beliefs. The director
can be red or even pink, so long as he is doing his job. If the factory
pays taxes and wages, the state will not quarrel with him," he said. 
If the factories are idling and there is no money to pay wages and taxes,
"such a director should be kicked out," Yeltsin said. 
People are hard hit by months-long wage delays, he admitted. "Yes, the
state owes money to public employees. We have discussed this problem and we
will solve it. But this is only 20%. The factories owe the remaining 80%
and the directors must be answerable for this," Yeltsin said. On numerous
occasions this is the result of their inability or unwillingness to operate
in the new environment, he said. 
Yeltsin said he gave First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov two weeks
to draft a state program of personnel training. 
"We will select the most talented young people for training in America,
Britain, France, Germany, Japan and Italy," he said. 
"Professional, vigorous, bold managers are our national wealth," Yeltsin
said. 
One such man is Ilya Klebanov, the director of the St. Petersburg-based
LOMO opto-mechanical plant that used to manufacture defense products and is
now making high quality and cheap medical equipment for sale to Russian and
foreign hospitals, he said. 
"Such powerful and talented directors do exist. True, they are not the
decisive force in our economy. But they will be when they number in the
thousands and tens of thousands," Yeltsin said. 

*********

#5
Date: Fri, 11 Jul 1997 18:11:12 +0300
From: matt Matt Bivens <matt@times.spb.ru>
Organization: The St Petersburg Times

David,
Normally I'd wait to see whether you'd pick an article up off of our web
site, but this one by reporter Charles Digges I was sure you'd not want
to miss. You should also check out Charles' article from Medvezhyegorsk
about the mass graves site there. 
Cheers,
Matt Bivens
Editor
The St. Petersburg Times [DJ: July 14th issue?]

-------

By Charles Digges
STAFF WRITER

PETROZAVODSK, Northwest Russia. When President Boris Yeltsin arrived in
a Karelian lakeside village for his two-month fishing vacation, he
brought with him his wife, his daughter and about 10,000 fish.
Yeltsin arrived Monday for a working vacation at the lakeside town of
Shuy, on Lake Uksheozero, about 30 kilometers north of the Petrozavodsk.
Russian media have billed the trip as a dual working-fishing vacation,
and although Yeltsin was never known before as a big fisher, he has been
doing spectacularly well apparently thanks to the Karelian Commission
on Fisheries, which hurriedly stocked Lake Uksheozero with several
thousand fish. 
"We were told by the [Petrozavodsk] city administration to make sure
[Yeltsin] had a good time, and that's what we're doing," said a
commissioner with the Karelian Commission on Fisheries in a telephone
interview Monday. "There are probably an extra 10,000 fish that were
specially stocked for the president." 
The commissioner added that Yeltsin will have little competition for
nibbles since the lake which is one of the most popular fishing holes
in lake-dotted Karelia's Petrozavodsk region will be closed to other
fishermen during the president's stay. 
Yeltsin has indeed been enjoying presidential luck, according to fish
stories in the local and international press. 
On Tuesday, Yeltsin's wife said the president caught 20 fish on Monday,
Reuters reported. Then on Wednesday, the Petrozavodsk daily newspaper
Severny Kurier citing "sources on the presidential security team who
requested anonymity" reported Yeltsin caught another 30. 
"According to die-hard fishermen, that is probably a record for
Uksheozero," the paper wrote. 
Sergei Kulikayev, the reporter from Severny Kuryer assigned to cover the
Yeltsin visit, however, complained that the angler's angle was the only
one local journalists were allowed to find. 
"The only reporters allowed near him are from Interfax and RTR
Television we have to rely on what they say," he fumed.
"All we can talk about is the same old stuff you talked about in the old
days what the president is wearing, how nice the weather was when he
arrived, and then its his motorcade with 20 or more cars blocking the
streets for hours." 
Severny Kuryer ran what was supposedly a photo of Yeltsin's fishing boat
on Lake Uksheozero, which would have been invisible were it not for an
enormous superimposed arrow indicating the boat's position on a gray
horizon. 
The photo was accompanied by a first-person account of how the paper's
photographer got the photo.
"Since no other boats are allowed out, our photographer could pick out
the one boat on the lake that must have been the president's," the paper
wrote. 
"We had time to snap off one photo before a lieutenant not at all
noticed by us before put his hand on our shoulders and smiled. He
offered us mineral water and sent us on our way." 
With a population of 250,000, Petrozavodsk is the largest city in
sparsely populated Karelia, and so locals are used to feeling like big
cosmopolitan fish in a small provincial pond.
But the arrival Monday of Yeltsin or of "the tsar," as some locals
not-so-affectionately put it city residents feel more like fish out of
water, as they complain about "snobby" out-of-town journalists, fancy
black limousines and traffic jams. 
"We haven't seen a thing but a lot of black cars rolling around,"
bitterly complained Yana Alekseyeva, who runs a food kiosk near the
Petrozavodsk train station.
"People like you, with cameras and notebooks, from the big city keep
asking us about [Yeltsin] as if we should be charmed the president would
come here you know, we were here before "the tsar' came."
And it is bound to get worse for the locals, as the Kremlin press
service says Saturday and Sunday Yeltsin is expected to host Finnish
President Martti Ahtisaari.
"Current international issues and bilateral ties will be discussed," the
Kremlin press service said.
Tuesday Yeltsin hosted First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov. "He
feels well," Nemtsov said later of Yeltsin. "All day we worked together
and everything was fine."
Yeltsin's wife, Naina, was quoted by Itar-Tass as saying the president
was pleased with his vacation, although she has forbidden him so far to
play tennis his favorite game before heart bypass surgery last year.

