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Johnson's Russia List


July 11, 1997   

This Date's Issues:   1032   1033  1034

Johnson's Russia List [list 2]
11 July 1997

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Pravda Rossii: Yevgeniy Grigoryev, "Chubays versus...Kulikov."
2. Moskovskiye Novosti: Sanobar Shermatova, "Talks: Oil and Karabakh. 
After Moscow, Washington Is Becoming Center of Caucasian Politics."
3. Sovetskaya Rossiya: Vasiliy Safronchuk, "Genuflection in Madrid...
Day of Russia's Shame."
4. NTV: Sergey Karaganov Airs Views of NATO Summit.]


Chubays Seen Maneuvering Against Kulikov 

Pravda Rossii
July 9, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Yevgeniy Grigoryev: "Chubays versus...Kulikov"

Russian and foreign observers have repeatedly predicted the inevitable
onset of political apathy in Russia. This would undoubtedly happen even
without such a figure as Chubays on the Russian political scene.
This is a man for whom rest is just a dream. His whole life has been
one of continuous struggle. It seems that this is Anatoliy Borisovich's
only possible means of existence. Perhaps not just of existence but of
survival. Hence he struggles with everyone who appears alongside him and
is just like the cuckoo, who cannot rest until he has pushed all the other
birds out of the nest one by one. Soskovets, Korzhakov, Barsukov, and
Grachev have already fallen from the nest.... But this is not enough for
the cuckoo -- he wants the top perch and the tastiest morsels for himself
alone. So he struggles, pushes, fights, and hits out....
It would seem that Chubays has everything he needs to ensure that he
wins this struggle: He has connections, money, the president's special
personal favor, and his own information center, which is what the analysis
group of Yeltsin's election headquarters has become. But no, he does not
have everything. He does not have an effective power structure whose
activity gives it extensive potential for penetrating all spheres of the
life of society and individual citizens and which is legally obliged to
institute legal proceedings if a violation is exposed (that is, to decide
whether to punish or to pardon), and even execute the sentence itself.
Such powers are given to a structure under the law which not only
imposes obligations but also makes demands. The aforementioned system
molds mainly people with a state mentality who are disciplined, purposeful,
and implacable toward violators of the law, regardless of their position in
society. The leaders of such services, possessing the qualities of a
mature politician in addition to professional skills, can have a great
future. Examples of this kind are rare but they do exist (take Yu.
Andropov). People in this mold are capable of causing considerable trouble
to unscrupulous political wheeler-dealers who have broken through into the
upper echelons of power.
The role of power minister-cum-counterweight has now fallen to A.
Kulikov, the vice premier and minister of internal affairs. There is an
element of chance in this, of course: In the heat of battle with his
previous opponents, Chubays overlooked Kulikov and failed to anticipate
that, in the absence of Korzhakov and Barsukov, Yeltsin would put forward
another figure (who came as a nasty shock) who would perform these
functions. In principle, as they say, any half-wit can see that Kulikov is
a contender for this vacancy, although Chubays' notorious analytical center
simply failed to consider this possibility. But precisely when did Chubays
and his highly-paid experts finally realize that they were opposed not
simply by a minister but by a fairly major politician who had managed to
become established at the rank of vice premier and despite the failure in
Chechnya had won the special trust of the president and the prime minister.
Chubays and his entourage still do not understand how the "chief of
police" has managed so quickly to learn their lessons of political
struggle. Having provided himself with a good staff of analysts and
reformed the public relations center, Kulikov is not only defending himself
skillfully but is also switching to the offensive and delivering preemptive
When he finally realized the danger, Chubays, with the help of B.
Berezovskiy, the "ideas man," pedantically set to work eliminating his
rival. He did so in the manner of a talented bureaucrat, demanding that
his staff begin by elaborating a set of basic measures "to improve the
political situation in the country." The plan was drawn up and its main
points are as follows. Point one. To instill in the public consciousness
the idea that it is primarily because of the unprofessional leadership of
the law enforcement agencies in the country that crime is rising, the cases
of major political killings (Men, Kholodov, and Listyev) have been put on
hold, and state property is being pilfered and privatized by criminal
Point two. To demonstrate that Kulikov is the only brake on and
opponent of the settlement of relations with Chechnya (it would be a
special triumph if the Chechens could be persuaded of this).
Point three. To try to remove Kulikov from the post of vice premier
on the pretext that this excessively politicized, dull- witted man in
uniform's ill-considered actions could seriously destabilize the situation
in the country (the comments on Chechnya, the campaign against foreign
investors, the criminal case involving the Spetsmontazhbank, and the leak
of video materials about the justice minister).
Point four. To reorganize the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] so
as to significantly limit Kulikov's powers as head of the ministry by
taking from him, among other things, the Investigations Committee and
transferring it to the Justice Ministry.
Point five. To deprive the MVD of its independence by empowering
special Federal Security Service subunits in the center and at local level
to conduct counterintelligence activity in internal affairs organs,
including security police operations (as happened under Andropov).
And finally, after the implementation of the above plan and the
appropriate shaping of public opinion, the task is to secure Kulikov's
removal from the post of MVD head (possibly leaving him as vice premier but
without MVD support) and replace him with his own manageable man, someone
like Ye. Savostyanov. If Kulikov retains the post of vice premier the aim
would be to limit his powers to "honorary," representative functions.
According to current information, this plan is already at the
implementation stage, as shown by the many articles in the press and items
on the electronic media controlled by a clutch of home-grown bankers. 
However, Kulikov's skillfully mounted defense is counteracting all the
efforts of his opponents.
The failure of Chubays' "Operation Barbarossa" means that even the
usually composed Anatoliy Borisovich's nerve is giving out. There is
evidence of outright clashes between him and Kulikov. In early June, for
example, Chubays learned that Kulikov had bypassed him and reported to
Chernomyrdin about abuses discovered in the activity of the State Committee
for the Management of State Property and of [Committee Chairman] A. Kokh
personally and tried to give the MVD leader a "dressing down," but met with
fierce resistance from him. According to certain information, the
discussion became heated. Chubays threatened Kulikov, saying that he has
information about infractions committed by the minister himself and if
necessary it would be no great problem to arrest him through the Justice
Ministry. Kulikov replied that he will find countermeasures and that if
push comes to shove he will summon the OMON [Special Purpose Police
Detachment] to his aid.
The scheme involving the transfer of the MVD's investigative functions
to the Justice Ministry did not work either, because the video recording of
Justice Minister Kovalev's bathhouse frolics was revealed in the nick of
The draft Russian Federation presidential edict "On
Counterintelligence Support (by the FSB) for the MVD's Central and Local
Organs" has now been prepared. The only factor preventing B. Yeltsin from
signing this edict could be that "peace and harmony" in the government
upset the president's system of checks and balances, which is for him the
basis for the preservation of his dominant position. However, given
Chubays' talent for putting ideas into practice and the existence of his
many allies, including people close to the Yeltsin family, it may be
regarded as highly likely that when the right moment eventually comes they
will try to persuade Yeltsin that the dim-witted veteran could cause
problems if he is not promptly put in his place.
Instead of bread the new community of people -- the Russian people --
could be offered yet another concept in the government structures.


