July 9, 1997   

This Date's Issues:   1027  • 1028

Johnson's Russia List
#1028
9 July 1997
djohnson@cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
1. David Filipov (Boston Globe): The scared, bought-and paid-for 
Western press.
2. Steve Blank (US Army): Gusev.
3. Lynn Turgeon (Hofstra: Soviet Imperialism.
4. St. Petersburg Times: Dmitry Zaks, Chubais Figures in Interest-Free 
Loan.
5. Washington Post: Lee Hamilton, Inside Russia, A Regional Takeoff.
6. Ogonyok: Leonid Radzikhovskiy, "A Wolf of War or a Fox of Politics?"
General Rokhlin has attracted attention to his own person only rather 
than to the army.
7. Reuter: Russia PM says army reforms hinges on economy drive.
8. Interfax: Committee To Create Russian Movement For Army Starts
Meeting.
9. New York Times editorial: NATO Plus Three.
10. RIA Novosti: RUSSIAN DELEGATE LASHES OUT AT NATO DECISION TO 
ADMIT NEW MEMBERS.
11. Reuter: Kuchma steps closer to West with Ukraine-NATO pact.
12. RIA Novosti: DUMA SPEAKER: THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO SETTLE 
WAGE ARREARS IN THE ARMY IS A POLITICAL ACTION.
13. RIA Novosti: RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT PLANS 1/5 TO 2 PER CENT ECONOMIC 
GROWTH IN 1998, SAYS BORIS NEMTSOV.
14. Reuter: Yeltsin's Fishing Goes Well, Says Wife.
15. St. Petersburg Times editorial: The Light Doesn't Shine That Bright 
for Many Russians.]

*********

#1
Date: Wed, 09 Jul 1997 14:09:14 +0400
From: David Filipov <dfilipov@glasnet.ru>
Subject: The scared, bought-and paid-for Western press

Dear David: 

That NTV report on how the Western press gives Russian business a bad name
is interesting for a variety of reasons.

Notice how, in Russia's upsidedown cake of a civil society, whenever you are
disatisfied with how things are going, you blame the press. Who can forget
the way certain leading Russian figures blamed "pro-Chechen reporting" for
the failure to win a military victory in Chechnya? And last week, Yevgeny
Nazdratenko went on NTV to blame the negative image of Primorye on a hate
campaign in the press supposedly ordered by his political opponents (read:
the hated Chubais). I'm sure it had nothing to do with the four-hours-a-day
energy rationing imposed in Vladivostok under the Nazz' enlightened rule,
just as I'm certain the negative vibes you see and hear in the Western press
about Russian business have nothing to do with all those bombings and
shootings. 

And so we have the return of the Vladimir Kruchkov-esque allegation that
Western journalists are being paid by unnamed Western business interests
(presumably not their publishers) to dig up the dirt. I remember during the
big Komi oil spill in late 1994, the head of the Komi oil company at the
time suggested that all the Western reporters who dragged their butts up to
that lovely tundra vacation spot to write about the spill were on the
payroll of the big Western oil companies. Still waiting for my check on that
one. 

Then there was the time on the outskirts of Shali when the Chechens accused
me and Lee Hockstader of being paid to write anti-Chechen things, and the
Russians accused us of being paid to write anti-Russian things, all on the
same day and within Kalashnikov range of each other. 

It's not so easy (although, believe me, I did) to laugh off the suggestion
made about Western reporters in Moscow by the usually respectable Stanislav
Menshikov. I'm sure Lee Hockstader would be interested to know that he sat
on his interview with Mr. Menshikov because of pressure from Chubais, rather
than editorial considerations. It may strike Mr. Menshikov as a news flash,
but not everyone in the world is as interested as JRL readers evidently are
in every single shred of evidence that Chubais is not the upstanding,
all-American guy we all thought he was in 1992. 

Being reprehensible seems to go with the territory: Neither Chubais, nor
Burbulis, nor Korzhakov, nor Soskovets are folks I would invite to my baby's
birthday party, to say nothing of asking them to build a civil society in
Russia. But to answer Mr. Menshikov's question with a question, if we are so
concerned with nailing a guy who took oodles of U.S.-taxpayer money and then
turned out to be far richer than he should be while repeatedly betraying the
ideals we thought we were entrusting him with, then why, pray tell, don't we
go after the man who hired all these people?

I would agree with Mr. Menshikov on one thing (as far as the press is
concerned; usually I agree with everything he writes): Most of the Russian
press IS showing its meek side on the Chubais thing, and THEIR readers do
have an interest and a right to know. As for my readers, I wrote about the
shameful meekness of the Russian press during the campaign to reelect
Chubais' boss. 

For better or for worse, and in all due respect to Mr. Menshikov and other
Chubais-haters out there, that is my opinion, and I came to it without the
slightest bit of pressure from my masters at the western oil companies or
their evil brethren behind the red-brick crenelations in Moscow.

I bet we could get Lee to corroborate this, if only we could reach him for
comment. Hockstader is currently basking in the southern Italian sun --
wonder who paid for that trip? 