********

#6
>From RIA Novosti
Trud
July 11, 1997

RUSSIA AND US CAUGHT "WITH THEIR PANTS DOWN"

At their Madrid summit, the NATO leaders agreed, 
as was to be expected, to admit Hungary, Poland and 
the Czech Republic to the bloc. Academician Georgy 
ARBATOV, director honoris of the Institute of USA and 
Canada, comments on the summit results in an interview
he granted to Alexander YERASTOV.

Arbatov: The NATO enlargement is a serious mistake made by
the USA and some of their most influential allies. What
happened? With the disappearance of an opponent, the bloc lost
its "raison d'etre," that is the reason for its existence. I
believe that NATO should have been transformed or dissolved
without losing face, or they should have openly said that NATO
would be preserved as long as there is no stability in Russia. 
In general, I think that neither we, nor the Americans
were ready for the end of the cold war. There is an expression
in America, "to be caught with one's pants down." Well, the end
of the cold war caught both us and the Americans with our pants
down. Neither side had a substantiated long-term foreign policy
for this case. It is true that Bush said something about a new
world order, and Gorbachev mentioned the new political
thinking. But these were abstract words which were not
translated into reality. Next we asked admission to NATO, then
gave the green light to the admission of East European
countries. We told Walesa, "OK, join NATO." It was a period of
great illusions.
Instead, we should have used our influence to launch
serious negotiations on a new system of European and global
security after the end of the cold war. We did not do this, and
neither did the Americans. But they were in no hurry; it was
not their Warsaw Pact that fell apart, but ours.
On the other hand, the USA should have thought about
creating a security system too, which, I admit, could have
incorporated certain NATO elements, because the bloc has the
best organisation network compared to all other such
structures.
Question: The Madrid summit was labelled historical
shortly before its opening, as it made the decision on the NATO
enlargement. Why do you think Washington was working for this
so persistently, although many influential people in the USA
protested against the admission of new members?
Arbatov: Indeed, there are quite a few dissatisfied people
in the USA. Why do we need the alliance if it costs the USA so
much? they ask. Against whom is it directed? What is its
function? European security? Not at all, for NATO was not
established for this. They decided to admit three countries,
and next in line are Romania and Slovenia. And then they will
find new aspirants. Where will they stop? And what will stop
them? On the other hand, the Americans have a "justification":
these countries wanted and still want to join NATO. But why do
they want it?
Question: Why, indeed?
Arbatov: This is a question which we should ponder. First,
they simply want to join all Western structures and become
full- fledged Europeans. This is their vanity, so to speak. The
second reason is instability in Russia, a weak economy and a
weak leadership. And then, peculiar statements are made... Now
Zhirinovsky promises to create a Warsaw Province, now others
keep harping about Sevastopol and the Crimea, which is only
pushing Ukraine towards NATO. And when Ukraine signed a charter
on special relations with NATO in Madrid, we were outraged.
Why? 
We should be outraged at ourselves. Our relations with
Ukraine should be more important for us than relations with the
USA. If Ukraine moves away from us and becomes our potential
opponent, Russia will really turn into a second-class power.
Meanwhile, we are playing into the hands of Bendera followers
and extreme nationalists, who are becoming more active, and put
into a difficult situation those moderate politicians who
understand that Ukraine's future is in good relations with
Russia.
Question: Let's get back to the Madrid summit. Why did the
USA disregard the opinion of the other bloc members and the
summit was held by the US scenario? I mean, only three
countries have been invited to join NATO, although France spoke
up for Romania, and Italy supported Slovenia.
Arbatov: The USA bears the bulk of responsibility for the
admission of new members, as this entails major outlays.
Washington's voice is louder than the voice of France, which
still has not decided whether it wants to rejoin the NATO
military organisation or not. And then, if Romania and Slovenia
were invited, why not invite Bulgaria and Slovakia? By the way,
if NATO enlarges too much, this might become its undoing. I
think that such expensive organisation cannot exist forever.
Unless we help it.
Question: What foreign policy should Russia pursue now?
Arbatov: Russia should work, and its leadership should
work. The quicker we restore order at home, the quicker the
NATO eastward enlargement will stop and it will start shrinking
towards the West. 