New Emphasis' Seen in U.S. Caucasus Policy 

Moskovskiye Novosti, No. 27
July 6-13, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Report by Sanobar Shermatova under the "Abroad" rubric: "Talks: Oil
and Karabakh. After Moscow, Washington Is Becoming Center of Caucasian

Heydar Aliyev is winning one position after the other from
Russia--this is the result of the Azerbaijani president's official visit to
Moscow. The "cold war" of sorts between the two countries has come to an
end; agreements on the fundamental problems of bilateral relations have
been signed. On Moscow's part, it is undoubtedly a surrender of positions
which it has held for the past four years. The conflict of Azerbaijani and
Russian interests concerned two problems: a settlement in Karabakh and
Caspian oil. For a long time Moscow has obstructed the solution of the
Karabakh question which is vitally important for Azerbaijan. In revenge for
the occupation of 20 percent of its territory, Azerbaijan blocked Armenian
transport communications. Russia did the same to Azerbaijan in connection
with the military operations in Chechnya.
Baku reacted appropriately, giving Russia to understand that it may
end up an outsider in the division of big flows of Caspian oil. But not one
project for the development and transportation of oil could be implemented
with a 100-percent guarantee of safety, without agreement from the Kremlin.
Thus Moscow and Baku put each other in a stalemate situation, from which
an exit had to be sought, all the same.
And in the end it was found, as proved by the joint declaration of the
presidents of Russia, the United States, and France in Denver.
The topic of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict was included in the
summit agenda on the initiative of American diplomats. It is noteworthy
that the settlement of the Karabakh conflict was discussed on such a high
level for the first time, and this confirms the interest of the political
leadership, at least that of the United States and France, in this problem.
New initiatives by the OSCE Minsk group are extremely reminiscent of the
Dayton plan for settlement in the Balkans. First [comes] the withdrawal of
Armenian armed units, not only from occupied territory outside Nagorno-
Karabakh, but also from the town of Shusha, not far from Stepanakert, then
bringing US, Russian, and other European states' peacekeeping forces into
these regions. The "blue helmets" will monitor the return of refugees and
their safety in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin corridor which links
Yerevan and Stepanakert. Then Azerbaijan and Karabakh will work out the
area's status. The unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic will have its
own authorities, but it will not gain independence from Baku. Clearly
Moscow's change in position regarding Karabakh was included in the price
which Russia paid to join the G-7. Naturally, not without benefit for
itself: An agreement was signed in Moscow on the participation of the
Russian companies Lukoil and Rosneft in oil developments in the Kyapaz oil
field. Heydar Aliyev's visit also brought certainty with respect to the
route of primary [pervichnaya] oil, which was a result of diplomatic
maneuvers by Moscow, Baku, and Groznyy. Chechnya was striving for a
three-way political agreement on the transportation of oil through its
territory. On the eve of Aliyev's visit to Moscow this problem became a
subject of discussion between first vice premiers Chubays and Udugov in
Moscow. Groznyy agreed to sign a treaty with Moscow on banking and customs
systems, only on condition that a three-way oil treaty [is signed]. Then
Chubays made a fine move, declaring: Moscow agrees but the agreement of
Baku is essential too. Azerbaijan would never include Chechnya as an equal
partner, afraid to create a precedent. To all appearances, it was from
Moscow that Baku was notified of Maskhadov's wish to go there. We can
conjecture what President Aliyev and his guest from Groznyy talked about
behind closed doors. Aliyev, it seems, succeeded in convincing Maskhadov of
the unfeasibility of Chechnya's wishes. As a result Yeltsin and Aliyev
agreed that a three-way commercial contract on the transportation of
primary oil with no political force whatever will be signed. In the upshot
the Russian and Azerbaijani sides got what they wanted, while Groznyy was
left unsatisfied.
But the resolution of the main problems still lies ahead. By which
routes will the main oil come from the Caspian? Baku postponed this
question until October 1998 and we can see why: The way the Karabakh
problem is solved will determine the route of the strategic oil pipeline. 
It is interesting that the report of the Clinton administration's readiness
to send American peacekeepers to the Transcaucasus with the aim of putting
an end to the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan came a few days before
Baku's announcement of the laying of a strategic pipeline from the Caspian
through Georgia to the West. Settlement of the conflict in Karabakh and
the fate of the main oil pipeline are closely linked to each other, and a