David Filipov
Moscow Bureau
The Boston Globe

**********

#2
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 1997 10:43:00 -0400
From: blanks@carlisle-emh2.army.mil (Steve Blank)
Subject: gusev

In reply to D. Gusev, I also believe that Pipes is wrong in saying 
that the generals have a plan to resotre the empire and his analysis 
of military policy suggests to me that he misunderstands the nature of 
the military process and reform in Russia, but I do not retreat 
fromthe positon that the government still maintains reintegration as a 
priority, one need only look at the Sept. 1995 decree and continuing 
attempts to push it even if they are meeting increasingly successful 
resistance. Furthermore, the military interventions in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia were not undertaken in a fit of absent-mindedness, as 
was Chechnya (not a MOD instigated operation by the way). ONe does 
not have to go from the extreme of denying a strategy for miltiary 
reconquest to the assumption that thre is no strategic rationale or 
policymaking whatsoever going on and it defies imaginaiton to assume 
that even Yeltsin's government, with its high degree of tolerance for 
chaos, does not know that it is sending troops all over the map or for 
what purpose.

********

#3
Date: Wed, 09 Jul 1997 08:19:32 -0400 (EDT)
From: "LYNN TURGEON, PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF ECONOMICS, HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY"
<ECOELT@vaxc.hofstra.edu>
Subj: Soviet Imperialism

What was the economic basis for Soviet imperialism? In short, who
exploited whom? IMHO, it was the Russians who were exploited by the
countries in
their sphere of influence, as well as the underdeveloped countries generally. 
The ideological basis for this exploitation goes back to Lenin's ideas
on imperialism. Whereas capitalism produced uneven development, the
post-revolutionary noncapitalist system would tend to "even out development."
Prices oninternational exchanges would ten to now be highly favorable to the
less developedcountries, whether they be India, Slovakia, Cuba, or the
countries
of Eastern Europe.
The best documentation of thisreverse exploitation is the recent bookby
Randall Stone,"Satellites and Commissars. Strategy and Conflict in the
Politics
of Soviet-bloc Trade."(Princeton,1996) The pressure for the expansion of
Comecon trade came from the countries other than the Soviet Union since
petroleumexports from the Soviet Unionwere highly subsidized.
The same was true for economic relations with the Third World.
Beginning with Khrushchev, the Soviet Union committed itself to a major aid
program with Marxist dogma dictating interest rates in the neighborhood of one
percent. To remain competitive, the advanced capitalist world developed the
International Development Association (IDA) the poor country's branch of the
World Bank with low interest rates competitive with those of the Soviet Union.
Cuba was heavily subsidized by Soviet exports of petroleum for refining
in Duba andsales in world markets with much higher prices. The generosity of
the Russians made the ultimate breadkown of Comecon more difficult during the
post-Communist transition.
TheAswan Dam in Egypt was largely a gift from the Soviet Union as Egypt
learned how to switch sides in the Cold War. Thus, when the Russians
sanctioned
the break-up ofthe Soviet Union, they thought that the removal of previous
subsidies to Central Asia, the Baltic Republics and Moldavia would result
in an
improvement of their own standard of living.
One of the principal problems faced by U.S. propagandists was their
inability to convince the Third World that there was
somethingcalled"SovietImperialism." This was obvious during the period of the
New International Economic Order in the mid-seventies when Third World
countries tried to emulate the OPEC countries andimprove theirterms of trade
for 17 commodities by establishing an organization that would buy up and store
commodities that were in oversupply, and sell these same commodities when
prices were high. This same principle underlay the New Deal programs to assist
U.S.agriculture. The Sovietsfinally agreed to joinin such an operation but the
West refused to go along with NIEO. 
When looking for reasons for the ultimate defeat of Soviet socialism,
in addition to the effects of NSC-68, Soviet foreign economic relations
represents an important reason.Ionce wrote an article, "Is the Soviet Union
Really an Imperialist Power?" for "Contemporary Crises",April,1978,
pp.157-166.
Lynn Turgeon

********

#4
St. Petersburg Times 
JULY 7-13, 1997
Chubais Figures in Interest-Free Loan 
By Dmitry Zaks
STAFF WRITER

MOSCOW - A fund headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais 
last year received a five year, interest-free loan worth 14 billion 
rubles ($3 million) from Stolichny bank, the newspaper Izvestia reported 
Tuesday.

The loan was made during the four month period when Chubais was 
dismissed from the Cabinet and working as a private citizen. He and a 
group of bankers were organizing President Boris Yeltsin's re-election 
campaign at the time.

Izvestia said it had obtained a copy of a loan agreement of February 29, 
1996 between the "Civil Accord" fund, headed by Chubais, and Stolichny 
bank, one of Russia's top 10 banks. Stolichny is now called SBS-Agro.

Izvestia said that Stolichny had lent the money to "Civil Accord" to 
assist in the "development of a civil society."