*********

#7
NATO: Analysis From Washington -- After Madrid
By Paul Goble
Washington, 10 July 1997 (RFE/RL) - NATO's decision at Madrid to invite 
three former Soviet bloc states to join its ranks seems certain to spark 
rather than still public debate about the role and even nature of the 
alliance in post-Cold War Europe. 
And that debate is likely to exacerbate differences among its 16 current 
members, to transform NATO into something very different from what it is 
today, and to make it less likely that the alliance will meet its public 
commitment to future rounds of expansion. 
There are three reasons for this conclusion. Each is rooted in the fact 
that NATO decided to include new members before its members had agreed 
on the nature of an alliance created to combat a threat that no longer 
exists - or at least no longer exists in the same form. 
First, there will now be 16 debates rather than one. If the alliance is 
to expand, each of the current 16 member states must ratify a treaty 
with each of the three countries that have been invited to join. 
In the absence of agreement among its current members on what the 
alliance should do in the future, these national ratification debates 
are likely to highlight the differences among the members rather than 
the points of agreement. 
Turkey, for example, wants NATO to be more deeply involved in the 
Balkans than many other alliance members. France wants greater 
representation in senior NATO councils. 
And Germany is increasingly at odds with other NATO countries about 
relations within Europe and between Europe and the United States. 
All these and many other points of disagreement will be aired by both 
opponents and supporters of NATO expansion. 
Second, these debates are now far more likely to focus on the costs of 
expansion than on its benefits. 
Just like individuals, countries are likely to weigh the costs of any 
action against its benefits when they agree on the purpose of the 
action. But when they do not agree, they are likely to consider only the 
costs. 
Such a focus on the costs of expansion is already dominating much of the 
debate in the United States and will certainly affect discussions in 
other countries as well. 
That will certainly make ratification of expansion more difficult. But 
it will also weaken the commitment of current members to the institution 
and the faith those, who hope to be taken in, may have in the alliance's 
commitments. 
And third, the Russians are likely to play a larger role than many now 
expect both in the individual national debates and in the new 
NATO-Russia forum created last May. 
In a variety of NATO countries, Russian diplomats and spokesmen have 
argued that there is now no need for the expansion of the alliance, that 
its costs are too high, and that the expansion of NATO is part of an 
American plan to dominate Europe. 
While none of these suggestions is without an obvious answer, each has 
found a sympathetic response among those who want to believe that there 
are now no serious challenges to European security. 
And Russian diplomats in both Madrid and Moscow publicly indicated that 
they plan to continue to raise these points as the debates on expansion 
and on the future of the alliance proceed. 
But even more, the Founding Act creating a new Russia-NATO council 
creates both expectations and opportunities for Moscow to intervene in 
alliance affairs. 
While it is true that this new relationship does not give Moscow the 
veto over alliance actions, it does create both expectations that the 
West will take Russia's positions into account and a forum in which 
Russia can press its case. 
Russian officials this week indicated that they will do just that, 
pointedly noting that Moscow will have a seat at NATO's table long 
before any of the three countries invited to join the alliance this week 
do. 
In the absence of agreement among the current members over just what 
NATO should now be doing, such Russian participation in Brussels is 
likely to have a profound impact on the shape of the alliance in the 
future. 
And as a result, the "new" NATO so often advertised at Madrid may soon 
become a very different organization, not so much because its members 
decided to change the organization but rather because they decided to 
expand the alliance before doing so.