serious political battle over them is being waged on the American continent
far from the Caspian.
Congressman Frank Pallone proposed two amendments to the foreign
policy law for 1998-1999. One of them concerns Nagorno-Karabakh and
recommends a "leading role for the United States" in the settlement of the
conflict. The second is on Caspian oil. It contains an appeal to
President Clinton to promote cooperation between the governments of
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, and also between private companies in the
development of oil resources in the Caspian, with the aim of constructing
an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan through Armenia to the Turkish
Mediterranean ports. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the
congressman's amendments on 12 June. Five days later the U.S. Embassy in
Baku circulated a State Department report from which it is clear that
official Washington did not support this amendment. In the absence of
peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan it is difficult to promote economic
cooperation between them -- this is the State Department's stand, which can
be interpreted as a kind of pressure on Armenia and a way of coercing it to
accept the new plan.
The suggested settlement scheme -- first withdrawal of troops then
talks on status -- does not suit either official Yerevan or Stepanakert. 
Official Baku is keeping silent, but the opposition expressed its
indignation, declaring that signing such an agreement will officially
consolidate the loss of Azerbaijani territories. Prime Minister Robert
Kocharyan, former leader of Karabakh, declared that his hopes are pinned
not on the OSCE and Russia but on the Armenian diaspora in the United
States, which actively lobbies for Armenian interests. The acceptance of
Pallone's amendment by the Senate committee provoked a favorable reaction
from the diaspora. Ross Vartyan [as transliterated], executive director of
the Armenian Assembly in America, called it a defeat for all the oil
conglomerates which are interested only in satisfying Azerbaijan's
political demands. The reference was not only to Pallone's amendment but
also to proposals by another congressman, republican Chris Smith. His
amendment proposes that not later than 60 days after it enters into force
the president prepare and present to the Congress a report on the facts of
the economic (or commercial) blockade by a certain state of the former
USSR. Commenting on his own amendment, Smith referred to the blockade of
Armenia by Azerbaijan. The amendment was passed by the committee. The
Azerbaijani side considers all these steps by American political figures a
result of the successful work of the Armenian lobby. Clearly that is why
steps are now being taken for the formation of a united Azerbaijani
lobbying organization. As the Turan agency reports, at the end of June,
the first international congress of Azerbaijanis living in the United
States and Europe took place in Los Angeles--the first forum of its kind. 
The congress set up a governing body. "We would like to organize our
community in such a way as to strengthen our economic influence in this
country for the good of Azerbaijan" -- said Gasan Agnani, one of the
initiators in convening the congress.
Participants in the forum agreed on the need to form an active
Azerbaijani lobby in the United States capable of influencing American
politics. Thus Washington is gradually turning into the focus of Caucasian
politics. Scarcely had Senator Pallone's "pro- Armenian" amendments
appeared when the Azerbaijani-American nongovernmental council called a
congress to repeal the 907 amendment to the Act in Support of Freedom. 
Having appeared in 1992, it forbids the rendering of government aid to
Azerbaijan in connection with the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. And
indeed, a short time later the Senate subcommittee on foreign aid adopted
an amendment relaxing the ban with regard to Azerbaijan. From now on US
financial institutions are allowed to provide credits and loans to oil
companies operating in Azerbaijan. This decision was taken without
discussion and may be regarded as a manifestation of serious changes in
Washington's policy with regard to Baku. The subcommittee's decision,
dubbed the Byrd-Leahy amendment, is part of the amendments to the "energy
section" of the law on foreign financial aid for 1998. The passing of this
law will allow the biggest financial banks to provide credits and loans to
American companies working in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile the level of aid to
Armenia will stay at the former level, while aid to other independent
states of the CIS will grow in the coming year.
All this is evidence of a new emphasis in American policy in the
Transcaucasus. And another important element: Washington, which all these
years has distanced itself from former KGB General Heydar Aliyev, has
reconsidered its position. In August the Azerbaijani president's first
official visit to the United States will take place.