But much of the money, Izvestia said, was in fact invested in GKOs, or 
short-term government treasury bills, which at the time yielded returns 
of up to 250 percent.

Several Russian newspapers reported this year that Chubais had opened an 
account with Montes Auri, a Moscow-based assets management fund, through 
which he made the GKO investments.

It remains unclear if Chubais is a beneficiary of the "Civil Accord" 
fund. Chubais' press spokesman could not be contacted Tuesday.

While in office, Chubais has been associated with government decisions 
of immense commercial significance to SBS-Agro.

In the shares-for-loans privatization auctions in December 1995, only 
two months before the "Civil Accord" fund received its loan, Stolichny 
was part of a consortium that won a controlling stake in Sibneft, one of 
Russia's top 10 oil companies. Chubais was in direct charge of the 
shares-for-loans sales.

In November 1996, after Chubais was given a new official role as 
presidential chief of staff, Stolichny was awarded a controlling stake 
in Agroprombank, a state-owned bank that ranks in Russia's top 10. 

***********

#5
Washington Post
9 July 1997
[for personal use only]
Inside Russia, A Regional Takeoff
By Lee H. Hamilton
The writer is the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations 
Committee. 

President Boris Yeltsin may be in the Kremlin, but significant political 
power is flowing from Moscow to the regions. Today, democratically 
elected regional leaders have growing power in Russia's politics, 
economics and even foreign policy. Russia's evolution toward a 
decentralized federal state has important and positive implications for 
U.S. policy, including a reduced likelihood that Russia will revert to a 
Soviet-style authoritarian state any time soon.

The political and economic levers of Moscow's power collapsed in 1991. 
No well-functioning system of central power has replaced the old regime. 
Regional governors and legislatures have taken up the slack. The Russian 
executive and legislative branches have frequently deadlocked on 
important issues, such as land reform, with the result that the regions 
have made their own decisions and gone their own way.

Most governors of Russia's regions now have been elected democratically. 
These elections have not only legitimated but empowered governors whose 
focus is on promoting the interests of their regions. The governors now 
automatically sit in the upper house of the Russian parliament, which 
gives them greater ability to defend regional interests.

Moscow and various regions have agreed to some 30 power-sharing 
treaties. These treaties define the respective power of the center and 
the regional governments and increase regional autonomy.

The Russian federation is still evolving, but the important point is 
that the constituent parts of Russia now matter. Resource-rich regions 
such as Tatarstan, for example, have signed advantageous treaties that 
give them a greater share and greater control over resources once ceded 
to Moscow. Crucial decisions on reform are made at the regional level. 
Reform has prospered in regions where the governors are progressive -- 
Samara, Novgorod, Nizhni Novgorod -- and had setbacks where governors 
are communist or corrupt. Regional leaders are increasingly active in 
foreign affairs. Governors in the Far East are engaged on a range of 
issues with Asian neighbors, and regional leaders help set policies that 
affect U.S. trade and investment.

Despite these changes, Moscow still sets the general approach toward 
reform and is still an important arbiter of political power and 
dispenser of resources. Moscow retains control of the security forces. 
The Russian Federation is not disintegrating. But the underlying shift 
in power to the regions is clear.

The diffusion of power in Russia has important implications for U.S. 
policy. The ability of Moscow to amass economic and military resourc\es 
for an expansionist foreign policy has significantly diminished. This 
diffusion of power helps check and balance central authority. Democracy 
in the regions, as well as in Russia's cities, tempers imperial 
tendencies among the Moscow elite. This trend significantly lessens the 
chance that Russia will any time soon pose a conventional military 
threat to U.S. interests.

In response to this trend, U.S. policy should focus more on Russia's 
governors, much as foreign countries deal with our state governors. We 
should make every effort to bring regional leaders to the United States 
to help build democratic and market-oriented regional governments. Even 
as the State Department is closing U.S. consulates around the world for 
budget reasons, there is a good argument that we need more consulates in 
a country that covers 11 time zones and where regional politics now make 
a difference.

The United States and other Western countries should target their 
assistance on regions and municipalities where local leaders are 
committed to reform. An important lesson from the past five years of 
U.S. assistance to Russia is that a committed and effective Russian 
partner makes all the difference in making political and economic reform 
happen. We should focus especially on training for regional officials in 
good governance and in creating the right business conditions to 
stimulate investment.

Devolution of power is a new reality in today's Russia. Kremlin politics 
still matter, but our policies can better promote reform and U.S. 
interests if we pay more attention to the "Federation" part of the 
Russian Federation.

**********

#6
Ogonyok No. 27, 14 - 20 Jul 97 pp 20-22 (signed to press
13.07.97)
Feature by: Leonid Radzikhovskiy "A Wolf of War or a Fox of
Politics?"

General Rokhlin has attracted attention to his own person only
rather than to the army.