*********

#8
Russian Cossack revivial irks Kazakh leaders
By Dmitry Solovyov 
KOSTANAI, Kazakhstan, July 11 (Reuter) - Things are stirring in this
far-flung corner of Kazakhstan, where a revival of tsarist-era Cossacks has
emboldened ethnic Russian nationalists but irritated Kazakh leaders -- from
the president down. 
``The problem of Cossacks is very dangerous for relations between Kazakhstan
and Russia,'' Kazakh President Nursulatan Nazarbayev recently told a group of
visiting Russian editors. 
Cossacks were a privileged warrior class of ethnic Russians in tsarist
Russia
and were used to guard and extend the empire's borders -- often ruthlessly. 
The communists persecuted the Cossacks with similar vigour after the 1917
Bolshevik revolution. 
But the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 prompted a revival,
including in
Kostanai, a regional centre near the Russian border, some 2,000 km (1,250
miles) north of the capital Almaty. Nazarbayev says he shares with other
Kazakhs the bitter memory of Cossack colonisation. 
``The Kazakhs...remember too well what Cossacks meant for Kazakhstan,'' he
said. ``They colonised the region with sword and fire. They were allowed to
drive Kazakhs from fertile lands into arid steppe. My ancestors were among
those Kazakhs.'' 
But now, in what could be isolated incidents or a concerted but unofficial
backlash, Cossacks have started to feel the heat. 

COSSACKS SEEN AS ANTI-KAZAKH HORNET'S NEST 

On the outskirts of Kostanai, self-styled Cossack leader Vladimir Fadeyev
grimly observed the debris of broken safes and furniture in his office,
ransacked despite being inside a Russian air force base. 
``We are being shown we are not welcome,'' he said. ``Local authorities see
us as a hornet's nest and an anti-Kazakh organisation.'' 
Recently, authorities forced his organisation -- Zashchita (Defence) -- to
leave its office in central Kostanai. 
Zashchita, registered as a commercial firm but spending its profits to back
Russian nationalism in the region, is now in the air force base. Two-thirds
of the population in the region are Slavs. 
``We try to revive the culture of Cossacks in the region and help local
Russians withstand ethnic discrimination,'' Fadeyev said. ``If you want my
personal view, northern Kazakhstan, including Kostanai, is Russian land.'' 
Fadeyev said he felt safer and more welcome inside the Russian base, despite
the break-in from outside of the camp. There are several Russian bases in
Kazakhstan under a collective security deal reached by the Commonwealth of
Independent States linking 12 of the 15 former Soviet republics. 
``Russian officers help us revive our traditions and defend our dignity,''
Fadeyev said proudly, pointing at a pile of used great coats, military
trousers and worn-out peaked caps. 
The kit donated by the Russian military is turned -- with the help of new
badges, shoulder tabs and cockades -- into a weird copy of old Cossack
uniforms worn in tsarist times. 
``I put on my uniform when we go to Cossack festivals in Russia. You can be
beaten wearing it here,'' he said. 

``NEW COSSACKS'' MEAN OLD TROUBLES FOR KAZAKHS 

The revival of Cossacks clearly annoys the leadership of Kazakhstan, a
Central Asian state five times the size of France but with a population of
just 16.7 million people. 
Cossacks colonised Kazakhstan's vast steppelands in the last century, moving
the borders of the empire and killing those opposed to the rule of Russian
tsars. 
While Kazakhstan seeks stable and friendly ties with its northern neighbour
Russia, Kazakh leaders are determined not to allow the revival to assume the
scale it has in Russia. 
Russia's recent decision to employ unarmed Cossack units to help guard more
than 7,000 km (4,375 miles) of its border with Kazakhstan has also sparked a
sharply negative reaction. 
``Now those highwaymen stand on the border and ransack the bags of grandmas
going to Russia to see their relatives,'' Nazarbayev thundered. ``Who needs
these Cossacks and this history? We should remember the history which unites
us.'' 