NATO Summit Seen as 'Shame' for Russia 

Sovetskaya Rossiya
July 8, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Vasiliy Safronchuk under the "Genuflection in Madrid..."
rubric: "Day of Russia's Shame"

The day of 8 July 1997 will forever go down in history as the day of
Russia's national shame. At the summit meeting of the North Atlantic
military-political alliance in Madrid today, despite Russia's objections,
the decision is being adopted to invite three new members, which once
belonged to the Warsaw Pact Organization, to join the bloc -- Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. When these countries are admitted to
NATO, the number of the bloc's members will increase from 15 to 18. Some
Russians among the "market-democrats" perceive nothing special in this. 
They say that NATO has expanded before: Greece and Turkey were admitted to
NATO in 1952, the FRG in 1955, and Spain in 1982. Certain "political
experts," like Borovoy or Novodvorskaya, generally consider it a good thing
that NATO is approaching Russia's borders. They have an animal fear of the
possibility of a revival of socialism in Russia and hope that the alliance
will not let this happen and will come to the defense of the "new Russians"
and the property plundered by them. Finally, the Kremlin makes out that it
was and still is opposed to NATO's eastward expansion and that it concluded
the "Founding Act" with the bloc for the sake of "minimizing" the damage
from such expansion. The People's Patriotic Union alone came out and still
comes out consistently and firmly at all stages against NATO's eastward
expansion, toward Russia's borders, and believes that this is not a fatally
inevitable step and that it can still be averted.
The Kremlin's attempts to pose as a principled opponent of NATO
expansion are thoroughly hypocritical and run counter to the facts. It is
sufficient to recall quite recent history. For it was none other than
Russian President B. Yeltsin who gave the "green light" to the admission to
NATO of new members from among the former Warsaw Pact countries. Paying
his first official visit to Poland in August 1993, he agreed in public that
Poland's joining NATO did not run counter to the interests of other
countries, including Russia. Moreover, the joint communique on the results
of the visit, which was read out 25 August 1993 at a joint news conference
by Yeltsin and Lech Walesa, who was then president of Poland, confirmed
Poland's intention of joining NATO and reflected Russia's "understanding"
of that stance of Warsaw's. Commenting on this point in the communique,
Andrzej Drzycimski (almost Yastrzhembskiy!), Walesa's spokesman for
relations with the press, said that it was "the most significant result of
the Russian president's visit to Poland." He emphasized that Russia's
stand on the question of Polish-NATO relations "must make the West lose its
reservations based on fears of offending Russia." "The West now has no
reason to say 'No' to Poland," Drzycimski declared. "Hitherto the West has
used the following argument: 'We do not want to upset the Russians.' Now
we will see the West's true intentions with regard to Poland" (The New York
Times 26 August 1993). The positions of the presidents of Poland and Russia
were also confirmed then, at the joint news conference, by their ministers
of foreign affairs -- Krzysztof Skubiszewski and Andrey Kozyrev. "If
Poland joins NATO," Skubiszewski said, "Europe's security will be
strengthened." He was echoed by Kozyrev: "Russia will have no objection if
NATO does not take an aggressive stand in respect of Russia. This is a
matter for Poland and NATO." Kozyrev's only reservation was that Poland's
joining NATO "will enrage the Russian nationalists" (ibidem). Subsequently
the Kremlin and the "democratic" Russian mass media made repeated attempts
to dissociate themselves from those statements by Yeltsin and Kozyrev and
to remove that shameful stain from them. But as the saying goes, the pen
is mightier than the sword. Those statements were picked up by the entire
world press and were unequivocally perceived everywhere as the Kremlin's
consent to Poland's membership of NATO. Some Western analysts believe that,
if Yeltsin and Kozyrev had taken a firmer stand in Warsaw then, the
question of NATO expansion could have been altogether excluded from the
bloc's agenda.
The subsequent events, the gradual surrender of positions by Russia,
and the West's drawing of Central and Eastern European countries into the
North Atlantic alliance are well known. Sovetskaya Rossiya has repeatedly
written about them. To be fair, it must be pointed out that, when Yevgeniy
Primakov became minister of foreign affairs at the beginning of 1996,
Russian diplomacy made vigorous efforts to halt NATO's eastward advance. 
Kozyrev is known to have been obsessed with America. Primakov, on the
contrary, visited Slovakia and Poland and received his counterparts from
the Czech Republic and Hungary in the mansion on Aleksey Tolstoy Street in