Appeal on the Eve of Vacations[subhead]
A political appeal on the threshold of summer vacations is like a
prayer for the dead at a wedding celebration. Obviously, Rokhlin's
"lion roar" frightened nobody in the Kremlin jungles. The news was
chewed up for want of something better while suitcases were being
packed -- and people departed for resorts. Lieutenants and colonels,
those "courageous, organized and disciplined" people whom the
chairman of the Duma committee tried to confuse with his letter
remained absolutely indifferent. The officers, melting down in hot
weather, did not gathered together for officer meetings. They have
other concerns. One of them said that they are aware of everything
that Rokhlin wrote but do not want to play games. Indeed, who among
the officers in a far-away garrison behind the Baikal has ever read
Rokhlin's address, who among them heard his name at all... In our
time the old words are called back from oblivion, everyone wants to
see something very noble in them and find... nothing but dust. 
Indeed, these are lofty words: zemstvo, officers' club. Aiguillettes
and adjutants, sword belt and moustache, St. George and St. Vladimir
orders, "lieutenant Golitsyn-Cornet Obolenskiy". This nostalgia was
tended by Soviet film makers who relished tsarist and German military
uniforms. This romantic feelings are for the civilians. A real
officer knows to what extent his colleagues resemble "lieutenant
Golitsyn". He is also well-aware of what real tsarist lieutenants
were, as described by Kuprin rather than shown by Keosanyan and
Motyl... It is easy to call an officers' meeting -- indeed, they are
called and will be called. But not ordered from the Duma. This is
all nonsense. Should this be taken to mean that when deciding to wage
a battle General Rokhlin attacked windmills? Andrey Cherkizov,
political observer of the Echo of Moscow radio station already said
this. He produced the following aphorism: "Rokhlin is a general, a
Jew and a fool. Three mutually exclusive properties." I think that
Cherkizov was wrong at least in half of his pronouncement. Rokhlin,
indeed, is a general, a Jew by his father and no fool. There are no
inner contradictions in him; I see him as an integral personality and
a crafty man. He is typical for the military milieu.

Epistolary Style[subhead]
Rokhlin can be seen in his letter written in a very original style. 
"Your decisions were volitional improvisations of your fleeting
moods". "Next to you there have always been people whose honesty was
doubted and was confirmed (!) by removal from their posts". "These
people are dangling on the hook of the Western special services and
are facing a choice...". He speaks in the same style -- clumsily,
with powerful jerks, bending down his head and forcing his way
through a heap of words. He and his style match one another -- badly
cut and tightly sewn together. When he first appeared on TV screen
two years ago Rokhlin looked an embodiment of courage: tired, deadly
tired. He was like a soldier on the march, in heavy boots with mud
on them. It is hard to visualize him in a ceremonial uniform. His
look goes well with his background: a real soldier, he saw fighting,
was wounded in Afghanistan, took Groznyy, saved the lives of his
soldiers, declined the Order of the Hero of Russia for the Chechen
campaign...

What Happened Then?[subhead]
This TV screen hero turned out to be a real Russian general-97, a new
Russian general. Accusations that have never been confirmed nor
refuted. Arms trade and a strange story about a pistol from which
somebody had killed and which (the pistol) was somehow associated
with the general's son-in-law. And a very real and brutal political
manoeuvring -- against Grachev, for Rodionov, against Armenia, for
Azerbaijan. An obvious taste for public politics. And, finally,
this address. No, with Rokhlin this was not a "decision of volitional
improvisations of his fleeting moods". This was a calculated and
harsh criticism hurled at the Supreme Commander's face. The
accusations were equal to those invented by "Zavtra" -- against the
traitors, the liberals, the democrats... one feels like Zionists will
be in place here. This could have been written by Govorukhin,
Nevzorov, Ilyukhin (who already stated his complete agreement with
every word the general wrote). Yet, Rokhlin is no imitator of
Nevzorov. These words about the general's honor could be written
only by the person who is convinced he has the right (and it is
recognized by others).

The General Who Fights for Himself[subhead]
It would be wrong to say that Rokhlin is waging a political game with
a cold head -- he hits at thegenerals and officers' most sensitive
places thus earning prestige and trying to take the still vacant
place of the military's political leader. This is not that simple. 
He learned many of the things he is writing about with his "flesh,
blood and sweat." It would be even more wrong to take the letter for
a spontaneous outburst of the old soldier's soul. Rokhlin, a true
political actor. would like to produce this impression. A talented
actor he blends with his character and plays at the brink of truth. 
This is the right way to conduct a political game on a large scale:
the effect is calculated in advance while the performance does not
look like theatre, it gives an impression of an impulse. It would be
completely wrong to take the letter for a sincere attempt to solve
the army's problems. It even does not mention this. There is not a
hint at an alternative military policy -- just an emotional
enumeration of the well-known problems. And a covert call for
disobedience, for dual command in the army that caused indignation of
many people: "organize yourself, elect heads of the officers'
meetings and demand that your legal rights be observed." These
"Rokhlin's meetings" have been already likened to the events of 1917.
On 1 March, 1917, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies issued "Order No. 1" which put an end to the Russian Army. 
Point 1 of this historic document said: "Committees of elected
representatives of the lower ranks should be created in all units,
batallions, regiments, depots, batteries, squadrons and individual
services at all sorts of military departments and on men-of-war of
the Navy." The sad results of this dual power (the commander-the
committee) for the country and the army are known too well. Rokhlin
is well aware of them, too. But we should not exagerrate. The
general knows well that nobody will hold "an officer meeting" without
a command. So the army is in no threat of destruction and perish. 
Yet he knew that he could attract attention to his own person, not to
the army. When deciding to fight he never though who would replace
him if he perished. After all, the fight is being waged not for the
army, Motherland and other ideas, but for himself, his political
image and political capital. Rokhlin is fighting like any other
Russian politician. This is the most interesting element in the
intrigue he has started. He is playing on the field where all other
Russian politicians are playing today. This is a public, populist
and unscrupulous game. He plays it like a true general: in an
aggressive style, aggravating the conflict, ready to receive blows
and prepared to rebuff them (he has been doing this all the time
throughout his hard life). He keeps in memory the bloody mud of the
war -- he does not shun political mud.