NOT ALL RUSSIANS WANT PROTECTION 

Ethnic Kazakhs account only for 51 percent of Kazakhstan's population and
for
a third or slightly more in northern regions. 
Yet many Russians say they feel uncomfortable because of an increase in
broadcasting in Kazakh and because their children have to study the language
at school. 
``To a certain extent, we help lessen this psychological tension. We help
Russians to get Russian citizenship and work in Russia,'' said Fadeyev,
himself a Russian citizen. 
Many Russians in Kostanai appear to know about the existence of Zashchita,
yet not all of them rush to be protected by it. 
``It is a bit unusual to hear more Kazakh in everyday life. It is also
difficult to find good work. But who is waiting for me in Russia, which
itself has big problems?'' said Yuri, a 35-year-old driver. Others gave less
practical reasons. 
``We were all taught in the former Soviet Union to respect all
nationalities.
I do not believe people like Fadeyev,'' said Valentina, a retired nurse.
``They push us toward something bad.'' 

BREAD MORE IMPORTANT THAN LAND 

In Troitsk, an ancient Cossack town 180 km (113 miles) north of Kostanai,
people seem more preoccupied with how to earn their daily bread than how to
annex Kazakh lands. 
``One may dream of grabbing northern Kazakhstan but we should deal with the
reality,'' said Boris Anokhin, ataman, or head, of the Troitsk Cossacks. ``We
want to revive the culture and traditions of Cossacks but do not want others'
lands.'' 
Rising crime in his once quiet town and the ``moral leprosy'' of the younger
generation are much more important than territorial claims on Kazakhstan,
Anokhin said. 
``Kazakh problems do not worry me at all,'' he said. ``I am much more
worried
by outrageous stealing in neighbouring villages, where you can't even leave a
cow in the street.'' 

**********

#9
Russia Editor Ousted by Businesses
July 10, 1997
MOSCOW (AP) - It was an epic battle, pitting the forces of press freedom
against the forces of greed. The press lost. 
That, at least, is how Igor Golembiovsky, editor of Izvestia, characterizes
his fight against the mighty businessmen he once thought would save his
newspaper, one of Russia's most influential and respected. 
Now, Golembiovsky is about to be the former editor of Izvestia. 
Golembiovsky said at a news conference Thursday that his defeat is a sign
that press freedoms in post-Soviet Russia are threatened by corporate moguls
with powerful ties to the government. 
``The media's duty is to protect society from the government,'' he said.
``Now there is a trend for the media to protect the government from
society.'' 
The Izvestia ownership battle that led to his decision to resign has been
the
most visible conflict as Russian tycoons have moved to take over media
outlets to increase their political clout. 
``We have come back to the past in terms of relations between the
authorities
and the media,'' Oleg Poptsov, the former chief of Russian state television
and radio, wrote in Thursday's issue of the weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta.
``The Communist Party's will has been replaced with that of a publisher or a
network owner.'' 
Izvestia - once the official organ of the Soviet government, now a liberal
daily faced with plummeting circulation and revenues - decided last year to
seek a corporate sponsor in order to survive. Golembiovsky offered Lukoil,
Russia's biggest oil company, a stake in the newspaper. He made
non-interference in editorial policy a condition for the deal. 
But conflict erupted in March after Izvestia reprinted an article from the
French newspaper Le Monde alleging that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin
has accumulated a multibillion-dollar fortune in office. 
Le Monde retracted the story and Izvestia expressed regret for printing it.
But Lukoil - said to have close ties to the premier - accused the newspaper
of scandal-mongering and moved to seize full control over Izvestia and oust
its editor. 
Litigation followed and Golembiovsky turned to Uneximbank, one of Russia's
largest commercial banks with strong government connections, with an offer to
buy part of the paper's stock to prevent a complete takeover by Lukoil. 
Izvestia celebrated victory, but within weeks Uneximbank changed sides,
joining efforts with Lukoil to oust the editor. 
``Izvestia has found itself defenseless before the new owners,''
Golembiovsky
said. 
A Soviet-era law that protects the media from political pressure helped
Izvestia withstand an attack from the old hard-line Russian parliament, which
tried to take control of the daily in the early 1990s. Golembiovsky described
that victory as the newspaper's greatest achievement. 
But Izvestia was clearly unprepared for a fight with Russia's new business
leaders, taking their promises at face value and failing to put agreements on
paper. 
He linked the takeover of Izvestia to preparation for the presidential
elections in 2000. Last year, Russian television networks and newspapers,
including Izvestia, campaigned openly for Boris Yeltsin's re-election. 
``Yeltsin's re-election in 1996 showed the power of the media,''
Golembiovsky
said, adding business leaders are seeking to exert more influence over the
media as the election approaches. 