Moscow during the first 100 days of his leadership of Russia's foreign
policy. Everyone remembers his repeated meetings (rounds) with NATO
Secretary General Javier Solana, U.S. Secretaries of State
Christopher and M. Albright, and the foreign ministers of France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Scandinavian countries, and other NATO member
countries. All these meetings and talks were dominated by the topic of
NATO, serious objections were advanced to the bloc's expansion as a result
of drawing in Central and Eastern European countries, warnings were voiced
about the possible serious negative consequences, and so forth. But
Primakov failed to win back the past five years and to neutralize the
destructive consequences of the capitulatory Yeltsin-Kozyrev line. 
Describing Primakov's diplomacy, the London weekly The Economist wrote in
February of this year: "The main rule in his diplomacy seems to be as
follows: Protracted disputes are better than quick compromises. In other
words, it is better for weak Russia to insist on all its disagreements and
complaints until it becomes a strong country and is able to insist on
having its own way. To give no consent to NATO expansion and thereby
preserve the bone of contention with the West for years to come -- this is
Primakov's style." It is not for nothing that the Russian minister is so
keen on repeating the words that Chancellor Gorchakov spoke after Russia's
defeat in the Crimean War: "Russia is becoming concentrated." There is a
resigned opinion, intensively cultivated by Russia's "democratic" mass
media, that it is impossible to hinder NATO's advance toward Russia's
borders and that this is an irreversible process. But there is a lot of
evidence that this is a delusion. The facade of NATO's many communiques
and other statements on this issue carefully conceals acute contradictions
both among the bloc's members and within them over the problem of the
bloc's eastward expansion. Sovetskaya Rossiya has already written about
the far from unequivocal attitude of the U.S. public to this problem (17
June 1997). New reports about this have appeared in recent days. A
statement by 40 former high-ranking State Department staffers and U.S.
ambassadors, including Jack Matlock, former U.S. ambassador to Russia, on
the possible negative consequences of NATO expansion, was published in the
United States 2 July. The eminent U.S. diplomats believe that this step
will lead once again to a split in Europe and could start a process whose
consequences are hard to predict. In their opinion, this action will
divert the bloc's attention from the chief task of ensuring Europe's
security. The statement's authors point out that Russia is too big to be
ignored or destroyed. They point to the fact that the admission of new
members to NATO will require of them new additional expenditure on military
needs. Meanwhile, it would be better to use these funds for economic
development with a view to ensuring these countries' greater political
stability. On 3 July the U.S. newspaper The Los Angeles Times also cast
doubt on the correctness of the White House decision to support the idea of
NATO expansion. This decision, in its opinion, can be a gift only to the
U.S. military-industrial complex, which is burning with the desire to join
in rearming the bloc's new members, but certainly not to the entire U.S.
economy. The newspaper estimates that the additional expenditure connected
with NATO expansion could total more than $100 billion, and part of this
burden will be shouldered by the alliance's new members. Meanwhile,
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are already experiencing economic
difficulties, and the United States and other Western members of NATO will
most likely have to take on their share of the expenditure. Somewhat
earlier, in June, the same newspaper published a lengthy article by Kay
Bailey Hutchison, Republican senator from Texas, who cites a number of
convincing arguments against NATO expansion. She believes that, before
enlarging its ranks, the alliance must implement in-depth internal reforms
and, to this end, radically amend the 1949 treaty, particularly its main
Article 5. Otherwise, Hutchison writes, the United States will have to
assume additional pledges associated with resolving potential conflicts
between the new NATO members. The number of such conflicts will increase
as the alliance admits new Central and Eastern European countries. In the
senator's opinion, this will weaken the United States and reduce the
effectiveness of NATO's "security umbrella" over Europe. She also believes
that the admission of new members to the bloc will entail additional new
military expenditure for them and will divert resources from the needs of
economic development. "Do the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland really
believe that the threat of invasion by Russia is more real than the threat
of economic instability? Do these countries' governments really not
believe that the strengthening of their economies must be a greater