New Russian General[subhead]
A Russian general-politician is a rare bird. In the last 200 years
they can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Indeed, the Orlov
brothers were not military or politicians, they were courtiers and
royal favorites. The Decembrists were mostly Russian nobles just
showing off. Those who could have developed into an adventurist
dictator (Pestel) had no time to manifest their abilities and died "a
thing in itself". A pause of nearly 100 years followed. Politics
attacked the generals in 1917 -- and they proved impotent. Kornilov,
known as a "lion heart with the head of an ass", Kolchak and even
Wrangel, the most skillful of them, were nothing more than mere chips
in the political storm. We should be just in our judgment -- it was
Lenin, the political genius of the 20th century, who stood opposed to
them. As for Russia's officers' corps, it served loyally the new,
Bolshevik powers and Trotskiy in the way they used to serve Nicholas
II or Kerenskiy. It is a fact that there were more former officers
in the Red Army than in the White Guard. The Soviet rule did not
encourage political talents in the military. The end of two, most
talented military leaders, Frunze and Zhukov, who had political will
as well, was sad, though different. Stalin ordered Frunze to be
murdered during appendectomy and replaced him with Voroshilov, "a
fool on horseback." Khrushchev could not forgive Zhukov for rescuing
his power, dismissed the popular marshal and made loyal Malinovskiy
minister [of defense]. The latter remained loyal to the Presidium of
the CC CPSU and helped dismiss Khrushchev. Malinovskiy showed no
political initiative. The revolution of 1991 - 93 made politicians
out of the defense ministers. We have seen how skillful they were. 
Yazov, who was arrested after GKChP [the events of August 1991] wrote
to Gorbachev: "Will you forgive me, the old fool." The best Soviet
Marshal Akhromeyev hanged himself (as was announced officially)
leaving a note saying that he had achieved nothing in anything. 
Grachev, while behaving as a bull doomed to slaughter, ordered
artillery attack on the White House. We have seen that the tradition:
"the army is outside politics" and "the army is an instrument in the
politicians' hands" is still valid. The army is as defenseless in
the face of democracy as it was in the face of the totalitarian
state. When the hard times came the people with arms accepted their
poverty more meekly than the people with pointers at schools or, even
less than the people wielding miner's picks. They are disciplined.
The army has no political leaders; the politicians in military
uniforms, from Rutskoy to Lebed, never paid much attention to the
army. They have left their greatcoats behind. They preferred to
play on the entire political field. Rokhlin is a fundamentally new
figure. The military who has turned into a public politician
concerned with military matters is a new phenomenon in Russia.

*********

#7
Russia PM says army reforms hinges on economy drive

MOSCOW, July 9 (Reuter) - Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said on
Wednesday that reforming Russia's cumbersome armed forces would require
stringent financial discipline but pledged government help for officers and
men laid off by the cuts. 

``We must learn to count every rouble, to track all the budgetary flows of
the Defence Ministry,'' Itar-Tass news agency quoted him as telling a
commission recently formed to monitor the long-delayed overhaul of Russia's
military. 

``It is impossible to carry out military reform without economies, without a
thorough and balanced accounting, without the introduction of financial order
into the army and navy.'' 

President Boris Yeltsin said last week that military reform was his
government's top priority and Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev unveiled plans
to cut their number to 1.2 million next year from their current level of
around 1.5 million. 

On Tuesday, in a bid to restore flagging military morale ahead of the
reorganisation, Yeltsin signed a decree saying wage arrears to the armed
forces should be paid in two months. The wage backlog is put at more than
five trillion roubles ($860 million). 

Chernomyrdin said on Wednesday that the restructuring of the armed forces
would take place in two stages, the first lasting until 2001 and the second
until 2006, and would draw on the lessons of other countries struggling with
military reform. 

Tass quoted him as saying that the state would compensate soldiers axed under
the reorganisation plans, partly through the privatisation of military
assets, but gave no further details. 