********

#10
Teachers', Doctors' Wage Protest Movement Continues 

Moskovskiye Novosti, No. 26
June 29-July 6, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Tatyana Skorobogatko: "Abandoned 'Budget Dependents'"

The total state debt in wages owed to teachers and doctors
significantly exceeds pension debts, which the government recently reported
had been cleared.
Russian teachers left for their vacation not having received 9.806
trillion rubles of their wages. Subsidies sent by the Finance Ministry to
the regions for the payment of teachers' "vacation pay" compensated for
only a fourth of the debts.
Financial injections from the [federal] center will probably allow
teachers to survive the summer. And so, in the struggle for the allocation
of these crumbs, there is no room for any feeling of professional
solidarity. Recently Vladivostok teachers protested because the Maritime
Kray authorities, having received subsidies from Moscow, sent them to the
rayons, leaving nothing for the capital of the kray. In other areas the
situation is no less strained. Teachers have been underpaid by far more
than in Maritime Kray (where the debt is 219 billion rubles) in Irkutsk
Oblast (653 billion), Krasnoyarsk Kray (536 billion), Kemerovo Oblast (490
billion), Chita Oblast (490 billion), Arkhangelsk Oblast (289 billion), and
other oblasts. By hastily settling accounts with teachers before the
vacation, local authorities have "squeezed" the doctors even more --
although their position is just as catastrophic.
In Kemerovo Oblast the medics are preparing to take part in the
Kuzbass-wide political strike. But, on the whole, doctors' and teachers'
strikes have not yet reached massive proportions. The former are still
held back by the Hippocratic oath and the latter by a feeling of
responsibility for the fate of their pupils. [passage omitted citing
specific examples of protest]
...On Sakhalin Island, in the Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinskiy central rayon
hospital, the majority of workers stopped the week-long hunger strike when
they received their December-January salary. However, 14 medics continued
to refuse to take food, demanding a full clearing of debts. In telegrams
sent to Moscow, the hospital management is no longer asking for money --
just for the medicines needed to treat complications following lengthy
hunger strikes....
This sad list could go on and on.
The federal center does not even promise to fully settle accounts with
the doctors and teachers -- the overwhelming majority of schools and
hospitals must be financed from local budgets, which are empty as a rule,
as enterprises which stand idle do not pay taxes. And the starving members
of what were once the two most prestigious professions in Russia, refusing
to go into the subtleties of inter- budget relations, more and more often
demand the resignation of everyone at once: rayon chiefs, oblast leaders,
the government, and the president.

***********

#11
Army Prying, Yeltsin Depression, Damning Videos Claimed 

Zavtra, No. 26
July 4, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
"Roundup" column of "Den Security Service Agents' Dispatches"

[passage omitted] An FSB [Federal Security Service] source reports: 
General Rokhlin's "Appeal" has gained wide circulation in military units
and garrisons, which aroused acute anxiety among the authorities and
intensified the activity of military counterintelligence aimed at exposing
informal political cells and organizations among the troops, particularly
in units of marines and army special forces....
It is reported from Kremlin analytical circles: The defeat in Denver,
where Yeltsin did not succeed in becoming a full member of the G-8, was a
sharp blow to the latter's physical and psychological well-being. 
Unreasonable fits of temper have given way to a deep depression, which
forced the "propaganda headquarters" to forbid the the Denver meeting being
interpreted as a failure on television and appeal to correspondents to talk
about the meeting of the G-8 exclusively in optimistic tones....
According to sources in criminal circles there is a special collection
of video cassettes like the one which put an end to Justice Minister
Kovalev's career. This "collection," painstakingly put together over
several years, is at the immediate disposal of three or four criminal
groups and contains compromising video material on many prominent active
bureaucrats and politicians, as well as those who have faded from the
limelight, including women from the "democratic camp." It is thought that
the said video collection serves as an effective tool in administrative,
political, and financial procedures, turning them towards the criminal
world.... [passage omitted]