priority than the military expenditure needed to meet NATO standards?"
Hutchison inquires.
Far from all U.S. military leaders are convinced that expanding the
bloc's membership will result in its enhanced effectiveness and combat
ability. In the opinion of some of them, this will make NATO's military
and political organs more cumbersome and less manageable. In this
connection they recall that Napoleon ascribed his military victories to the
fact that during the period from 1798 through 1814 he had to deal with four
badly managed coalitions of various European powers: While the members of
the coalitions and their commanders were arguing among themselves over
where to send their troops, the French armies were taking up positions and
attacking. Former Russian Ambassador Anatoliy Adamishin recently expressed
an approach similar to Napoleon's. In his sensational interview with a
London newspaper he said that the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic to NATO will not increase NATO's combat ability. He regards
NATO expansion as wrong for another reason -- it will lead to Russia's
humiliation, to its increased isolation in Europe, and to the creation
around it of a new version of a "cordon sanitaire." While agreeing with
Adamishin in this regard, we must still point out that, although the Poles,
Czechs, and Hungarians as such will do little to enhance NATO's combat
ability, the inclusion in the bloc's combined forces of the heavy arms that
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic possess will drastically alter the
correlation of forces between NATO and Russia. The Treaty on Limiting
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] set them a joint arms quota of
7,000 tanks, approximately 11,000 armored personnel carriers, and 4,500
artillery systems. The group of NATO member states in Central Europe --
the FRG, Belgium, and Holland -- has roughly the same quota. This requires
a radical review of the CFE Treaty. Meanwhile, Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic could be admitted to NATO during the next two years, while a
review of the CFE Treaty and ratification of the corresponding agreement
could take many years.
Contradictions among the bloc members themselves are also manifesting
themselves increasingly clearly. France is still refusing to reinstate its
membership of NATO's military organization, insisting that it be given the
post of commander of the alliance's southern grouping, while Washington is
stubbornly refusing to hand this post over to it. Contradictions with
regard to whom to admit to NATO membership and in accordance with what
procedure are also no less acute. The United States believes that in
Madrid it is necessary to confine themselves to admitting Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic, for Washington has decided that only these are best
prepared militarily, possess sufficient financial resources, and are
politically stable. France and Germany are insisting that Romania and
Slovenia, which are dependent on them in many respects, be admitted right
now, in addition to the aforesaid three countries. Denmark proposes to
admit the Baltic countries at the same time. Let us recall how acute are
the contradictions between Turkey and Greece, which have been on the verge
of war several times because of a territorial dispute over ownership of
certain islands in the Aegean. Finally, acute conflicts flare up
periodically within the framework of the EU, to which almost all the NATO
members belong, apart from the United States and Canada, over the
allocation of fishing quotas, agricultural subsidies, beef exports, and so
forth. Equally acute are the contradictions in this sphere between the
United States and Canada, on the one hand, and the EU countries on the
On setting out for Europe in connection with the NATO summit, Clinton
declared without false modesty in a radio interview 4 July that in Madrid
he intended to "erase the artificial dividing line drawn in Europe by
Stalin after World War II." Quite the contrary, Mr. President, you will
draw a new line which, to our great sorrow, will, as a result of the
Kremlin's capitulatory line, be several hundred kilometers closer to
Russia's border than the line drawn by Stalin. While the NATO bloc's
leaders are admitting new members, the president of Russia is resting in
his new "Shuyskaya Chupa" residence in Karelia, seemingly his sixth, which
previously was earmarked as a rest home for veterans. The Russian mass
media have reported that the residence has been made over by a Swiss firm
with the last word in domestic equipment and has everything that the former
fighter against privileges needs, including a sauna and a tennis court. 
The money has been found for this. No money is to be found in the budget
for the wages of miners, teachers, medical workers, defense industry
workers, and servicemen. To ensure that their families do not starve to
death, they have been forced literally to lie down on the rails....