It said Chernomyrdin also stressed the need to counter critics of military
reform with an educational campaign to inform the public about the reasons
for the changes. 

Recently a top general, Lev Rokhlin, said the downscaling planned by
Yeltsin's team would be disastrous for Russia's armed forces and urged
officers to resist the cuts. 

On Wednesday former defence minister Igor Rodionov, sacked by Yeltsin earlier
this year for demanding more money to implement the reforms, seemed to echo
Rokhlin's call. 

``Already much is destroyed...but it is still possible to preserve
something,'' Rodionov told Ekho Moskvy radio, adding that only the officer
corps could do this. 

Rodionov and Rokhlin started forming a public movement on Wednesday to lobby
for the interests of the military. 

**********

#8
Committee To Create Russian Movement For Army Starts Meeting

MOSCOW, July 9 (Interfax) - The organizational committee of the All 
Russian Movement for Support of the Army, the Defense Industry and 
Military Sciences, which is being created by Gen. *Lev Rokhlin*, began 
its first meeting in Moscow Wednesday. 

Earlier, Rokhlin, chairman of the State Duma's Defense Committee, issued 
an address to President Boris Yeltsin to accuse him of the collapse of 
the armed forces and to urge military servicemen to consolidate and 
defend the interests of the army and their own. 

Besides Rokhlin, the current meeting involves former Russian Defense 
Minister Igor Rodionov, former USSR KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, 
former USSR First Deputy Defense Minister Vladislav Achalov, former head 
of the USSR KGB Intelligence Department Leonid Shebarshin, Chairman of 
the Union of Officers Stanislav Terekhov and others, an Interfax 
correspondent has reported. 

Sources in the Duma's Defense Committee told Interfax earlier that the 
meeting planned to adopt an address to the Russian government insisting 
on measures to help the armed forces. 

*********

#9
New York Times
July 9, 1997
[for personal use only]
Editorial
NATO Plus Three

The grand declarations, rippling flags and bright sunshine in Madrid 
yesterday could not obscure the serious differences within NATO over how 
far and fast it should grow. Those divisions may ultimately defeat the 
purpose of expansion, which President Clinton heralded as the creation 
of a Europe that for the first time is undivided, democratic and at 
peace. 

At American insistence, expansion will initially be limited to Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. That restricts membership to the most 
qualified countries and limits the cost of expansion, which may help 
make this dubious plan acceptable to the Senate. A two-thirds Senate 
majority is required to approve the plan. 

Most of NATO's 16 current members wished to add Romania and Slovenia as 
well. Weeks of negotiation were required to finesse the problem. In the 
end, a NATO communiqué made clear that additional members would be added 
in the future, and conspicuously noted that Romania and Slovenia were 
making progress toward admission. But no date for round two was set, and 
no explicit commitment was given to any country. 

While this compromise may be diplomatically elegant, it only delays a 
potentially enervating membership fight. France, having bowed to the 
American preference in Madrid, will no doubt insist on Romanian 
membership next time the question comes up, most likely in 1999. Romania 
may have historic ties with France, but only last year did it shed the 
deadening regime that came to power after the fall of Communism. 
Politically, economically and militarily it is in no shape to join NATO. 


If Romania is offered membership in the next round, how can NATO justify 
denying access to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania? They are at the moment 
at least as democratic as Romania and more vulnerable to any future 
Russian security threat, the unspoken reason for expanding NATO in the 
first place. Yet Washington remains wary about adding the Baltic 
countries because their admission is anathema to Russia. Altogether, 12 
countries want to join NATO, including Albania, Slovakia and Bulgaria, 
which to varying degrees are still suffering from Communist hangovers. 

At some point, the addition of new members will weaken the alliance by 
putting in question the security guarantees that remain NATO's core. 
Americans, for instance, admire the courage of Poles, Czechs and 
Hungarians, who survived decades of Soviet rule. It is less clear 
whether most Americans see the defense of those countries as vital to 
American security. The case for placing an American nuclear shield over 
Romania or Slovenia may be even harder to make. 

Wherever expansion stops, a new division in Europe will probably 
develop. Draw the line at Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and 
the rest of Eastern Europe will be left out. Push it farther south, and 
Bulgaria may still remain outside. Move it east, and it hits the Russian 
border. From any such division, economic and political isolation of 
those left outside is bound to grow. 

Absent the cold war with its hard military boundaries, Europe has slowly 
been moving toward the state of unity and peace that Bill Clinton seeks. 
Russia, the giant in the East, is today more democratic and less 
threatening than at any time in its history. Expanding NATO now may well 
complicate, if not undermine, the transformation of Europe. 