*********

#12
MSNBC
http://www.msnbc.com
Moscow, Russia
Big Trouble for Russia's Famous Bolshoi Ballet
By Richard Gizbert, ABCNEWS Correspondent

Bolshoi is one of the most famous words in the world of ballet. It 
evokes images of grace, beauty and power. It brings to mind names like 
Godunov, Kozlov, Plisetskaya, the best of Russian ballet. 
     People who don’t speak Russian tend to be surprised to learn the 
Bolshoi doesn’t take its name from a famous Russian, the way the Kirov 
Ballet of St. Petersburg did. Bolshoi is simply the Russian word for 
“big.” The Big Ballet. Now, we are told, one of Russia’s most famous 
ballet theaters is in bolshoi trouble. The white-columned facade of the 
Bolshoi Theater in Moscow is one of the most recognized in the world 
(PNI Photo) 
The Bottom Line 
Like most Russian institutions now under threat, the issue is money.
     “Where are we going to get the money? If we don’t [get it] we just 
won’t be able to open next season. We just don’t have the money for new 
productions.”
     Those are the words of Vladimir Vasiliev, the Bolshoi’s artistic 
director. He issued the warning as the curtain came down on the ballet’s 
1996-97 season.
     Sitting in front of the 221-year-old theater, with its columned 
facade of a light and subtle pink, it’s hard to understand the problem. 
Every few seconds, a symbol of the New Russia, a Mercedes 600 with 
tinted windows, or a 7 series BMW, glides by. But the money that’s 
buying and fueling the limos hasn’t helped the Bolshoi. 

No New Money For Old Art 
The New Russians, the euphemism of choice when Moscovites discuss the 
new class of wealthy Russians, don’t care much for the country’s 
artistic traditions. A few buy season’s tickets for a box, but they seem 
more interested in it as a status symbol than in what’s on the stage 
below. They horrify ballet aficionados by boorishly drinking beer or 
champagne during the performance.
     Inside the Bolshoi, gilded balconies overlook the orchestra (PNI 
Photo) Whatever new money is out there hasn’t yet trickled down to the 
ordinary ballet goer. Maybe it never will. The box office sells tickets 
for a couple of bucks and the Bolshoi is reluctant to jack up prices. 
Scalpers, another reality of the New Russia, are not. They gouge 
tourists looking for last minute tickets, but the theater doesn’t see 
the money.
     Costs have skyrocketed (staging a new production sets the company 
back between $500,000 to $1,000,000). But the market isn’t able to 
provide a proportional return. The government’s $12 million annual 
subsidy barely covers wages and can’t stop the exodus of top dancers out 
of the country. 

Is Freedom Part Of The Problem? 
Critics say Vasiliev, the artistic director, is part of the problem. 
They say his policy of staging modern interpretations of classics such 
as Swan Lake, Giselle and Romeo and Juliet betrays the Bolshoi’s 
history, tarnishes its reputation, and makes the Bolshoi less marketable 
as a touring company. Leave the modern interpretations to the upstarts, 
they argue. Nobody, the saying goes, should touch up the Mona Lisa.
     Maya Plisetskaya, shown here dancing with Boris Yefimon, has seen 
many changes within the Bolshoi (PNI Photo) But to the untrained 
observer, the outsider, the Bolshoi’s crisis seems symptomatic of what 
most of the country is enduring in 1997.
     Maya Plisetskaya, Russia’s best known ballerina, has danced for 
Stalin, Brezhnev and Yeltsin. She has said the Bolshoi was like the old 
Soviet Union, held together by intimidation and fear. The dancers 
weren’t treated well, their freedom limited to prevent defections to the 
west.
     Those days are gone. Let’s hope the Bolshoi can thrive in the New 
Russia, not become one of its countless casualties. 

*********

#13
Christian Science Monitor
July 11, 1997 
[for personal use only]
The Real Problem With NATO Expansion 
By Ira Straus 
Ira Straus is US coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and 
Russia in NATO.