Expert Airs Views on NATO Summit 

July 8, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
>From the "Hero of the Day" program

[Anchorman Pavel Lobkov] About 30 minutes ago, a historic event took
place. In Madrid a decision, a final decision was taken to expand NATO
eastward. Three new members are to join NATO: Hungary, the Czech
Republic, and Poland. Russia's main battle abroad in the last two years --
the battle against NATO -- seems to have ended in Russia's defeat. It is
now time to comment. We have in our studio today Sergey Karaganov, the
Deputy Director of the Institute for European Studies, member of the
Presidential Council, and an active fighter against NATO.
[Addressing Karaganov] Can we take it as Russia's defeat and should we
take today's events as the birthday of a new Europe?
[Karaganov] I do not think that this is the beginning of a new Europe.
On the contrary, I would say that we have given, in some way, a new lease
of life to the old Europe, the Europe of alliances. I do not think of
today's events solely in terms of Russia's defeat. We certainly did not
want NATO's expansion and we believe that NATO's expansion is taking Europe
back to the past. But it is not worth viewing it as Russia's defeat
either. We fought well and won a great deal. And we now have new
opportunities. The question is whether we are managing to use these new
opportunities. [passage omitted; hookup with correspondent Vadim Glusker
in Madrid, who talks about events there]
[Lobkov] Much has been said about the role of [Andrey] Kozyrev and
Yevgeniy Primakov in Russia's relations with NATO. It is said that because
Kozyrev was a Westernizer he surrendered his positions easily, whereas
Primakov stuck up for Russia's positions stringently and uncompromisingly. 
But in the final analysis, Primakov has signed the same kind of document
that Kozyrev would have signed. [passage omitted; repetitive]
[Karaganov] You know, Mr. Kozyrev is one of the main authors of NATO's
expansion. About three years ago, according to our evidence, he began
behind-the-scenes talks about compensations for NATO's expansion, having
created the impression in the West, deliberately or not, that Russia would
agree to it. He is responsible for launching this process. After that we
fought against NATO's expansion, because the Russian elite and a
considerable proportion of the Western elite were against it. After all,
Madrid is a victory for the minority. Most of the Western and Russian
elites did not want NATO's expansion. As for Primakov, if I were in his
shoes I would not have signed the treaty. Many colleagues agree with me. 
But he put up a superb fight and gained respect both in Russia and among
his Western colleagues. He has managed to squeeze out all he could.
[Lobkov] But if it had been up to Kozyrev he would have had just two
rounds of talks, whereas Primakov needed eight of them.
[Karaganov] If it had not been for Kozyrev, there would have been no
expansion of NATO. [passage omitted; discussion on Kozyrev's policy in
[Lobkov] Can Russia's participation in the G-8 meeting in Denver be
considered to be a form of moral compensation for Russia; that Russia did
not have to lose face after all, that we did not go off the rails, as it
were, and did not go to any extremes, such as right-wing patriotism?
[Karaganov] I do not think that we have any reason to go off the
rails, or even can go off the rails. Thank God, there are no such signs. 
Madrid and Denver are two directions in politics. Madrid marks adaptation
by old institutions to the current or even yesterday's agenda. NATO is
necessary, but since there is no security problem in Europe, NATO is not
very involved in dealing with important problems. Denver, on the other
hand, looks to the future. Denver gives us the opportunity to influence
problems which are essential for our future, that is, the economy,
finances, debts, environment, and telecommunications. In Denver we
received much more and can receive much more, considerably more than what
we could win or lose in Madrid.
[Lobkov] So, what was the point of fighting on both sides, if NATO is
not an essential institution, anyway? Surely, there must have been some
point to that fight?
[Karaganov] First, there is a very big problem in Europe. There are
too many security experts there and they have nothing to do. The main
reason for NATO's expansion is that these security experts in the West were
afraid of losing their jobs. [passage omitted; elaboration] NATO has
expanded but there is nothing tragic about it. The most tragic thing that
can happen and has happened is that for the last three years both Russia
and the West have been addressing a false agenda. We quarreled and argued
about problems of the past instead of thinking about the future and
preparing for it. The saddest thing that can happen now is that we might
once again begin to argue about NATO's expansion, about who, how, and why.
[passage omitted; repetitive]
[Lobkov] Do you know of any retaliatory steps in the offing?
[Karaganov] I do not know of any retaliatory measures being planned as
part of the formal diplomatic process. But many issues were discussed. 
Many possible solutions were discussed, and some of them even spilled over