************

#10
RUSSIAN DELEGATE LASHES OUT AT NATO DECISION TO ADMIT NEW MEMBERS
MADRID, JULY 9 /FROM RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT JUAN
KABO/--Russia keeps reacting in the negative to NATO expansion,
qualifying the encouragement of this process and the invitation
of new members to the Alliance as an erroneous move which is
certain to create ever more problems. This statement was made by
Vice-Premier Valery Serov when speaking at the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) session. He believes collective
security can be most effectively upheld through the build-up of
confidence rather than armed force.
In the opinion of the Russian delegate, main threats come
today not so much from the military factor as from aggressive
nationalism, terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking.
Therefore, he said,the EAPC can achieve success only in close
cooperation and interaction with the OSCE and other
international structures.
Touching upon stability and security on the regional level,
Serov confirmed Russia's readiness to guarantee regional
security and to instill relations of good-neighbourliness and
cooperation here. He is confident that any action on
consolidating regional security calls for thorough arrangements
and practical action under the UN Security Council aegis or
under OSCE supervision with the observance of a certain balance
between regional approaches and the interests of all-European
security and cooperation. The time is rip, said Valery Serov, to
proceed to working out a European Security Charter answering the
interests of both big and small nations.

************

#11
Kuchma steps closer to West with Ukraine-NATO pact
By Elaine Monaghan 
KIEV, July 9 (Reuter) - Ukraine's conclusion of a
security pact with NATO on Wednesday cut another strand in its umbilical cord
to Russia, infuriating conservatives in the former Soviet republic. 

Analysts said the pact, signed a day after NATO invited three former Soviet
Bloc members to join the alliance, would help plant Ukraine's flag on the map
of Europe. But it was unlikely to help an economy limping well behind its
vast northern neighbour in the push for market reform. 

Scores of mostly elderly people gathered outside Kuchma's residence shouting:
"NATO is a hangman's noose!" and "Tanks will roll!" 

Communist party head Petro Symonenko repeated his group's opposition to NATO
enlargement, saying: "Ukraine's leadership is carrying out a gradual,
"creeping" entry to NATO. This movement is in the opposite direction from
brotherly Russia and Belarus." 

The constitution passed last year says Ukraine is neutral and communists,
agrarians and socialists who make up a third of parliament oppose President
Leonid Kuchma's moves towards NATO. 

His opponents want Ukraine to form strategic unions with neighbouring Russia
and Belarus, the other two Slav ex-Soviet countries, rather than with old
enemies from the Cold War. 

But Kuchma, who signed the "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO
and Ukraine" earlier on Wednesday in Madrid, has hailed the pact as further
proof of the country's strategic aim of moving closer to Europe. 

In return for a promise of consultations with the Western defence alliance if
Kiev feels threatened, Ukraine pledged to continue reforms of its
impoverished army and to respect borders and the sovereignty of other states.


In the three years of his presidency, Kuchma has been on a political march to
the West, helping put Ukraine third in line for U.S. cash after Israel and
Egypt and declaring the country's post-Soviet strategic goal as being entry
to the European Union. 

Analysts say the charter will do little to ease the pain of Ukraine's biggest
headache -- economic hardship -- but will at least allow the country to focus
more on domestic issues. 

"The NATO charter helps position Ukraine in the European security framework.
This charter puts a missing piece into the puzzle," one Western diplomat
said. 

The pact could help psychologically but would do little to boost foreign
investment, kept low by complaints of corruption and changing legislation,
analysts said. 

While moving towards the West, Ukraine aims to keep relations with Russia,
its biggest trading partner and energy supplier, smooth. 

It took Kiev and Moscow until May this year since independence in 1991 to
officially make friends. Relations were soured by rows centring on Kiev's
pro-Russian peninsula of Crimea and the ex-Soviet Black Sea fleet based
there. 

The same month NATO signed a cooperation treaty with Russia, which unlike
Ukraine opposes the alliance admitting new members from former Soviet
countries. 

Perhaps recognising the improbability of following Hungary, the Czech
Republic and Poland into NATO quickly, Ukraine has stopped short of saying it
seeks membership of the Western alliance but has not ruled it out in the
future. 

**********

#12
DUMA SPEAKER: THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO SETTLE WAGE ARREARS IN THE 
ARMY IS A POLITICAL ACTION
MOSCOW, JULY 9 /FROM RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT YULIA
PANYUSHINA/--The intention of the Russian president and
government to pay off its debts to the army as soon as possible
is nothing than a political action. This is the opinion of Duma
Speaker Gennady Seleznyov, uttered at a briefing in the State
Duma. He fears the rush in settling the wage arrears in the army
will lead to the suspension of other payments as well as to the
freezing of many state programmes.
He also pointed to the fact that the government is rather
vague about sources of repayment.
As to the government's intention to sell shares of the
Unified Electric Power Systems (YeES) company, he said he does
not know yet a pattern after which the shares will be sold. He
specified however that the Duma has passed a law on the number
of shares allowed to be marketed to foreigners and if the
government violates it, the Duma will step in.
Seleznyov keeps insisting on money emission as the most
important source of budgetary injections. "In contrast to the
IMF, I consider tied emission, with a subsequent control over
the passage of every copeck to be quite possible in Russia,"
said Seleznyov. In his opinion, such an emission should be
directed above all to back serious investment projects conducive
to industrial recovery and early returns.