One would think NATO would be celebrating. It won the cold war, and now 
it's inviting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join. But NATO 
is badly divided. President Clinton is laying down the law. He is 
casting a veto against the majority in NATO, which wants still more new 
members.
Sandy Berger, the national security adviser, explained on July 2 that 
the reason for keeping out any more countries is because "there's no 
exit door from NATO." Once they're in, we're stuck with them, no matter 
how much trouble they make. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott 
inadvertently added the reason why they would be able to make trouble: 
because decisions in NATO aren't made by a majority vote but by 
"consensus."
That was a polite way of saying that the US was vetoing the majority - 
something that has already brought a lot of resentment. "Blackmail" and 
"the tyranny of the minority" are other descriptions that have been used 
for the veto procedure. It is easy to see the dangers of giving this 
power of veto to an unreliable country. Thus it follows that only the 
reliable ones can be let into NATO - although there is the slight 
logical problem that all countries are inherently unreliable and 
susceptible to abusing the veto.
Legally, it is not true that there is a right of veto in NATO. But, in 
practice, members are allowed the privilege of vetoing NATO decisions. 
And Mr. Berger is right that there is no way to expel a member. Even if 
a country falls under a dictatorship - as Greece and Turkey have at 
times - it remains a full member, with full privileges of vetoing NATO 
decisions and throwing monkey wrenches into the works.
Each new member means a new veto, making it harder for NATO to reach 
decisions. This turns the plan to expand NATO into a plan to ruin NATO. 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen may go on giving emphatic assurances 
that the new members will strengthen NATO because they have been 
carefully selected, but in practice they cannot help but weaken NATO.

Not their fault

This is not the fault of the Eastern Europeans. It was not their choice. 
They wanted to join a strong NATO and get integrated deeply into the 
West. Some of them actually proposed that NATO start using a voting 
procedure so there would be no problem. But NATO rebuffed them, and, as 
supplicants to enter the club, they were in no position to argue back.
Now, instead of adjusting its own procedures, NATO is projecting the 
entire burden of adjustment on the Eastern Europeans. It is asking them 
to prove themselves so reliable that they can safely be given a veto and 
let in the one-way door. The result is to set unrealistically high 
standards of reliability and then fudge the standards nervously.
This is why we see such a rigid method of expansion. It is divisive and 
demoralizing. The Eastern Europeans are kept on hold for years and put 
through a sort of "beauty contest." Existing members fight over whom 
they want in and whom it's safe to let in. The stakes of the fight are 
raised a thousandfold by the veto power and the one-way door. It is 
feared that what is being decided today is being decided forever - that 
if a country is let in before it proves itself reliable enough, it could 
ruin the alliance. On the other hand, if it isn't let in now it might 
never get in. This sharpens all differences. Threats of vetoes fly in 
all directions. Arm twisting replaces deliberation.
A veto invites blackmail. None of the prospective members are reliable 
enough to be entrusted with that. They won't be for decades to come. 
Their problems run too deep, and so do their historical disputes with 
one another and with Russia. They would face irresistible domestic 
pressures to use their vetoes in NATO to settle scores. Greece and 
Turkey have already shown how to do this, causing tremendous damage to 
NATO. Even NATO budgets get vetoed. There are already too many vetoes in 
NATO. The alliance cannot afford more. The whole veto business needs to 
be moved away from, not extended.
Remember all the warnings about how it's bad to give Russia any kind of 
voice because that might be a bit like a veto? But now it is real vetoes 
that are going to be spread around with scarcely a moment's concern. And 
the vetoes are going to be given not to just one new member but to three 
of them. And even more in the next round. And not just for now, but 
forever, without any exit door.

Creating an exit

But there could be an exit door. There could be procedures for dealing 
with problem members and limiting the damage they can do. What is needed 
is to write such procedures into the protocols of accession that are 
about to be negotiated with each new member. The protocols might provide 
that:

* The NATO Council can demote the entering country to associate member 
status, or suspend it, if it lapses from alliance standards - and, 
conversely, to restore it to full membership.

* The entering country cannot veto decisions in the NATO Council, and 
cannot veto further new memberships. 

The rule for new members should be the democratic right of the vote, not 
the aristocratic privilege of the veto. Later, the old members might 
also be brought into line with democratic rules. Meanwhile, an anti-veto 
protocol is the only way to make it possible to bring in all aspiring 
new members and avoid destroying NATO at the same time.

********





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