into the press. You will recall the statements by all of our defense
ministers. [Lobkov] You will recall the trips by Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin and Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov to China in the last
week. Is this a deliberate move to show that we will find friends in the
East, as it were, if you in the West do not wish to be friends with us? We
will sell arms to the East and that will be our retaliation, as it were.
[Karaganov] God bless you, where is that person in the West who does
not want to be friends with us? All of them in the West are going out of
their way to be friends with us. But it is to our great advantage to be
friends with the East, especially with China since that would compel the
West to work more actively to be friends with us. That is a very
beneficial strategy. [passage omitted; repetitive] We must have good
friendly relations with practically all countries, but above all with
powerful and rich states. [passage omitted; all this is important] You
have to bear in mind that it is not America that is playing the China card
against us, Russia is playing the China card against America. At the same
time our relations with the United States remain very cordial. We are
playing this game, and it is being played more now than in the past. In
this case there can be no misgivings against Russian diplomacy. But forming
strategic alliances with poor countries which can give nothing to us
economically is a losing policy.
[Lobkov] So, Russia is fully rejecting the bloc-based policy. But
surely, this is a form of reaction, a kind of sensitivity, as if to say
that since they in the West are not rejecting the bloc-based policy in
accepting our former friends, then we will pretend that we do reject it in
favor of friendships based on mutual economic interests. But then Russia
would remain a nonaligned country. That is our move. Am I right?
[Karaganov] That is just one option. The problem is that we will
remain as we are, because no one is inviting us to join any blocs. But
foreign policy and foreign economic activity and social aspects must be
taken into account in their own right, and these remain directed toward the
West, the West which includes Japan and a growing China, since China will
sooner or later be part of the West, in a broad sense of this word, as a
future prosperous and rich country.
[Lobkov] Speaking about the former republics of the USSR, that is, of
the Baltic region and other republics, to what extent do you think their
joining NATO in the immediate future is possible? A Soviet person has long
thought of Hungary and the Czech Republic as abroad. But will the former
Soviet citizen be able to live with the idea of Lithuania being part of
[Karaganov] I do not know whether a former Soviet citizen will be able
to live with the idea. But I believe that after we gave up all of our
former clients and said yes after that anyway [as heard], it will be
difficult for us to resist NATO's further expansion. But resistance will
be growing inside NATO and inside NATO's main countries, because until now
nobody wanted to calculate the cost of benefits and losses. Now these
gains and losses will be much more important. But we will find it much
more difficult to put up resistance. [passage omitted; NATO spending on
infrastructure will rise]
[Lobkov] But what about Ukraine? Leonid Kuchma's arrival in Madrid,
while Yeltsin refused to go, can be taken as a certain sign, don't you
[Karaganov] Yes, it is a sign. It is a sign of where Ukraine wants to
go, and it is a sign of Ukraine's weakness. We can afford not to go to
Madrid. Alas, Leonid Kuchma cannot afford it, considering Ukraine's
weakness. I wish to express with affection my sympathy to our Ukrainian
[Lobkov] Do you think it was right for Yeltsin not to go to Madrid? 
Very many people advised him to go and to state our position, considering
that he was invited.
[Karaganov] I think the President took the right decision. His
arrival would have changed nothing, while politically it would have
provoked a wave of derision both at home and in the West. If one says no,
one has to say it with dignity.
[Lobkov] I want to ask you about your forecast for the immediate
future. Romania and Slovenia have been put down on the waiting list today
to join NATO. Do you think other countries of East Europe will want to
join, too? Will this process continue until NATO reaches all the Russian
[Karaganov] You know, I think, this is probable. I am very concerned
about this, not because I think that there is a threat to Russia's
security. I worry that we might have to waste a great deal of time on
pointless arguments and that the ageing knights of the Cold War will win
anyway, as they have nothing else to do in the new Europe. Their only wish
is to extend their political careers.
[Lobkov] Just like in our country. We also have people like that.
[Karaganov] Absolutely, we have even more of them. But they are not
as well paid and therefore they do not initiate problems like they do in
the West. Therefore, I think that we should try and put some restrictions
on these knights. [passage omitted; Lobkov signs off]


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