**********

#13
RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT PLANS 1/5 TO 2 PER CENT ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 1998, SAYS 
BORIS NEMTSOV
By RIA Novosti correspondent Alexander Ivashchenko
NIZHNY NOVGOROD, JULY 9 /RIA NOVOSTI/--The Russian
government is planning an economic growth of 1.5 to 2 per cent
in 1998, First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov said today.
He was talking to businessmen in Nizhny Novgorod. 
He emphasised that some growth had already been registered
in the motor industry, chemicals and petrochemicals. 
On relations between the legislative and executive branches
Nemtsov said that the State Duma, when examining a number of
government projects, "intentionally stalls them".
In his view, this is explained by the State Duma's "lack of
interest in positive economic change".

**********

#14
Yeltsin's Fishing Goes Well, Says Wife 
Reuter
July 8, 1997
MOSCOW -- Russian President Boris Yeltsin, on vacation for the first 
time at a lakeside residence in the northwestern region of Karelia, is 
having a successful fishing trip, his wife Naina said on Tuesday. 

"On the first day they caught next to nothing. Perhaps the fish were 
scared away," Naina said in televised remarks. 

"But yesterday I think they caught about 20. Some were very small but 
still very tasty. I think the water is very good here." 

Yeltsin and his wife arrived on Sunday at the Shuyskaya Chupa residence 
in a pine forest near the Karelian capital Petrozavodsk, 180 kilometers 
(110 miles) from the border with Finland. Itar-Tass news agency said the 
residence, labeled the "President Hotel" by local journalists, had 
angling facilities and an indoor tennis court. 

"There will be no problems for the president with fishing," a local 
fishing official told Tass on Sunday, adding that Karelia had 62,000 
lakes and 11,000 rivers. 

Yeltsin is a passionate fisherman and hunter and a doctor has said his 
shooting at his residence near Moscow complicated preparations for his 
heart surgery last year. The weapon's recoil affected his chest, the 
doctor said. 

A Karelian hunting official told Tass that hunting for most types of 
game was prohibited at this time of the year, but wild boar was a 
possibility. 

Tass quoted Naina as saying on Tuesday she was not allowing the 
66-year-old Kremlin leader to play tennis. 

Yeltsin was a keen tennis player before he was struck down with heart 
disease last year, but he has not returned to the game despite his 
apparent recovery from a multiple heart bypass last November. (Reuters) 

************

#15
St. Petersburg Times
JULY 7-13, 1997
Editorial
The Light Doesn't Shine That Bright for Many Russians 

LYUDMILA Rolshchikova, a 52-year-old cleaning woman from Moscow: Dead 
when a chunk of ice fell off of a building and onto her head. The family 
is suing city officials charged with maintaining buildings.

Manuk Jajoyan, an Armenian-born French citizen and journalist: Dead when 
a car ran him over at 1:30 a.m. Monday on Nevsky Prospect. The driver of 
the car says it was difficult to see Jajoyan because the city has turned 
off street lights during the White Nights. (See Charles Digges' story on 
page 3).

Alexei Lazarev, 14, Lyosha to his parents, friends and classmates: Dead 
when a chunk of cement broke free from a second-story balcony and fell 
onto his head as he walked past below. The Lazarev family is suing city 
authorities for not maintaining the crumbling building properly.

This list of accidental deaths is the sort that can go on and on - far 
more so in Russia than in Europe or America. As reported on the front 
page today, accidents are the second leading cause of death in Russia. 
In 1995, government statistics show, a Russian was nearly five times 
more likely to die in an accident than an American. More than a dozen 
St. Petersburgers were injured this winter by falling icicles, for 
example.

Russian men have a life expectancy of just 59 years. At current 
mortality rates (as reported in Tuesday's issue) a 16-year-old boy has a 
54 percent chance of making it to age 60; in the United States, it's 85 
percent.

According to statistics from the Moscow-based MedSocEconomInform public 
health research institute, 33,177 Russian men died in 1995 from alcohol 
poisoning. In the United States, with a male population nearly twice 
Russia's, there are about 350 deaths a year from alcohol poisoning.

There are steps that could be taken - and indeed, some are being taken - 
to make Russia safer. The decision to ban vodka sales from kiosks may 
help curtail the sale of cruddy homemade moonshine, which kills 
thousands.

St. Petersburg's City Hall could also reverse its decision to turn off 
street lighting during the White Nights - an absurd move that has made 
the city frightening at night and dangerous on the roads, and has also 
detracted from the city's beauty during the peak tourist season.

But that sort of tinkering is not going to help stem this horrible tide 
of deadly accidents. 

A deeper solution is a reform of the economy that would put money into 
every person's pockets, and not just fatten the political elite; and 
reform of the judiciary so that people would have to take responsibility 
for their negligence.

Perhaps such reforms would help Russians change their thinking so as to 
cling more tightly to life - both for themselves and for every one of 
their neighbors - than they historically have. 

**********